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The picture of democracy we get from both Thomas Jefferson and Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau is one that is characterized by potentiality or possibility: the development of 
democracy and the cultivation of virtuous, republican citizens are processes of perpetual 
becoming, or perpetual improvement and progress towards an ideal form of freedom.  My 
primary objective is to demonstrate an affinity in principle between the moral, political, 
and educational thought of Thomas Jefferson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  While 
similarity is demonstrable, I do not claim that Jeffersonian republicanism and 
Rousseauian republicanism are merely ideological or theoretical carbon copies; each is, 
in fact, distinct in its own right and the two are, at times, seemingly disparate, if not 
incompatible.  Nevertheless, I suggest that the core of the Jeffersonian vision of 
republican government—perhaps best defined nearly four decades after Jefferson’s death 
by Abraham Lincoln as a government “of the people, by the people, and for the 
people”—sits comfortably alongside Rousseau’s theory.  In fact, we might say that 
Jefferson’s theory is something of an indirect adaptation of Rousseau’s overly 
romanticized vision of a pastoral sort of republicanism—a much more practical 
adaptation to the unique circumstances of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century 
America, no doubt, but an adaptation nonetheless. 
Jefferson and Rousseau each embrace a notion of transcendent moral and political 
right and each subscribes to a natural rights philosophy informed by that standard.  
However, scholars either reject the Rousseauian overtones in Jefferson’s thought or fail 
to appreciate fully those facets of his thought that substantiate the heretofore 
unrecognized affinity between Rousseauian and Jeffersonian idealism.  While there have 
been a few (misguided) attempts to show that Jefferson was, historically, quite the 
Rousseauist, that is not my aim; rather, I wish to show that Jefferson’s moral and political 
thought has more in common with Rousseau’s at the level of principle than many 
scholars (and perhaps Jefferson himself) seem ready to recognize.   
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 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
We of the United States are constitutionally and conscientiously democrats.  We 
consider society as one of the natural wants with which man has been created; that 
he has been endowed with faculties and qualities to effect its satisfaction by 
concurrence of others having the same want; that when, by the exercise of these 
faculties, he has procured a state of society, it is one of his acquisitions which he 
has a right to regulate and control, jointly indeed with all those who have 
concurred in the procurement, whom he cannot exclude from its use or direction 
more than they him.1 
 
Born a citizen of a free State, and a member of the sovereign, the right to vote in it 
is enough to impose on me the duty to learn about public affairs, regardless of 
how weak might be the influence of my voice on them.  Happy whenever I 
meditate about Governments, always to find in my inquiries new reasons for 
loving that of my country.2  
 
 
 
I. The Sage of Monticello and the Enfant Terrible of the Enlightenment: Strange 
Bedfellows?  
 
My primary objective is to demonstrate an affinity between the moral, political, and 
educational thought of Thomas Jefferson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  While similarity is 
demonstrable, I do not claim that Jeffersonian republicanism and Rousseauian 
republicanism are merely ideological or theoretical carbon copies; each is, in fact, distinct 
in its own right and the two are, at times, seemingly disparate, if not incompatible.  
Nevertheless, I suggest that the core of the Jeffersonian vision of republican 
government—perhaps best defined nearly four decades after Jefferson’s death by 
Abraham Lincoln as a government “of the people, by the people, and for the people”—
sits comfortably alongside Rousseau’s theory.  In fact, we might say that Jefferson’s 
                                                
1 Thomas Jefferson to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, 24 April 1816, in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., 
Thomas Jefferson: Writings (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1387.  Hereafter, Writings. 
 
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Social Contract, Preface, Book I, in The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald 
A. Cress (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1987).  Hereafter, SC. 
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theory is something of an indirect adaptation of Rousseau’s overly romanticized vision of 
a pastoral sort of republicanism—a much more practical adaptation to the unique 
circumstances of late eighteenth and early nineteenth century America, no doubt, but an 
adaptation nonetheless. 
While I try to relate Jefferson’s republican vision to Rousseau’s by way of careful 
textual analysis, I do not mean simply to point out parallel or ostensibly parallel passages 
in the texts.  Textual similarities do exist and I highlight them as needed.  However, my 
primary aim is to call attention to the ways in which Rousseau and Jefferson overlap at 
the level of principle, or the ways in which their respective moral and political theories 
converge.  It is my contention that an examination of either figure outside of their 
historical context is wholly inadequate.  Likewise, simply studying Rousseau’s Social 
Contract or Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, will ultimately afford the reader 
very little in the way of a systematic understanding of either man’s moral and political 
philosophy.  While Rousseau had the luxury of remaining aloof and virtually disengaged 
from public life, Jefferson did not.  Jefferson’s theory might not always agree with his 
practice, but this much is to be expected, especially from a man who was wrapped up in 
the politics of revolution for the better part of two decades and who would, in one way or 
another, be embroiled in political controversy for the rest of his life.  
Another of my goals—an ambitious goal, to be sure—is to offer a more precise 
account of Jefferson’s moral and political thought.  In particular, I mean to profile the 
coherence and unity of Jefferson’s thoughts on the relationship between natural rights, 
republicanism, and moral virtue.  I seek to glean from Jefferson’s political philosophy a 
better understanding of his thoughts on the quality of character that is necessary to the 
 3 
preservation of liberty and a democratic way of life.3  This entails an exploration of 
several facets of Jefferson’s thought: from his understanding of natural right and 
conventional right4 to the primacy of majority rule; his nuanced emphasis on the 
importance of civic virtue of a particular type and a separate, but no less significant 
emphasis on the importance of moral virtue; and the often overlooked (or at least 
underemphasized) notion of a rationalized or “republicanized” Christianity (something 
akin to Rousseau’s “civil religion”). 
Notwithstanding the fact that Jefferson mentions Rousseau explicitly only a few 
times, I believe there is ample evidence to demonstrate that Jefferson eventually came to 
embrace certain aspects of the Genevan’s moral and political thought.  Indeed, the 
transplantation of Rousseauian romanticism into Jefferson’s thought was most likely 
indirect: although Jefferson was acquainted with Rousseau’s works—and even esteemed 
the friendship and opinion of one of Rousseau’s greatest defenders, the Baroness de 
Staël-Holstein5—he never went to any great length to expound on or appropriate the 
                                                
3 On the question of whether Jefferson was in fact much of a political philosopher at all, see Eva Brann, 
“Was Jefferson a Philosopher?” in Law and Philosophy: The Practice of Theory: Essays in Honor of 
George Anastaplo, ed. John A. Murley (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1992), 654-670.  Brann 
characterizes Jefferson as the Enlightenment’s “deliberate dilettante” and insists that, despite the seemingly 
“shallow, obtusely idiosyncratic, [and] willfully unreflective” nature of his writings, there is nevertheless 
“implicit” coherence, “unity and wholeness” in his thought.  (669) See also Michael P. Zuckert, The 
Natural Rights Republic: Studies in the Foundation of the American Political Tradition (Notre Dame, IN: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1996).  On the Declaration of Independence as a document of political 
philosophy, see Harry V. Jaffa, “On the Education of the Guardians of Freedom,” Modern Age, Vol. 30 
(Spring, 1986): 137 and Zuckert, 13-40. 
 
4 The influence of Locke on Jefferson’s understanding of natural right (and rights) is not to be denied.  In 
fact, the Lockean persuasion in Jefferson’s revolutionary writings is unmistakable.  For an unsurpassed 
treatment of this topic, see Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic.  See also Zuckert, Natural Rights and the 
New Republicanism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).  For a rejoinder to critics who deny 
(or discount) the significance of Locke’s influence on Jefferson, see Zuckert, “Response,” in Thomas 
Jefferson and the Politics of Nature, ed. Thomas S. Engeman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 2000): 191-210. 
 
5 See Germaine de Staël’s Letters on the Works and Character of J.J. Rousseau (London: G.G.J. and J. 
Robinson, 1789) 
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philosopher for his own purposes.  Moreover, it is unclear exactly how much of 
Rousseau’s writings Jefferson actually knew well.  Still, a careful reading of Jefferson 
reveals more than a mere coincidental similarity to Rousseau’s views on morality and 
politics.6 
The Rousseauian variety of republicanism borrows heavily from multiple sources, 
the ancients and Montesquieu most notably (though Rousseau certainly makes no room 
for representative institutions in his ideal).7  Given John Adams’s penchant for the 
ancients (and for Montesquieu, Harrington, and other analysts of the virtues and vices of 
classical republicanism), it is no surprise to find in his writings what amounts to an 
outright rejection of genuinely democratic government, a rejection that is indeed quite 
un-Rousseauian to say the least.  On the other hand, Jefferson’s republicanism, it seems, 
lies somewhere between the pastoral and the pragmatic,8 somewhere between the 
Rousseauian Alpine idyll and Adams’s officious brand of federalism.  It is this golden 
mean that I seek to find in the Sage of Monticello.   
  
II. Linking Rousseau and Jefferson 
If much of Jefferson’s moral and political philosophy can be linked to Rousseau’s, why 
                                                
 
6 Paul Rahe makes a similar move by demonstrating a certain theoretical and practical indebtedness on the 
part of Jefferson to Machiavelli.  Jefferson rarely mentions the Florentine in his correspondence but Rahe 
successfully shows that certain elements of Jefferson’s republicanism can be indirectly derived from 
Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy.  Though at times Rahe seems to exaggerate the extent to which 
Jeffersonian political theory overlaps with Machiavellian political science, his inferences are nonetheless 
valid.  See Paul A. Rahe, “Thomas Jefferson’s Machiavellian Political Science,” The Review of Politics, 
Vol. 57 (Summer, 1995): 449-481. 
 
7 Indeed, Jefferson seems to have accepted representative government only begrudgingly.  See Benjamin R.  
Barber, “Education and Democracy: Sommuary and Comment,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of 
a Citizen, ed. James Gilreath (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999), 134-52. 
 
8 “Pragmatic” in the obsolete sense of the word but also, to a certain extent, in the modern sense. 
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does the Virginian never really discuss the Genevan in detail?  After all, Jefferson often 
made an effort to show his zeal for the works of Sidney and Locke, among others.  
Indeed, Jefferson makes reference to the authors of such “elementary books of public 
right”9 too frequently to keep count.  It would seem, then, that any supposed affinity with 
Rousseau would be better documented in Jefferson’s public papers and, especially, in the 
extant private correspondence.  Mentions of the Genevan in Jefferson’s writings are scant 
at best, although Jefferson likely had good political motivations for concealing (or at least 
subduing) his enthusiasm, especially after 1788.  For instance, the infamous letter to 
Philip Mazzei of 24 April 1796 caused considerable controversy for Jefferson.10  
Following the letter’s unauthorized publication, Jefferson took more than a little flak: 
Federalist supporters and those itching for war with France were quick to mark Jefferson 
as a Jacobin sympathizer.  In fact, an anonymous engraving even went so far as to depict 
Jefferson as failing to protect the Constitution: “The Providential Detection” depicted 
him as an “agent of evil” serving up certain authors on the “Altar of Gallic Despotism”!  
Beneath the “altar” were the names of supposedly radical “revolutionaries” associated 
                                                
9 TJ to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, Writings, 1500-02.   
 
10 In his letter to Philip Mazzei of 24 April 1796, Jefferson offers harsh criticism of the administrations of 
both George Washington and John Adams (and of the Federalists in general).  “In place of that noble love 
of liberty and republican government which carried us triumphantly thro' the war,” he writes, “an Anglican, 
monarchical and aristocratical party has sprung up…Against us are the Executive, the Judiciary, two out of 
three branches of the legislature, all the officers of the government, all who want to be officers, all timid 
men who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty.”  In Papers of Thomas Jefferson, 
Vol. 29, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958), 82.  Hereafter, PTJ.  The 
letter, in which Jefferson likened the Federalists to tyrannical monarchs, was subsequently circulated by 
Mazzei in Italy and France without Jefferson’s permission.  On 25 January 1797, the letter was published in 
Paris in the Gazette Nationale ou Le Moniteur Universel and included critical commentary on the Adams 
administration’s foreign policy toward France.  Eventually, the letter reached Noah Webster and was 
published in the Minerva and the Gazette of the United States.  Following publication in the Minerva and 
the Gazette, numerous Federalist newspapers across the country followed suit.  See “Editorial Note,” PTJ 
29:73. 
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with the Jacobites: Voltaire, Paine, William Godwin, Volney, James Monroe, the Aurora, 
and Rousseau.11 
The controversy over the Mazzei letter might help to explain the lack of any 
detailed commentary on Rousseau and other figures associated with the French 
Revolution (rightfully or not) during this time period (and beyond).  Numerous anxieties 
abounded over the fragility of the young Republic and a divided sentiment prevailed over 
the propriety of an alliance with either Britain or France.  Given the political tumult in 
America during the 1790s, if Rousseau was (wrongly) associated with Robespierre and 
the French Revolution (intellectually), then Jefferson would most likely have wanted to 
avoid mentioning the Genevan, at least in any public document or anything likely to be 
made public.  After all, as Jefferson had been aware of as early as his sojourn to Paris, 
even private correspondence was liable to “miscarry.”12  
 Rousseau was indeed wrongly associated with the radical revolutionaries in France, 
at least intellectually.  It is well known that Robespierre championed Rousseau’s writings 
and that Rousseau eventually came to be known as the intellectual “father of the French 
Revolution.”  However misappropriated Rousseau was by the Jacobins, this much is true: 
Rousseau’s political writings, particularly those on natural equality and the primacy of 
majority rule (or, more broadly, the elusive concept of the “general will”) were indeed 
radical for the time.  Yet in no way did Rousseau intend for his writings to be employed 
in the service of a bloody revolution, however democratic it proclaimed to be.  To be 
sure, the Terror was certainly not a means Rousseau would have approved of, regardless 
                                                
11 “The Providential Detection” is reproduced in the Appendix and in PTJ 29:319.  
 
12 See Boyd, “Editorial Note,” PTJ 29:81. 
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of the legitimacy of the end in question.13   
 Jefferson was well acquainted with Rousseau’s writings; this much is certain.  But 
his relative lack of commentary on Rousseau is somewhat puzzling.  If so much of 
Jefferson’s moral and political thought can be found in Rousseau, why do we find a 
virtual dearth of support for this in Jefferson’s correspondence?  There are several 
possible explanations worth considering. 
 First, Jefferson’s apparent lack of detailed commentary on Rousseau means 
nothing.  Although Jefferson’s correspondents broach the topic on occasion, he rarely 
offers up any explicit (much less substantive) remarks.  Jefferson did not always respond 
to every question his correspondents asked.  Nor did he always remark on their comments 
or criticisms.  Thus, the absence of a statement or remark is not necessarily indicative of 
either agreement or disagreement (or indifference for that matter).14   
 Madame de Staël devoted considerable effort to defending Rousseau’s writings, 
particularly in her 1788 panegyric Lettres sur les Ouvrages et le Caractère de J.-J. 
Rousseau.  Jefferson’s correspondence with Madame de Staël during his residence in 
Paris and upon his return to the United States suggests that he not only esteemed her as a 
friend, but that he also appreciated her acumen.15  Kevin Hayes notes that, “Jefferson’s 
                                                
13 Interestingly, John Adams seems to misunderstand Rousseau in his correspondence with Jefferson on 
several occasions.  See, for instance, John Adams to TJ, 13 July 1813, in The Adams-Jefferson Letters: The 
Complete Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and Abigail and John Adams, ed. Lester J. Capon 
(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 354-56.  Hereafter, AJL.  See also Adams to 
TJ, 16 July 1814, AJL:434-39.  On one occasion, Adams seems to be in complete agreement with 
Rousseau: see Adams to TJ, 15 November 1813, AJL:400. 
 
14 See Rahe, “Thomas Jefferson’s Machiavellian Political Science.” 
 
15 See Gilbert Chinard, “La Correspondance de Madame de Staël avec Jefferson,” Revue de Littérature 
Comparée, Vol. 2 (1922): 621-640. 
 
 8 
friendship with Madame de Staël encouraged his interest in the writings of Rousseau.”16  
Relying on George Leavitt’s Poplar Forest Catalogue, Hayes surmises that Jefferson 
“acquired Pierre Alexandre Peyrou’s edition of Rousseau’s Œuvres Completes as well as 
an edition of Rousseau’s correspondence, which together formed a thirty-eight volume 
collection.”17   
 Second, during the Enlightenment, many grand and controversial ideas were simply 
“in the air,” as Gilbert Chinard puts it.  Chinard shows that although Jefferson was not, 
strictly speaking, a disciple of the French Enlightenment, something of an intellectual 
lineage can be traced through the philosophes (at least, to a point).  However, Chinard is 
careful not to overemphasize the affinities between the Virginian and his intellectual 
brethren across the Atlantic (both in France and in Britain).  While the English and 
Scottish philosophers and jurists undoubtedly played a direct role in the formation of 
Jefferson’s intellect in the 1760s, the ideas of d’Holbach, Helvétius, Rousseau, and 
                                                
16 Kevin J. Hayes, The Road to Monticello: The Life and Mind of Thomas Jefferson (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 298. 
 
17 Ibid.  As Leavitt indicates, Jefferson’s Poplar Forest Library did contain a copy of Rousseau’s Œuvres 
Completes avec Correspondance, published in Geneva in 1782.  See George A. Leavitt, Catalogue of a 
Private Library Comprising a Rich Assortment of Rare and Standard Works…Also the Remaining Portion 
of the Library of the Late Thomas Jefferson, Comprising many Classical Works and Several Autograph 
Letters, Offered by his Grandson, Francis Eppes, of Poplar Forest, Va. (New York: George A. Leavitt & 
Co., 1873), lot 654.  However, the Leavitt catalog offers no clue as to when Jefferson actually requested or 
acquired the copy; it merely indicates that it was in his possession as early as, but no sooner than 1809 (the 
year in which Jefferson began to transfer books from Monticello to his retirement retreat at Poplar Forest).  
A better indicator is Jefferson’s own hand-written catalog of books from 1783 and 1789.  In the catalog of 
1783, Jefferson records: “Œuvres de Rousseau, 31 v., 12 mo. et correspondance, 3 v. 12. mo.”  This entry 
indicates that Jefferson owned a total of 34 volumes by 1783.  In the catalog of 1789, Jefferson records: 
“Œuvres de Rousseau, 31 v., 12 mo.,” presumably the same edition as that listed in the 1783 catalog.  See 
Thomas Jefferson, “1783 Catalog of Books,” Original Manuscript from the Coolidge Collection of Thomas 
Jefferson Manuscripts (Massachusetts Historical Society, c. 1775-1812), 243; and Jefferson, “1789 Catalog 
of Books,” Original Manuscript from the Coolidge Collection of Thomas Jefferson Manuscripts 
(Massachusetts Historical Society, c. 1789), 49.  Rousseau’s Confessions would not be published in its 
entirety until 1789.  We know that upon his return from France, Jefferson requested that William Short 
dispatch to him a copy of the “continuation of Rousseau’s Confessions.”  See William Short to TJ, 30 
November 1789, PTJ 15:568 and TJ to William Short, 6 April 1790, PTJ 16:319.  The second installment 
of the Confessions would likely have been bound into four volumes, thus making the total number of 
volumes thirty eight (and, thus, consistent with the entry recorded in Leavitt’s catalog).   
 9 
Voltaire, among others, eventually worked their way into Jefferson’s mind, albeit, as 
Chinard claims, in a far more indirect manner.  We could easily “demonstrate,” Chinard 
says, “through carefully chosen and apparently conclusive passages, that Jefferson was a 
disciple of Rousseau.  It would be just as easy to prove that he was influenced by 
Montesquieu or by Voltaire, unless we preferred to show that he derived most of his ideas 
from Locke.”18   
Chinard’s point is rather obvious; indeed, it seems almost a truism: by selectively 
extracting from one author’s texts, it is possible to show, by way of comparison, that 
another author embraces the same views or supports the same conclusions.  In short, it is 
often possible to make any given author say what we want them to say, if only we pick 
and choose their words carefully and consider them out of their proper context.  Thus, 
Chinard’s ultimate conclusion amounts to more than mere truism, for he is concerned to 
show (as all intellectual historians should be) that “influence” is not only a difficult thing 
to prove (even in what appears to be seemingly obvious cases), but that it can be 
especially misleading, if not dangerous.  “There is very little hope,” he says,  
that we shall ever reach an approximate truth as long as the noxious word 
influence is not used with more discrimination, as long at least as we do not 
realize and bear constantly in mind that between men belonging to the same 
generation, there is necessarily some resemblance, some relationship, some 
intellectual kinship which accounts for the similarity of their views, more truly, if 
somewhat less obviously, than the admission of definite influences.19   
 
The identification of discernable and precise “influences” is indeed a challenging 
enterprise, especially when an author affords his reader little in the way of explicit 
                                                
18 Gilbert Chinard, The Correspondence of Jefferson and Du Pont de Nemours, with an Introduction on 
Jefferson and the Physiocrats (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1931): ix (emphasis in original). 
 
19 Ibid., x (emphasis in original). 
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attributions or statements in which a debt of intellectual gratitude is explicitly 
announced.20 
 
III.  The Plan of the Dissertation  
Chapter One explores several key elements of Rousseau’s republicanism.  I begin with an 
analysis of Rousseau’s account of democratic citizenship in an ideally constituted state 
and his understanding of political right.  For Rousseau, democratic legitimacy turns on 
the ability of citizens to subordinate self-interest to the interest of the public, or the ability 
to recognize and act in accordance with a general will, or a political volonté générale.  
Presumably, since right is a transcendent norm, and since the general will of a community 
always tends toward political right, the general will can be found within every citizen.  
However, while the general will might be inside of every citizen, it is not necessarily the 
case that it will always be found.  To be sure, finding the general will can prove to be 
rather difficult.   
Finally, I explore the significance of Rousseau’s civil religion and the vital role it 
plays in sustaining the social contract.  Rousseau’s remarks in the Social Contract have 
led many of his twentieth-century critics to conclude that what he defends is nothing 
short of democratic totalitarianism.  A careful examination shows that this is, in fact, not 
true.  Clearly, Rousseau sees enough utility in the civil religion to prescribe sanctions for 
conduct that might be subversive of social and political order.  But if the civil religion is 
                                                
20 More often than not scholars are forced either to take the path of least resistance—in which case they 
attempt to prove their points by way of selective extraction and comparison—or they are compelled to 
engage in the painstaking task of scouring an author’s entire corpus in the hopes of discovering the 
definitive link between that author and some other source.  Depending on one’s goals, either approach is 
likely to yield something fruitful.  Still, Chinard’s position seems undeniable: “We shall have to admit that 
there are times when ideas are ‘in the air,’ when they seem common property, and when the attribution to 
any one man of the paternity of any particular idea is well nigh impossible.  The eighteenth century was 
undoubtedly such a period.”  Ibid., xi.   
 11 
so important as to necessitate legal enforcement, it seems to make little sense for 
Rousseau to insist that the guiding principle behind the civil religion ought to be 
tolerance.21  After all, since the purpose of the civil religion is to bind citizens together, 
toleration seems to be counterintuitive.  Religious toleration seems to imply something 
far more permissive than what he has in mind.           
In Chapter One, I consider Rousseau’s republican vision from the top down.  That 
is, I consider the ways in which Rousseau’s ideal state stands or falls solely on the basis 
of its political and social constitution.  In Chapter Two, I consider the other half of 
Rousseau’s theory, or the ways in which his ideal state is constituted from the bottom up.  
Rousseau’s educational theory issues in a seemingly irreconcilable paradox (the so-called 
paradox of founding).  This seeming paradox results from the often-misunderstood 
relationship between Rousseau’s most notable artificers, namely, the Social Contract’s 
legislator and Emile’s tutor.  Rather than viewing the educative ends of each artificer as 
mutually exclusive, I suggest a reading that identifies a necessary convergence between 
their respective “founding” and “fatherly” roles.  This reading posits Emile’s private tutor 
and the Social Contract’s public legislator as civic analogues.  The Social Contract 
supplies standards for judging political right and part of the means by which the 
foundations are to be laid in practice.  Emile provides standards for judging and means 
for cultivating moral right in the individual.  More importantly, Emile shows why such 
cultivation is necessary, in conjunction with sound institutions and the rule of law, to 
realize humanity’s latent potential to advance toward, or approximate political right.   
 Chapter Three explores the ways in which Thomas Jefferson’s moral and 
                                                
21 “Tolerance should be shown to all those that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing 
contrary to the duties of a citizen.”  Rousseau, SC IV.viii. 
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political thought eventually came to mirror much of Rousseau’s.  I begin with a rather 
broad but significant claim: Thomas Jefferson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau each embrace 
a notion of transcendent moral and political right and each subscribes to a natural rights 
philosophy that is informed by that standard.  However, scholars either reject the 
Rousseauian overtones that are apparent in Jefferson’s thought or fail to appreciate fully 
those facets of his thought that substantiate the heretofore unrecognized affinity between 
Rousseauian and Jeffersonian idealism.  I intend to show that Jefferson’s moral and 
political thought has more in common with Rousseau’s at the level of principle than 
many scholars (and perhaps Jefferson himself) seem ready to recognize.  Specifically, I 
consider three particular elements of Jefferson’s political thought that parallel 
Rousseau’s: Jefferson’s understanding and defense of majority rule and the ways in 
which it mirrors Rousseau’s conception of the general will; the Virginian’s reluctant 
embrace of political representation; and his theory of generational sovereignty.   
In Chapter Four, I consider Jefferson’s understanding and critique of religion in 
general.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson recognizes the importance of an unfettered mind and, 
accordingly, the Virginian is often highly critical of institutionalized religion.  In fact, he 
and James Madison were regular allies in the assault on established religion in the Old 
Dominion.  Nevertheless, Jefferson is neither the irreligious apostle of atheism many 
have painted him to be, nor is he committed to a disavowal of any and all religious 
influence in the public sphere.  Indeed, Jefferson’s private religion had a pronounced 
effect on his policies as President.  Moreover, we see Jefferson’s peculiar understanding 
of the Gospels and of Christianity in general weaved throughout his republicanism.   
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Though it evolves from the 1760s until his death in 1826, the role of religion in 
Jefferson’s republicanism is unmistakable.  I try to show that although Jefferson was not 
exactly an orthodox Christian—he did, in fact, reject much of what institutionalized 
Christianity had to offer—he was deeply committed to the fundamental moral principles 
embedded in the Christian tradition.  Moreover, Jefferson firmly believed that the moral 
foundations of a pure, more rational form of Christianity were highly apposite, if not 
indispensible to the creation of virtuous, independent citizens in the American Republic.  
In other words, Jefferson recognized the value—indeed, the social utility—of an 
American civil religion grounded in the pure, unadulterated precepts of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
Chapter Five places Jefferson’s theory of moral and civic education in the context 
of his republicanism.  Jefferson was of the conviction that a properly educated 
citizenry—coupled with sound, stable, yet adaptable political institutions—was 
necessary, if not indispensible to the vitality and longevity of the new Republic.  After 
placing Jefferson’s thoughts on moral and civic education into context, I explore the ways 
in which his overarching theory parallels Rousseau’s.  I try to show that Jefferson’s 
understanding of the educative function of fathers (and father figures) in both the private 
and public realms is not unlike Rousseau’s.  Among other things, Jefferson’s emphasis on 
an affectionate form of pedagogy, instruction by example, his appeal to natural rights and 
utility, and the importance of cultivating autonomous, duty-minded individuals puts him 
in close company with Rousseau.  I explore the ways in which Jefferson’s own education, 
his public and private thoughts on the subject, and his prescriptions and practices with his 
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children, grandchildren, and other affectionate charges mirror much of what Rousseau 
prescribes in Emile.  
Rousseau and Jefferson each speak to the need for a form of education that is 
designed to combat the ill-effects of excessive individualism; a form of education that 
promotes the values of liberal democracy while simultaneously impressing upon children 
the importance of community; a form of education that seeks to strike an appropriate 
balance between individual rights and the common good; a form of education that 
embraces at once individual independence and mutual interdependence.  In many ways, 
Jefferson seems not only to pick up where Rousseau left off, but also fills in certain 
conceptual (and practical) gaps that Rousseau overlooked.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Rousseau’s Republican Ideal: Volonté Générale and the Priority of Right 
 
I.  Introduction 
Finding a way to mold morally autonomous individuals and getting them to apprehend 
and adhere to the transcendent form of political right are paramount objectives in 
Rousseau’s project.  In order to appreciate Rousseau’s theory of moral and civic 
education—and in order to appreciate the theoretical import of the reading I offer—it is 
necessary to begin with an analysis of Rousseau’s conception of republican citizenship.  
For Rousseau, democratic legitimacy turns on the ability of citizens to subordinate self-
interest to the interest of the public, or the ability to recognize and act in accordance with 
a general will (a political volonté générale).  Presumably, since right is a transcendent 
norm, and since the general will of a community always tends toward political right, the 
general will can be found within every citizen.  However, while the general will might be 
inside of every citizen, it is not necessarily the case that it will always be found.  To be 
sure, finding the general will can prove to be rather difficult, if not impossible at times.   
If justice (or right) is a transcendent norm, and if human beings have been 
endowed by nature with the ability to grasp or apprehend this norm, then why is it the 
case that political right so often fails to be approximated in actual political societies?  
Notwithstanding the metaphysical complexities of a transcendent form of right, the 
failure to approximate the form in practice is, in large part, a failure—or rather, 
reluctance—of human will.  But this failure cannot be explained away in terms of an 
inherently reluctant or defective will.  We cannot simply lay the blame on volition alone, 
for acting in accordance with moral and political right requires virtue, and “[v]irtue 
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belongs to a being that is weak by nature and strong by will.”1  In other words, humans 
are capable of virtue, that is, humans have the ability to become virtuous, though this 
ability (like all abilities) must be cultivated and reinforced, for there is much in civil 
society to seduce us from right.2   
But it is necessary that individuals develop the ability to grasp right both as men 
and as citizens.  In fact, the former is necessary to the latter, that is, an understanding of 
moral right is necessary to an understanding (or a judgment) of public or political right.  
Put differently, it is necessary that the individual learn to subject his will to the eternal 
precepts of moral right if he is to become a de jure citizen, or a citizen who is capable of 
finding within himself the general will that is particular to his community.  Such a 
citizen, we might say, is morally autonomous insofar as he is capable of subjecting his 
private (particular) will to the public (general) will.  A genuine citizen, on Rousseau’s 
account, is one who is subjected only to virtue.   
In this chapter, I begin by offering a rather unconventional mathematical 
interpretation of volonté générale.  Though it certainly requires a charitable reading of 
Rousseau, this interpretation serves to render his notion of a political volonté générale 
more plausible (or, at the very least, less cryptic).  Given Rousseau’s affinity for both 
Platonism and geometry, it seems only fitting to suggest an interpretation that employs 
mathematical analogy as a means of clarifying an otherwise obscure concept. 
                                                
1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile, or On Education, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979 
[1762]), 444 (emphasis added).  Hereafter, Emile. 
 
2 Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, in Rousseau, The Basic Political Writings, trans. Donald 
A. Cress (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987).  Hereafter, SD.  All people of sound mind are capable of 
apprehending the transcendent form of right, but sometimes people are deceived by the appearance of 
right.  Hence, the need for moral education.  See David Lay Williams, Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment 
(University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007) for an unparalleled analysis of 
Rousseau’s understanding of right as a transcendent norm. 
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After considering Rousseau’s understanding of the general will, I explore several 
separate but related facets of his political theory, including his thoughts on representation 
in republican systems, his constitutionalism, and his case for a public or civil religion.  
Rousseau’s republicanism is complex, to say the least, and a systematic treatment of each 
component is necessary in order to glean a more complete picture of his ideal state, or 
what Joshua Cohen refers to as a “free community of equals, a social-political world in 
which individuals realize their nature as free by living together as equals, giving the laws 
to themselves, guided in those lawgiving judgments by a conception of their common 
good.”3  
 
II.  Putting the “I” into the “Common”: Volonté Générale and the Moi Commun   
Rousseau maintains that the common interest or, more specifically, the “common 
element” in the differing interests of a society’s members is the sole basis from which 
governments should derive.  If the object of the state’s interest (i.e., the end for which a 
state exists) is the common good, then only the “general will [volonté générale]…can 
direct the State according to [that] object.”4  But what exactly is volonté générale?   
In the Social Contract, Rousseau says the volonté générale of a people is “always 
right and tends to the public advantage,” notwithstanding the fact that public 
deliberations “are [not] always equally correct.”  Though we always will what is “for our 
own good,” it is not the case that we “always see what that [good] is.”  Moreover, “the 
                                                
3 Joshua Cohen, Rousseau: A Free Community of Equals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 10. 
 
4 SC II.i. 
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people is never corrupted, but it is often deceived, and on such occasions only does it 
seem to will what is bad.5  Rousseau goes on to say: 
There is often a great deal of difference between the will of all and the general 
will; the latter considers only the common interest, while the former takes private 
interest into account, and is no more than a sum of particular wills: but take away 
from these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel one another, and the 
general will remains as the sum of the differences.6 
 
Rousseau’s conception of volonté générale appears to turn on a notion of common human 
existence [communauté] or, more accurately, the in-common that is experienced by 
people living together in society.  While civil society and politics are not natural,7 they 
are, nevertheless, features of the human condition that Rousseau does not deny.  In other 
words, civil society is unavoidable and, as it turns out, integral to human happiness, or 
well-being.8  Since self-interest is man’s primary motivator, it only stands to reason that 
individual interests will be at odds with one another invariably.  Although individual, or 
particular interests will occasionally overlap and even coincide, the relative infrequency 
of such an occurrence makes politics an inescapable feature of civil society.  
However, as a matter of right, it cannot be the case that politics is the final arbiter 
of difference: the illegitimate social compact described in the Second Discourse—a “trick 
of the rich played upon the poor”—is, after all, the product of a perverted political 
enterprise.9  Thus, Rousseau tells us, it became necessary for man to legitimate his 
                                                
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Ibid. 
 
7 See SD, Part I. 
 
8 Since we cannot return to the state of blissful ignorance and complete independence depicted in the 
Second Discourse, the mutual dependence characteristic of civil society becomes an indispensible feature 
of human life.  
 
9 SD, 68. 
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chains, to justify his subjection, as it were.  Man was compelled, of necessity, to reconcile 
natural right with conventional right, to abandon his natural freedom in exchange for civil 
freedom.  But moral freedom requires people to find and adhere to a political volonté 
générale in themselves, and this demands that people recognize commonalities. 
If people naturally have nothing in common (save for amour de soi and the 
sentiment of pity), but commonality is necessary to a well-ordered society, then people 
must be molded into beings “in whom the thought of the common is [or can be] 
realized.”10  That is to say, they must be denatured, or educated to be something 
unnatural if they are to exist in civil society.11  The citizen (the denatured individual), 
then, is the very being in whom the common is realized completely.  This agrees with 
Rousseau’s contention in Emile that, prior to socially instituted processes of denaturation, 
humans lived in a state of absolute existence or a state of being that was wholly inward.   
If it is through denaturation that one becomes a citizen, then it is through the 
citizen that the “common is realized.”12  Rousseau’s conception of volonté générale rests 
on this idea, though Strong urges us to resist interpreting Rousseau’s formulation of the 
social contract as a summation of individual wills into a “collective being.”13  Rather, 
Strong suggests an alternative reading: “at the moment of the social pact we take into 
ourself, as our self, a self that is common or general…[T]he social pact replaces in me the 
                                                
10 Tracy B. Strong, Jean-Jacques Rousseau: The Politics of the Ordinary (Thousand Oaks: Sage 
Publications, 1994), 76. 
 
11 See also Patrick Riley, “Rousseau’s General Will,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rousseau, ed. 
Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 124-53. 
 
12 Strong, 76. 
 
13 Ibid., 77. 
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self that could individually compact with a self that is common.”14  As such, the purpose 
of the social contract is the “free realization of the humanly common,”15 which allows the 
citizen to be common, to experience the common, in common.  Rousseau’s volonté 
générale thus derives from the common and has as its goal (or object) the common; it is 
the “expression of [a] common self…the self that [one] find[s] in others.”16   
Rousseau’s political volonté générale, then, is not merely an expression of a 
collective opinion (or an opinion of all).  Instead, it is an extension of the self, or a self 
that recognizes itself in others.  There are many things that volonté générale is not: it is 
neither the will of the majority, nor is it the will “of all.”17  Rousseau is careful to 
differentiate the générale from the particulière (like his theologian predecessors18) in 
terms of the will’s object, and he concludes that the individual’s will is general only if its 
object is the common.  Thus, a political volonté générale cannot concern itself with 
anything that does not involve the common.  “Each of us,” Rousseau says, “puts in 
common [our] person and all [our] power under the supreme ordering of the general will; 
and we receive corporeally each member as a part indivisible from the whole…[T]his act 
produces a moral and collective body…[from which it] receives…its unity, its common 
ego [moi commun], its life and its will.”19   
                                                
14 Ibid. 
 
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Ibid., 83. 
 
17 SC, II.iii. 
 
18 For a thorough (and indispensable) treatment of the theological origins of Rousseau’s general will, see 
Patrick Riley, The General Will before Rousseau: The Transformation of the Divine into the Civic 
(Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1986). 
 
19 SC, I.vi. 
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Though naturally perfect beings, Rousseau contends that men must be 
transformed, or denatured in order to be conducive to harmonious social existence.  That 
is, they must be made into something unnatural much like a child must be socialized to be 
what he or she ought to be.  Thus, Rousseau’s aim in denaturing individuals is 
presumably to generalize their will over time without severely restricting freedom.20  
Rousseau must then locate what Patrick Riley terms a “non-willful will,” or a will that is 
capable of reconciling the individual’s natural freedom with what the individual ought to 
be in civil society.21  The solution suggested by Rousseau—denaturation—is decidedly 
pedagogical: an appropriate moral and civic education is the only thing capable of 
creating a virtuous citizen—that is, an individual who is sufficiently capable of inserting 
the I into the common.22   
I propose a view of Rousseau’s volonté générale that derives from a fusion of the 
moi commun and the need for denaturation.  It is typically held that Rousseau’s 
conception of volonté générale ends in paradox; I maintain that it does not.  It seems that 
denaturation (understood to be a process of moral and civic education that instills in the 
individual a strong sense of the moi commun) forces the individual toward a form of 
existence that would otherwise be unattainable.   
That there exists some general end toward which the volitions of a community’s 
members—all of whom share the in-common—will proceed through trial and error is 
                                                
20 Riley, “Rousseau’s General Will,” 126. 
 
21 Ibid. 
 
22 Riley alludes to this connection only cursorily, noting that the very notion of volonté générale described 
by Rousseau consists in two distinct ideas: that which is générale refers to the “rule of law” and “[a] civic 
education…that draws [individuals] to the common good,” while volonté refers to those civil associations 
that are the “most voluntary act[s] in the world.”  See Patrick Riley, “A Possible Explanation of Rousseau’s 
General Will,” in The Social Contract Theorists: Critical Essays on Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, ed. 
Morris (Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 167-90. 
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unmistakable: the general good or general welfare of all is the goal of a political society 
in which the members have been properly educated or denatured.  It is (or should be) 
quite apparent that recognition of the in-common will be very difficult (if not impossible) 
in the absence of sufficient denaturation.  In other words, it is possible to recognize the 
general good as a desirable end only if a society’s members are properly educated.  
Whether they ought to be in agreement with the general will is immaterial.  A properly 
educated group of individuals will extend their public will only to that which concerns 
the common, or that which is general.  This is not to say that the general volitions of a 
group that recognizes and assigns primacy to the in-common will always be universally 
good, or satisfactory to all; they will, however, be just precisely because their object is 
the in-common and their general will is in fact particular to them alone.   
Much like the general volitions of God are always just (despite the fact that some 
fail to find grace or that some unfortunately do not reap the benefits of God’s grace),23 
the general volitions of a community of properly educated individuals will always be just, 
but only for that particular community.  It is crucial that Rousseau’s volonté générale be 
understood in this way.  Where Malebranche takes God’s will to be naturally and 
essentially general, Rousseau takes man’s will to be something that must be made to be 
general.24  Rousseau likens this to the task of “squaring the circle,” though I argue that his 
conception requires a slightly different geometrical interpretation if it is to be free from 
ambiguity.  
A central source of ambiguity in Rousseau’s conception of volonté générale is in 
his supposed contention of its infallibility.  This, I argue, is partially resolved by 
                                                
23 See Riley, The General Will before Rousseau. 
 
24 Ibid., 130-131ff. 
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examining carefully the precise language employed by Rousseau.  In the Social Contract, 
Rousseau asserts: “Il s’ensuit de ce qui précède que la volonté générale est toujours 
droite…”25 Translators often render this as “the general will is always right,” which, then, 
seems to ascribe to volonté générale a universal correctness or infallibility.  As F.A. 
Taylor points out, such a translation “makes it appear that the question is already settled, 
as if Rousseau’s hypothesis was purely academic.”26   
Several translators27 render this phrase more appropriately, paying closer attention 
to the nuances of the French language and in turn making Rousseau’s thought more 
accessible, though not necessarily less paradoxical.  Instead of rendering “est toujours 
droite” literally as “is always right,” more precise translations acknowledge the 
distinction between droit functioning as a noun (e.g., main droite) and an adjectival droit 
affixed to an abstract concept (such as volonté générale).  In the latter case, droit 
qualifies volonté générale and thus cannot refer to correctness (i.e., rightness as opposed 
to wrongness).  Instead, droit is to be translated as something like “upright” or “straight,” 
much like the German Recht28 may be rendered.  To say that volonté générale is always 
upright—or better, that volonté générale is always “in the right” (i.e., always “wishes to 
do the right thing”29)—is to accord Rousseau’s conception more integrity.  It is, after all, 
rather awkward to suggest that, on the one hand, the volitions of a people are always 
                                                
25 SC, II.iv. 
 
26 F.A. Taylor, “A Note on Rousseau, Contrat Social, Book II, Chapter 3,” Mind 53:233 (January 1950), 
82-84.  
 
27 Compare Harrington, trans. (Knickerbocker Press, 1893); Tozer, trans. (New York: Swan Sonnenschein: 
1895); Cole, trans. (Everyman’s Library); Bondanella, trans. (New York: Norton, 1988).  
 
28 The German Recht, like the French droit, is problematic for English translators.  Like droit, Recht can 
refer to a right or set of rights (Rechte, pl.), or it can describe position.  Recht can also refer to moral 
uprightness, such as being in the right (im Recht sein).    
 
29 Taylor, 83. 
 24 
(universally) correct, and, on the other hand, that volonté générale varies from 
community to community. 
Considering Rousseau’s conception of volonté générale in the way I have 
described serves not only to disambiguate his thought in the Social Contract; it also 
provides a basis from which an alternative—and perhaps more plausible—interpretation 
or conceptualization can be drawn.  If the general will is always in the right, then it must 
be inferred that it always tends toward the right.  If it can be inferred that education 
invariably shapes human existence as we know it in civil society, then it can be argued 
that a group of sufficiently educated (or denatured) individuals who share strong common 
bonds—what Rousseau would identify as a “community”—forces volonté générale to go 
to its limit, so to speak.  Thus, it seems that Rousseau is simply mistaken in his analogy: 
what he wants to do is in fact not “square the circle,” but rather “circle the square.” 
To say that such a community forces the general will to a limit is rather 
ambiguous and requires clarification.  Borrowing the language of calculus, the general 
will can be thought of as a geometric expression enclosed within a boundary, an 
expression that can be said to approach a limit.  Although details of the formal definition 
of a limit are unnecessary, an intuitive understanding of the concept is indispensable.  A 
definition that requires only a fair amount of mathematical precision is as follows: a limit 
is a number whose numerical difference from a mathematical function is arbitrarily small 
for all values of the independent variables that are sufficiently close, but not equal to 
given prescribed numbers, or that are sufficiently large positively or negatively. 
If the general will is always in “the right,” then “the right” must be something that 
is formally perfect or harmonious, something capable of maximizing without 
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compromise the freedom of all members of the community.  “The right,” then, can be 
given a definite shape (it can be formalized).  If the general will is an expression that is 
bounded by a maximizing or perfect shape, and the general will can be said to approach a 
limit, then the shape within which the general will is bound must be a circle (for a circle 
is the only geometric shape capable of fully maximizing the area within a boundary). 
For the general will to approach its limit—for the general will to be truly 
generalized—a process of denaturation or civic education is necessary.  However, it is 
impossible for the general will ever to reach circularity; it is possible only for circularity 
to be approached.  Hence, it can never reach perfection and can never be universalized.  
Nowhere does Rousseau imply the contrary; in fact, he states that although the general 
will cannot err, citizens may at times mistake their private wills for the general will. 
Consider the mathematical design described above: a limit, by definition, is a 
value at which a given function will never arrive; it will simply approach its limit (for, in 
mathematical terms, reaching a limit implies that a function is undefined).  In the case of 
the above design, we might say that “will” is modeled as an n-gon (a polygon with n 
sides) inscribed within “the right” (a circle, which maximizes the area within which 
freedom is contained30).  The n-gon becomes more circular (more general) as sides are 
added.  Though the n-gon may have an infinite number of sides added (making it more 
general) it will most certainly never reach circularity.  Eventually it will (or could) reach 
a point at which its sides are so large in number that it appears to be circular.  That is, 
                                                
30 A circle, it seems, is the intuitive choice for such a model, for in the Social Contract, Rousseau insists 
that what is required is “a form of association which defends and protects with all common forces the 
person and goods of each associate, and by means of which each one, while uniting with all, nevertheless 
obeys only himself and remains as free as before.”  SC I.vi.  In the state of nature, individual freedom is 
bounded only by nature.  From this it follows that anything other than existence in the state of nature 
implies less-than-perfect freedom, or a freedom that is bounded more rigidly.  Though the general will may 
at times dictate restrictions on individual freedom, the general will simultaneously preserves the freedom of 
all. 
 26 
over time the difference between the perimeter and the circle’s circumference (2!r) will 
be arbitrarily small. 
It should be noted that the n-gon’s sides do not represent a quantity of individuals.  
Instead, the n-gon’s sides represent commonalities among an arbitrary number of 
individuals within a community.  The point here is that the general will is more likely to 
be realized when a group of people exhibits a sufficient degree of commonality.  
Determining precisely the degree to which these commonalities should be shared (and 
precisely what they are) is another question altogether.   
 
III.  Rousseau’s Constitutionalism and the Problem with Representation 
While Rousseau accepts that several forms of government might be counted as genuinely 
republican, he does not embrace direct democracy as one of those possibilities.31  
Popular, democratic government might be suitable on a very small scale where citizen 
concerns are extremely localized, but the typical republic (and even the ideal sort of 
republic Rousseau romanticizes) is not amenable to such a regime.  Rousseau does 
mention citizen assemblies at various points, but this in no way suggests that he favors 
direct democratic rule.  The function of the sovereign assembly is not necessarily to 
debate and deliberate; rather, the assembly is designed simply to reaffirm the sovereign 
body’s commitment to the general law (i.e., the constitution, or the social contract).32  By 
implication, the assembly may decline to uphold its commitment to the social contract by 
                                                
31 See SC II.vi, n.5. 
 
32 See Ethan Putterman, Rousseau, Law, and the Sovereignty of the People (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), Chapter Two.  As Putterman suggests, the assemblies may in fact engage in 
discussion and deliberation.  However, the assembly’s agenda is typically pre-determined and, as such, 
cannot be considered genuinely democratic.   
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a majority vote.  However, Rousseau does not expressly indicate the procedure by which 
a revocation of the social contract might occur, nor does he explain how the assembly 
would go about suspending or altering the present form of government.  The assembly’s 
main purpose, then (if not its only purpose), is to reaffirm the tenets of the social contract 
and the legitimacy of the present form of government (and, by extension, the laws passed 
by the present administration).33  On Joseph Schwartz’s reading of Rousseau, “[t]he 
assemblies are ritual institutions that promote moral education and rejuvenation.  They do 
not engage in political debate and decision making.”34  Likewise, as John Noone puts it, 
“[t]autologically stated, every legitimate law is a reaffirmation of the social contract.”35 
In the mid-eighteenth century, Rousseau observed something of a malfunction, if 
not a total failure of Europe’s representative bodies to govern effectively.  Seeing no 
viable alternative to disconnected representation in territorially expansive nation-states, 
Rousseau concluded that genuine republicanism was simply unattainable where citizens 
were too far removed from their government.  Only in the smallest towns or cities could 
democratic self-government be sustained.36  In Rousseau’s estimation, corrupt deputies 
                                                
33 See SC IV.xviii: “I am presupposing here what I believe I have demonstrated, namely that in the state 
there is no fundamental law that cannot be revoked, not even the social compact.  For if all the citizens 
were to assemble in order to break this compact by common agreement, no one could doubt that it was 
legitimately broken.”  See also, SC III.xiii: “In addition to the extraordinary assemblies that unforeseen 
situations can necessitate, there must be some fixed, periodic assemblies that nothing can abolish or 
prorogue, so that on a specified day the populace is rightfully convened, by law, without the need for any 
other formal convocation.” 
 
34 Joseph M. Schwartz, The Permanence of the Political: A Democratic Critique of the Radical Impulse to 
Transcend Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 61. 
 
35 John B. Noone, Jr., “The Social Contract and the Idea of Sovereignty in Rousseau,” The Journal of 
Politics, Vol. 32, No. 3 (1970), 703 (emphasis in original). 
 
36 Rousseau is convinced that the Corsicans are in that rare, but “fortunate condition which makes possible 
the establishment of a good constitution.”  In addition to being relatively small and homogenous—two of 
the conditions necessary to prevent popular rule from degenerating into political chaos—the Corsican 
people are “[f]ull of health and vigor, [and] they can give themselves a government which will keep them 
healthy and vigorous.”  “Plan for a Constitution for Corsica,” in The Collected Works of Rousseau, Vol. 2, 
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and self-serving monarchs rarely, if ever had the common good in mind and, as a result, 
the plight of most European nation-states was a condition of perpetual conflict and war.   
Thus, Rousseau was convinced that only a league or federation of European states 
could abate this condition and permit monarchs and legislative bodies to return to the 
business of governing for the common good.  In other words, there existed among the 
European powers a Hobbesian state of nature—a condition in which resources were often 
scarce and violent competition between states was plentiful; a condition in which no 
competent, recognized authority existed to adjudicate disputes between powers.  
Rousseau recognized the gravity of such a miserable condition and, in response to a 
proposal by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre (with whom Rousseau is in partial agreement), 
Rousseau deduced that a federative league of independent states was not only the best 
practical solution, but also the arrangement that would best accord with principles of 
political right.  The various nation-states would remain completely sovereign over their 
internal affairs, ceding to the federation only those powers necessary to preserve 
international peace and maintain comity.37 
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Setting his thoughts on a federative union aside momentarily, the problem of 
representation looms large in Rousseau’s political thought.  Rousseau’s rejection of 
representative government stems from his theory of the general will as the guidepost for 
legislative action.  “Sovereignty,” he says, “cannot be represented for the same reason 
that it cannot be alienated.  It consists…in the general will, and the will does not allow of 
being represented.  It is either itself or something else; there is nothing in between.  The 
deputies of the people, therefore, neither are nor can be its representatives; they are 
merely its agents.”38  Since all acts of the legislative body are acts of the sovereign (and 
sovereignty cannot be alienated), it only follows that such legislative acts cannot be 
delegated to a representative body.  Nevertheless, Rousseau accepts that representation, 
in some form, is a practical necessity in all but the smallest republics.  Large deliberative 
bodies are difficult to convene and operate in even the best of conditions.  As such, 
republics must resort to representation out of necessity: “The cooling off of patriotism, 
the activity of private interest, the largeness of states, conquests, the abuse of 
government: these have suggested the route of using deputies or representatives of the 
people in the nation’s assemblies.”39   
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On Joshua Cohen’s reading, Rousseau’s argument against representation is best 
understood not simply as an argument of principle—the general will cannot be alienated 
and, for the same reason, cannot be represented—but as an extension of the arguments 
condemning slavery.40  Rousseau denounces slavery on the grounds that it severely 
cripples or eliminates altogether the slave’s ability to will.  Accordingly, the absence of a 
will implies an inability to incur obligations.41  As such, the “ right of slavery is null, not 
simply because it is illegitimate, but because it is absurd and meaningless.  These words, 
slavery and right, are contradictory.  They are mutually exclusive.”42  But Cohen argues 
that representative government ought not to be likened to slavery, for there is nothing 
inherent in a system of representation that would necessarily entail an alienation or 
destruction of a citizen’s will.  If this were the case, then Rousseau would appear to be 
inconsistent with respect to his remarks on government representing the sovereign.43  In 
fact, it is possible for the government to represent the sovereign if the government is 
understood merely to be executing the will of the sovereign as expressed through the 
law.44  Elected officials or deputies cannot represent the sovereign’s will because this 
would require such officials to determine the content of the will, which is the 
responsibility (and the right) of the people. 
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Still, Cohen maintains that Rousseau could not (and did not) whole-heartedly 
reject representative government as a viable alternative to the direct participation of 
citizens.  For Rousseau, it was certainly plausible that citizens might be able to express 
their political preferences through representatives.  “It is fully consistent,” Cohen argues, 
“with the logic of representation that judgments about who is the best representative 
express citizens’ substantive views, held on reflection, about the representatives’ views 
on the common good and how best to achieve it, and not simply preferences rooted in 
considerations of rational advantage.”45  On this interpretation, it does not follow that 
citizens are devoid of a political will when they are represented; the general will that is 
presumably inside of every citizen can, in theory, be legitimately located in representative 
bodies. 
 Though he does not make the connection in any of his writings, the principles 
behind Rousseau’s prescriptions for a federative union of European states may very well 
alleviate many of his worries over representation.  If Rousseau’s concerns derive 
primarily from the idea that sovereignty cannot be alienated—on this point Rousseau is 
axiomatic and unyielding—then perhaps the solution is to minimize the points in a 
republic where sovereignty is diminished or where representation seems necessary.  This, 
of course, does nothing to change the fact that sovereignty is being alienated to some 
extent (and there seems to be no real way around this), but it does help to lessen the 
severity of the alienation.  In other words, if the ideal is for people to assemble and 
legislate in person (as opposed to employing representatives to act on their behalf), then 
the second best solution—or the solution that comes as close as possible to the ideal—is 
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to divide the nation into smaller subsidiaries wherever possible.  The idea here is not 
simply to minimize the use of representatives; Rousseau thinks that is certainly a good 
idea, but it is not an end in and of itself.  The point is to keep citizens as close as possible 
to the issues that affect them directly and personally so that they may have a legitimate 
stake in law making, so that they can experience genuine self-government—so that they 
may, as Rousseau puts it, truly be both citizens and subjects.46 
 
IV.  The Civil Religion: Republican Breach?  Or the Tie that Binds? 
The third—and ostensibly most unrepublican—element of Rousseau’s theory is his 
account of the civil religion.  In a move that is typical of the Genevan’s style, Rousseau at 
once decries the social and political forces that have hitherto restrained the human 
mind—a hallmark feature of Enlightenment thinking—and simultaneously points up the 
merits of a civil religion that compels at least an outward profession of faith, or a public 
acceptance of the civil religion’s articles, despite one’s privately held beliefs.  Rousseau’s 
insistence on the establishment of a civil religion seems to be at odds with his thoughts on 
freedom of conscience and the axiom that conviction cannot be coerced.  As such, the 
prescriptions of the Social Contract and the treatment of religion offered in Book IV of 
Emile seem to produce an outline for a rather unrepublican enterprise.   
 In this section, I consider two possible interpretations of Rousseau’s civil religion 
and the role it plays in his republican theory.  I conclude that both interpretations are 
plausible and need not be thought of as mutually exclusive.  The first interpretation 
derives from Terence Ball’s reading of Rousseau.  Ball posits that the chapter on the civil 
religion was not merely an afterthought, as some critics have suggested; rather, the 
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chapter serves as something of a “test—a final examination, as it were—for the reader.  
Its purpose is to determine whether the reader has learnt to speak the language of the 
legislator, so as not to need (and indeed be immune from) the conjuring tricks and 
illusions on which earlier founders had to rely.”47  If Ball is correct, then Rousseau’s 
prescriptions for the civil religion cannot be taken too seriously.  In fact, in the ideal 
republican state, a civil religion would be superfluous at best.  At first, the people would 
be persuaded by the legislator and he would likely need to appeal to divinity in the course 
of founding the republic.  However, over time, the people would presumably come to 
learn the language of the legislator—that is, the language of political right—and would 
eventually be able to dispense with the civil religion altogether.  If the civil religion 
remains necessary to the republic, then the people do not know as much as they should 
and, as such, could not be deemed capable of genuine self-government.   
Like the first interpretation, the second suggests that Rousseau’s inclusion of the 
chapter on the civil religion in the Social Contract was not merely an afterthought; the 
civil religion plays in integral role in his republicanism.  However, this interpretation 
downplays the notion that Rousseau ultimately conceived of an ideal state wherein the 
civil religion was unnecessary.  Such a state might be ideal, but not even Rousseau could 
envision a time or place in which human beings might govern themselves successfully on 
the basis of reason alone.  That citizens should cast off the yoke of burdensome religious 
institutions was certainly an integral feature of Rousseau’s romantic vision.  But 
Rousseau understood human nature all too well to hold out for such a possibility.  Just as 
James Madison intimated in his famous dictum—“If men were angels, no government 
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would be necessary.  If angels were to govern men, neither internal nor external controls 
on government would be necessary.”48—Rousseau recognized and appreciated the need 
to bind and restrain even the best of peoples.   
When considering Rousseau’s treatment of religion in the Social Contract, it is 
important to remember that Rousseau’s tendency toward hyperbole often obscures his 
true intentions.  Rousseau’s tendency to overstate ideas has landed him in hot water with 
numerous twentieth century critics who allege, among other things, that the Genevan is 
nothing less than a democratic totalitarian.49  Some of Rousseau’s twentieth-century 
defenders, however, have shown that the totalitarian impulses in the Genevan’s political 
theory amount to very little, if anything substantive.50  
With respect to the civil religion, nowhere is this more apparent than in 
Rousseau’s remarks concerning intolerance and the need for public adherence to the 
articles of faith.  When Rousseau claims that the sovereign lacks the ability to oblige any 
citizen to believe sincerely in the articles of faith, he reaffirms his commitment to the 
notion that beliefs cannot be induced or compelled, that conscience cannot be coerced.51  
Though some critics might have balked at such reasoning in Rousseau’s time, the modern 
reader will hardly bridle at such a claim.  When Rousseau goes on to suggest that the 
sovereign may banish the non-believer—“not for being impious but for being unsociable, 
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for being incapable of sincerely loving the laws and justice, and of sacrificing his life, if 
necessary, for his duty”52—we might understand Rousseau to be implying something less 
appalling than what he actually says, but his remarks are still troubling.  Finally, when 
Rousseau prescribes death for the person who outwardly behaves as a non-believer in 
defiance of the laws, ought we to take his words at face value?  Given that Rousseau 
often resorts to hyperbolic language in order to emphasize a point, it seems reasonable to 
suggest a more cautious, charitable reading.  As is often the case with Rousseau, there 
seems to be very little grey area when it comes to matters of principle and he often opts 
for rhetorical force over cogency and levelheadedness.   
To be sure, the general will and the legislative procedures Rousseau prescribes are 
the primary means of ensuring republican virtue and governmental accountability; but the 
civil religion still functions as an ancillary mechanism to sustain virtue and keep a people 
whole, so to speak.  On this reading, then, it seems that the closer the legislator gets a 
people to the ideal of political right, the less the civil religion will figure into the 
equation.  Likewise, over time, as a people refines its understanding of and 
implementation of principles of political right, the role of the civil religion will gradually 
diminish, though likely never fade completely. 
Rousseau’s account of the civil religion in the Social Contract and Emile begins 
with a fundamental question: Is there any social utility in religion?  That is, does religion 
serve some useful social purpose and, if so, does the state have a legitimate reason to 
regulate certain aspects of this religion?  Setting aside the question of legitimacy for a 
moment, Rousseau believes that a certain form of state-sponsored religion is conducive—
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indeed, necessary—to achieving the political ends he describes in the first half of the 
Social Contract and in Book V of Emile. 
Yet there is more to Rousseau’s civil religion than meets the eye.  Rousseau’s 
account of the relationship between state and religion—and his concise, if not distorted 
and over-simplified, historical treatment of religion—underscores the social and political 
utility of religion with respect to the founding and maintenance a republic.  The civil 
religion is a peculiar political device used to cultivate civic morality in citizens rather 
than any particular inward belief.  Presumably, the sort of civil or public religion 
Rousseau has in mind would serve less of a sacred and more of a secular purpose.  Like 
the array of patriotic rituals and devices Rousseau prescribes, the civil religion stands to 
unite citizens who share several common attributes, including, but not limited to 
language, ancestry, customs, and laws—in short, a national identity.  The civil religion is 
designed to work as a socio-political glue, so to speak.  Its primary function—if not its 
only function—is to unite citizens around a common, rational moral base for the sake of 
social and political stability.  Thus, it seems as if the fundamental tenets of the civil 
religion are just sacred enough to appeal to citizens’ common beliefs and customs, while 
just secular enough to preserve freedom of conscience.  Viewed in such a way, 
Rousseau’s civil religion does not appear to be as unrepublican (or even totalitarian) as 
some of his modern critics think.   
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau insists that the foundation of government must 
rely on a “more solid base than reason alone.”  In order to unite individuals into a body 
politic—in order to create and bind a people—a founder (Rousseau’s great “legislator”) 
must have some recourse to divinity, as it is “necessary…for the public repose that the 
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divine will intervene to endow the Sovereign authority with a sacred and inviolable 
character that might deprive subjects of the fatal Right to dispose of it.  If Religion had 
performed only this good for men, it would be enough for them all to have to cherish and 
adopt it.”53   
But religion had ultimately failed to produce the good that Rousseau has in mind.  
In the pagan world, Rousseau says, religious wars had a much different character than 
typical eighteenth century wars.  In Ancient Greece and in pre-Christian Rome, nations 
were predominantly theocratic: gods were summoned to fight for mortals, not vice versa.  
Hence, there were seldom any “jealous gods” to be found.  But during the first 
millennium, and especially after the fall of Rome, Judaism and Christianity introduced a 
form of religion in Europe that was, at least initially, distinctly separate from the state.  
This dualism would give rise to significant social and political strife in the centuries 
following the fall of Rome.  Rousseau was certainly not the first to recognize the 
problems inherent in such a dualism; Hobbes saw it long before, but his solution was not 
something Rousseau was willing to countenance.  For Hobbes the solution was rather 
simple: the Sovereign was to be the supreme civil and ecclesiastical authority in the state.  
Rousseau rejects this solution for practical and principles reasons, primarily due to the 
fact that Christianity is contrary to and irreconcilable with the political system Hobbes 
proposes.”54   
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Some of Rousseau’s critics argue that the his thoughts on religion and politics 
may be divorced from one another, that religion plays an important, though distinct and 
separate role from politics.  Others see Rousseau’s benign brand of religion as the driving 
force behind the construction of his ideal state and the cultivation of moral and civic 
virtue.  Rousseau’s approach to the problem is not exactly straightforward.  On 
Rousseau’s account, there are typically two mistaken views when it comes to the question 
of how the relationship between church and state ought to be regulated (if at all).  To be 
sure, Rousseau positioned himself somewhere in between two extremes when it came to 
religion and politics: to one side of the debate were the sectarians (le parti devot) and to 
the other the secularists (le coterie philosophique).  Eighteenth century proponents of 
state-sponsored religion, such as William Warburton, understand Christianity to be the 
only true means of support for the body politic.  The second view is diametrically 
opposed to the first, and essentially claims that no state-sponsored religion can ever be 
useful to the body politic.  This view can be attributed, in large part, to the likes of Pierre 
Bayle55 and even Voltaire, both of whom were quite skeptical not of religion per se, but 
of faith that could not be justified by reason. 
The problem of reconciling these two opposing views certainly has a long history, 
of which Rousseau was well aware.  Rousseau argues that both views are mistaken and 
he seeks to find a solution that will work in his ideal republican state.  In other words, he 
wants to find a non-institutionalized brand of religion that will ensure social order and 
perpetuate habits (and sentiments) of sociability among citizens.  His goal is to harness 
all that is socially useful in religion—namely, those moral precepts that are conducive to 
good, republican order—while dispensing with the miraculous and mystical elements 
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that, on his account, only lead to zealotry and conflict.  In short, Rousseau seeks a 
rationalized or republicanized form of public religion.   
In order to understand Rousseau’s position, it is helpful to consider the various 
forms of religion discussed in Book IV of the Social Contract and Emile’s “Profession of 
Faith of a Savoyard Vicar.”  First, there is the so-called religion of man.  According to 
Rousseau, there is some social utility in this religion but not nearly enough.  For instance, 
the religion of man teaches some degree of toleration, though it does have a significant 
drawback: this religion teaches a dangerous sort of passivity toward evil and unjust rulers 
(“true Christians are made to be slaves,” Rousseau says).56  The religion of man is 
essentially the simple religion of the Gospels—what Christopher Bertram calls a “non-
doctrinaire Christianity”57—but it is also the interpretation of the Gospels by the likes of 
St. Paul, St. Augustine, and many others (interpretations that Rousseau thinks have done 
nothing but complicate the Gospels).58  Christianity’s Achilles Heel is its other-
worldliness, or its indifference to the civil and political affairs of this world.  Although it 
preaches a universal morality and even seems conducive to worldly peace (at least in 
theory), Rousseau shows little optimism when it comes to institutionalized Christianity.  
In fact, Rousseau’s pessimism lines up neatly with his rejection of a universal general 
will: although he commends Christianity for the idea of a universal morality, Rousseau 
believes that there is a great difference between “men as they are” and men as they can to 
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be.  In other words, individuals will, more often than not, fail to comply with this 
universal morality because there is simply no good, practical reason for them to do so. 
Nevertheless, the religion of man is good and pure.  Unfortunately, this form of 
religion is not conducive to good citizenship because people are generally too concerned 
with the other world (i.e., the Kingdom of God).  As such, this religion fails to bring 
people together well enough to form and sustain a sufficiently strong political 
community.  It should be noted that Rousseau does not reject the principles and teaching 
of pure, unadulterated Christianity.  In the Letters Written from the Mountain, Rousseau 
attempted to refine the views he expressed in the Social Contract and Emile, largely to no 
avail.  Although his views changed little after 1762, Rousseau does claim in the Letters 
that he is concerned not with theological disputations or matters of personal conviction, 
but solely with social and political order.  This, of course, did little to alleviate the 
anxiety of those who saw his views as hostile to the teachings of the Church and the 
authority of Louis XV; still, Rousseau’s remarks in the Letters help to clarify his position 
on the civil religion.  The type of morality espoused by Roman Catholicism would be 
sufficient to produce lasting peace among men, but only if all men adhered to Church’s 
precepts.  As Bertram puts it,   
the very need for political association arises from the fact that this condition of 
spontaneous compliance with universal morality does not obtain.  The Christians 
whom we find among us are not saints, they are men, and subject to the passions 
of men.  Men need political institutions.  Those institutions, in turn, need affective 
support from citizens and they cannot get enough of this from the religion of 
man.59 
 
 The next religion Rousseau considers is the religion of the citizen.  The upshot to 
this religion, he says, is that it tends to produce extreme social unity.  In such a political 
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community, to obey the civil law is to obey God.  In other words, when a citizen loves 
God they simultaneously love the laws and vice versa.  On the face of it, such unity 
seems desirable given Rousseau’s ultimate objective.  The problem is that this religion 
can obviously become extremely exclusive; it can also easily become tyrannical or even 
genocidal.  What is more, the religion of the citizen tends to produce far too many 
superstitious practices and beliefs, none of which are capable of satisfying and unifying 
the entire body politic.  The existence of numerous superstitions and beliefs can make 
people zealous and the result is that people become too bent on defending their faith and 
less determined to defend the political ideals they presumably share in common.  
Moreover, this religion is likely to produce dangerous and permanent divisions between 
believers and non-believers, or those who believe themselves to be saved and those who 
are believed to be damned.  Such a religion, on Rousseau’s view, cannot be a good 
practical choice, nor can it possibly support a rational sort of civil creed, or a set of 
rational articles of faith to which all citizens can assent.60   
 Finally, Rousseau offers a treatment of what he calls the religion of the priest.  
There is absolutely no social utility in the religion of the priest and the greatest drawback 
is that it creates something of a dual allegiance: citizens must constantly profess loyalty 
to both a civil government and an ecclesiastical government, and each institution will 
undoubtedly have competing beliefs, interests, and demands that are difficult, if not 
impossible to reconcile.  Here, Rousseau might agree with Hobbes in asserting that the 
religion of the priest is flawed because it obfuscates a person’s allegiances: a subject is 
ruled by two separate and opposing sovereigns, each of whom commands distinct and 
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even contradictory duties.  “Everything that destroys social unity is worthless,” in 
Rousseau’s opinion, and proselytizing does just that: it destroys social unity.61   
 The three forms of religion Rousseau discusses in the Social Contract are all 
inadequate for different reasons.  However, religion itself is of the utmost importance; no 
state can be founded without some form of a civil religion, which nurtures sentiments of 
sociability and allows citizens to live peaceably together (in part due to common belief).  
But what does this civil religion look like?  If Rousseau’s scheme is situated somewhere 
between the secular and the sacred, where exactly does it lie?  In other words, how much 
religion is Rousseau willing to countenance in a republic and what form ought religion to 
take if the republic is to remain free?  Rousseau’s prescriptions for a civil profession of 
faith in the Social Contract—and the religious views he attributes to the fictional 
Savoyard Vicar in Emile—derive from the ideas he articulates in his letter to Voltaire of 
18 August 1756.  Victor Gourevitch argues that, of all the religious views Rousseau 
attributes to his characters—Julie, Wolmar, the Savoyard Vicar, and numerous others—
the letter to Voltaire remains “Rousseau’s most authoritative discussion of religious 
issues, the discussion in the light of which careful readers will assess his numerous other 
discussions of these issues.”62 
In the letter to Voltaire, Rousseau engages with a number of topics, including the 
recent Lisbon earthquake, the poverty of metaphysics, and the difference between 
“vulgar” and “refined Epicureanism.”63  As Gourevitch points out, Rousseau’s 
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Epicureanism and “the sober ‘optimism’ that Rousseau defends” to Voltaire are by and 
large derived from Lucretius’ teachings in De Rerum Natura.64  However, Rousseau parts 
company with the classical Epicurean model in at least one respect: he is more concerned 
with the plight of those who fail to find comfort in the Epicurean denial of Providence 
and the bitterness it seems to impart on the world.65  Though Rousseau’s Epicureanism 
may be of the “refined” variety, he “tends, by and large, to speak of political life and of 
religion as desirable in themselves rather than instrumentally, and [he assigns] them a far 
more central role than his Epicurean models do.”66   
In the letter, Rousseau also marks out the difference between convictions or 
privately held beliefs and public behavior, as well as the legitimate scope of state 
authority with respect to the establishment of religious doctrine.  The sovereign, he says, 
is not permitted to intrude in the realm of personal belief.  Such an intrusion would 
neither be possible nor desirable.  As such, it makes little sense for the state to endorse or 
prescribe a creed that professes beliefs to which all (or at least a vast majority) of citizens 
cannot assent.  If personal conviction or conscience cannot be coerced by the state, then 
the same ought to hold true for public conduct.  Thus, in the letter to Voltaire, Rousseau 
states unequivocally that, since religion is necessary to political society, and since a 
legislator “cannot too forcefully attack the superstitions that disturb society, nor too much 
respect the Religion that upholds it,”67 a civil profession of faith is what is needed.  The 
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civil religion would not interfere with the free exercise of religion within the state, 
provided that such exercises are neither subversive of the state’s legitimate authority nor 
indicative of intolerance.  Rousseau’s civil professions of faith—a general creed that 
embraces only “those social maxims [all citizens] would be bound to acknowledge”68—is 
perfectly compatible with the notion of religious pluralism.  Certain religious maxims 
(i.e., the maxims of fanatics) would, of necessity, be rejected in the civil profession of 
faith, though not as a matter of right belief, but rather as a matter of sedition.69 
The civil profession of faith is not intended to convince any citizen of the 
rightfulness of any religious doctrine, for it is impossible to convince anyone in matters 
of religion.  Instead, the civil profession of faith is merely a tool to persuade, and the 
distinction Rousseau draws between being convinced and being persuaded is significant.  
Gourevitch’s explanation of the difference is exceptional and bears quoting at length.  
The contrast, he says,  
between being convinced and being persuaded corresponds to the 
contrast…between reason proper and sentiment, as well as with the contrast that 
[Rousseau] goes on to draw between demonstration proper and proofs of 
sentiment.  To convince and to demonstrate is to establish “physical” certainty; to 
persuade and to offer proofs of sentiment is to establish “moral” certainty.  The 
lawgiver must invoke the gods in order to persuade the vulgar whom he cannot 
convince; the Savoyard Vicar claims no more than that he is persuaded by his 
Profession of Faith.70  
 
The lawgiver or legislator has very little recourse to reason, for the masses cannot fully 
comprehend him.71  The legislator’s only appeal, then, is to divinity, for this seems to be 
the only thing capable of persuading a sufficient number of people.  But why?  The 
                                                
68 Ibid., 121 
 
69 Ibid. 
 
70 Gourevitch, 211. 
 
71 In the next chapter, I offer a detailed analysis of the legislator’s role in founding a republic. 
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vulgar masses stand in need of divine revelation; their religious beliefs are sincere, yet 
unprovable.  Still, these beliefs and the piety that accompanies them are reassuring; just 
as Julie’s piety is something of “an opiate [for her] soul,”72 so too is the common religion 
of the people.  Thus, the legislator must not only appeal to this in the founding of a 
republic, he must also see to it that, after the founding, the common religion of the people 
is neither hindered nor too heavily buttressed by the state. 
The great legislator, like Wolmar, stands above the people in two peculiar ways: 
he understands the language and principles of political right and is capable of putting 
these principles into practice to found a virtuous state; and he is sufficiently enlightened 
so as not to need the opiate-like consolation of religion (he is, after all, God-like).  
Wolmar, an atheist and a domestic analogue to the legislator, recognizes and even 
appreciates Julie’s religious devoutness; though he himself is a non-believer, he still goes 
so far as to attend worship services with her regularly and participate in the community’s 
practices.  But Wolmar’s church attendance and his support of the community’s traditions 
and practices are nothing more than a façade: Wolmar, being the “intellect” of Clarens, 
understands that the people, including his wife, stand in need of the solace and relief their 
religion provides, and this is indeed one of the strongest bonds they share.  Wolmar’s 
“religiosity,” then, is nothing more than a Machiavellian sort of appearance that is meant 
to comfort or reassure the peasants of Clarens. 
 
 
 
                                                
72 Rousseau, Julie, or the New Heloise, in The Collected Works of Rousseau, Vol. 6, Roger D. Masters and 
Christopher Kelly, eds., Philip Stewart and Jean Vaché, trans. (Hanover, NH: University Press of New 
England, 1997), 697. 
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IV.  Conclusion 
While modeling Rousseau’s conception of the general will in mathematical terms is 
disambiguating to a certain extent, it also raises several worries.  First, a rather typical 
interpretation of Rousseau suggests that the “denaturing” required to realize the general 
will renders individuals starkly unindividualistic, that the commonality required to 
produce a general will is too demanding, and that such a society—a society of extremely 
undifferentiated individuals—is terribly unattractive.  On the other hand, in Emile it 
seems that Rousseau in fact preserves individuality while simultaneously instilling a moi 
commun that is sufficient to produce a general will.  I have suggested a mathematical 
model of Rousseau’s general will simply to give the concept more clarity.73  A careful 
reading of Emile is required in order to alleviate each of the aforementioned concerns and 
sharpen what is otherwise obscured by Rousseau’s cryptic language in the Social 
Contract.  
Rousseau’s ambivalence toward representation is understandable, given his 
refusal to admit that the will can ever be alienated.  Though not fully developed in his 
writings, the idea of subsidiarity seems to ease some of Rousseau’s concerns.  Ultimately, 
Rousseau’s objections to representation are principled, but, as Cohen has shown, these 
principled objections might very well not be as forceful as they seem.  Presumably, in the 
type of federative union Rousseau describes, each member state would operate 
independently of the others with respect to its domestic affairs; the union’s function 
                                                
73 Rousseau’s language in the Discourse on Political Economy seems to support the mathematical analogy I 
have made.  “[P]ersonal interest,” he says, “is always inversely proportional to duty, and increases in direct 
proportion as the association grows narrower and the commitment less sacred; invincible proof that the 
most general will is also the most just, and…the voice of the people is indeed the voice of God.” Discourse 
on Political Economy, in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, Vol. 3, Roger D. Masters and Christopher 
Kelly, eds., Judith R. Bush, Roger D. Masters, Christopher Kelly, and Terence Marshall, trans. (Hanover, 
NH: University Press of New England, 1992), 144 (emphasis added). 
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would simply be to regulate those affairs that the several states could not perform on their 
own.  Rousseau’s writings on this subject are limited, and in those writings, the internal 
organization of each state is left to be determined.  Nevertheless, it seems only logical to 
extend the principles of federalism as far as practicable.  Whether this is a truly palatable 
option for Rousseau is a separate—and likely unanswerable—question. 
Finally, Rousseau’s thoughts on the utility of public religion are difficult to 
decipher.  Clearly, Rousseau sees enough utility in the civil religion to prescribe 
sanctions for conduct that might be subversive of social and political order.  But if the 
civil religion is so important as to necessitate legal enforcement, it seems to make little 
sense for Rousseau to insist that the guiding principle behind the civil religion ought to be 
tolerance.74  After all, since the purpose of the civil religion is to bind citizens together, 
toleration seems to be counterintuitive.  Religious toleration seems to imply something 
far more permissive than what Rousseau has in mind.   
 The point is that for Rousseau, a civil religion entails at least an outward profession 
of belief in certain social dogmas—dogmas that happen to have a theological component 
(i.e., belief in an omnipotent and just God, punishment of the wicked).  Since Christianity 
dominated much of eighteenth-century Europe, most people would have accepted these 
very basic, core beliefs.  As such, these particular theological foundations would have 
been rather useful in promoting social cohesion because most people endorsed and shared 
them.  In another part of the world where Christianity was not the dominant religion, 
perhaps some other dogmas would suffice.   
 It might be asked whether the theological component of the civil religion is in fact 
                                                
74 “Tolerance should be shown to all those that tolerate others, so long as their dogmas contain nothing 
contrary to the duties of a citizen.”  SC IV.viii. 
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necessary.75  Can a civil religion be something that has either a very loose or weak 
theological foundation, or something that even has no theological foundation at all?  In 
other words, can it be something purely secular—something that requires adherence to 
certain social dogmas, but social dogmas that are devoid of any theological connotations 
whatsoever? 
                                                
75 After all, the word religion derives from the Latin religare, which has no theological connotation.  
Etymologically, the word comes from ligare, meaning to bind or tie.  The prefix “re” means “again” or 
implies some repetition.  Religare, then, simply means to bind back together. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Fathers as Founders and Founders as Fathers: 
Rousseau, Civic Education, and the Problem of Making Citizens and Men 
 
 
A father, when he engenders and feeds his children, does with that only a third of 
his task.  He owes to his species men; he owes to society sociable men; he owes to 
the state citizens.1 
 
When [Rousseau] called upon his readers to choose between man and the citizen 
he was forcing them to face the moral realities of social life.  They were asked, in 
fact, not to choose, but to recognize that the choice was impossible, and that they 
were not and would never become either men or citizens.2 
 
I.  Introduction 
Rousseau’s educational theory, as spelled out in the Social Contract and Emile, is at once 
systematic and irregular: systematic insofar as each treatise requires as a condition for 
success submission to an alien will; systematic to the extent that Rousseau delineates 
with precision the steps and conditions necessary to effect his prescriptions; systematic to 
the extent that both are remarkably consistent with respect to procedure and desired 
                                                
1 Rousseau, Emile, 49 (emphasis added).  On my reading, Rousseau’s maxim can be stated as follows: what 
we owe to one another, as parents and citizens, is nothing less (and nothing more) than the production of 
morally autonomous individuals who apprehend and act in accordance with the transcendent norms of 
right.  Two important though controversial ideas emerge from this maxim (the content and full implications 
of which cannot be explored here): first, the idea that parents incur an obligation not merely to raise their 
children, but to help cultivate in them a sufficient degree of moral autonomy.  In Rousseau’s opinion, this is 
a debt acquired by virtue of our primary natural right (the right to liberty), and it is a debt we cannot simply 
write off.  Second is the related, though arguably more controversial notion of transcendent right.  
Notwithstanding his lack of systematicity (in comparison with the likes of Kant or Hegel) and his more 
practically oriented approaches to “political science” in the Constitutional Project for Corsica and 
Considerations on the Government of Poland, Rousseau is decidedly not the positivist some make him out 
to be.  Hanley, for example, in an otherwise remarkable analysis of Rousseau and Adam Smith on the 
“science” of nation building, fails to appreciate both the deontological and Platonic underpinnings of 
Rousseau’s political thought as a whole.  See Ryan Hanley, “Enlightened Nation Building: The ‘Science of 
the Legislator’ in Adam Smith and Rousseau,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 2 
(2008): 219-234.  For a convincing (and unparalleled) defense of Rousseau as a Platonist, see Williams, 
Rousseau’s Platonic Enlightenment. 
 
2 Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens: A Study of Rousseau’s Social Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 214. 
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outcome (freedom); irregular—indeed paradoxical—insofar as each text proposes an 
exercise in total control3 that seems to produce two diametrically opposed forms of 
freedom, or two existences (the one partial, the other whole).  When considered 
independently, the prescriptions stand on solid ground, theoretically; when combined, 
Rousseau’s prescriptions issue in a seemingly irreconcilable paradox.4 
This seeming paradox results from an often overlooked, but significant 
connection between two of Rousseau’s most notable artificers, namely the Social 
Contract’s legislator and Emile’s tutor.  The legislator stands to be the father of a nation, 
the founder of public freedom, as it were; the tutor is quite literally the father of a man, or 
the founder of private, individual freedom.  The ends of each artificer seem incompatible 
and the two forms of freedom—civil and natural—incongruent.  At first glance, 
Rousseau’s educational paradox seems to turn solely on the ends of his artificers rather 
than their means.  In the Social Contract, the legislator exists in order to establish in the 
individual a complete and total dependence on the community.  In Emile, the tutor seeks 
to accomplish the opposite: rather than inculcating a sense of total dependence on others, 
                                                
3 David Gauthier, Rousseau: The Sentiment of Existence (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), 66. 
 
4 Much ink has been spilled on the subject of Rousseau’s paradoxes.  Rousseau is seen as either vacillant 
and imprecise in his opinion of the arts and sciences and religious toleration, for example; or he is simply 
taken to be the holder of two incommensurate (if incompatible) convictions—for example, his insistence on 
the need for public virtue, on the one hand, and his seeming embrace of the solitary life, on the other.  For 
Rousseau the vacillator, see, among others, Victor Gourevitch, “Rousseau on the Arts and Sciences,” 
Journal of Philosophy 69 (1972): 737-54.  For Rousseau as a deliberately incommensurate and 
contradictory social and political theorist, see Shklar, Men and Citizens and Jean Starobinski, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau: Transparency and Obstruction (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).  Shklar insists that 
Rousseau’s paradoxes are unavoidable byproducts of his pessimistic outlook on civil society and humanity 
in general.  I reject this interpretation as it pertains specifically to Rousseau’s theory of moral and civic 
education and I concur with Ruth Grant’s reading of Rousseau as a theorist of moral integrity.  Contra 
Shklar, Ruth Grant concludes that the “Rousseauian ideal [of integrity] is [not] withdrawal from public 
life.”  See Ruth W. Grant, “Integrity and Politics: An Alternative Reading of Rousseau,” Political Theory, 
Vol. 22, No. 3 (August 1994): 414-443.  For a more comprehensive analysis (and a rejection of views that 
hold Rousseau to be hopelessly and pointlessly paradoxical), see Stephen G. Salkever, “Interpreting 
Rousseau’s Paradoxes,” Eighteenth Century Studies, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1978): 204-226. 
  
 51 
his aim is to forestall denaturation in the individual, effectively cutting off the 
mechanisms by which dependencies are born.   
 But this is precisely where the difficulty arises: when the self-sufficient, whole 
individual is introduced to civil society—a world in which vice, vanity, and dependence 
abound—how will it be possible for Emile to remain free and independent?  If Rousseau 
is correct to assume civil society is inevitable and necessary, the two educational 
prescriptions appear to yield a paradox.  The legislator does not “create” citizens 
[citoyens], as it were, but facilitates the production (and reproduction) of citizens via the 
establishment of good institutions and laws.5  The tutor, on the other hand, cultivates 
natural freedom and moral autonomy in a child by way of a negative education (an 
education the content of which is firmly grounded in nature and experience).  At least, 
this is the standard reading of Rousseau Judith Shklar would have us embrace: that 
attempts to create both men and citizens were, in Rousseau’s view, impracticable and that 
both of Rousseau’s utopias ultimately reveal the impossibility of creating either men or 
citizens.   
I question the validity of such a reading and explore the means by which 
Rousseau’s apparently incompatible prescriptions might be reconciled.  I consider two 
possible interpretations of his educational theory and conclude, by way of a synthesis of 
these interpretations, that there is indeed no paradox at all.  Rather than viewing the 
educative ends of each artificer as mutually exclusive, I suggest a reading that identifies 
not merely a possible but a necessary convergence between the “founding” and “fatherly” 
roles of each figure.   
                                                
5 Men become “what they should become by means of law.”  SC, II.vii. 
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The first possible interpretation takes the work of the legislator to be necessarily 
prior and superior to that of the tutor and suggests that the work of the tutor would, in the 
grand scheme of things, be superfluous.  The implication is that approaching the ideal of 
the Social Contract—approximating political right—requires moral and civic education 
to be imparted solely from the top down. 
The second interpretation suggests the opposite: the work of the tutor is 
necessarily anterior and superior to that of the legislator.  This interpretation locates the 
results of Emile’s education prior to the ideal social and political order founded in the 
Social Contract.  The logic of this interpretation simply suggests that men must be made 
men before they can be made citizens.  On this reading, approaching the ideal would 
require moral and civic education to be imparted solely from the bottom up.   
My goal, however, is not simply to explore several alternative explanations of 
Rousseau’s educational theory; rather, I intend to show that the so-called paradox of 
founding6 is nonexistent.  Thus, I offer a third interpretation that synthesizes the first two: 
since moral goodness is necessary to moral virtue, and moral virtue is necessary to civic 
virtue, the legislator’s work is necessarily anterior, though not inferior to the tutor’s.  The 
legislator’s work—the founding of a political order based on principles of political 
right—necessarily precedes the work of the tutor, or the founding of moral right within 
                                                
6 Or, as Bonnie Honig understands it, the “paradox of politics.”  Honig is rightly skeptical of the very real 
temporal problem inherent in any theory of political founding, namely, the question of whether good law 
must necessarily precede good citizens (or vice versa).  However, Honig dismisses altogether the 
possibility of settling the temporal question in Rousseau’s thought and, ultimately, rejects any potential 
reconciliation of his paradox.  Notwithstanding the question of “democratic legitimation” (or the supposed 
betrayal of the democratic ideal posed by Rousseau’s legislator), Honig’s conclusion seems misguided.  
Like so many other interpreters of Rousseau’s founding paradox, Honig hones in on his discussion of the 
legislator in SC II.vii, to the exclusion of nearly all of Rousseau’s other pertinent writings on the matter 
(particularly Emile).  See Honig, “Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic 
Theory,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 101, no. 1 (2007): 1-17. 
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the individual.  This interpretation posits Emile’s private tutor and the Social Contract’s 
public legislator as civic analogues.  The end of each artificer is similar, though each 
operates on a different level.  By itself, the legislator’s work can only accomplish so 
much.  Likewise, the tutor’s work in educating an individual to moral autonomy and 
goodness in a corrupt society, however exemplary the individual may be, is only so 
useful. 
 
II.  Founders as Fathers: The Art of the Legislator, or “To Persuade without 
Convincing” 
In the Second Discourse, Rousseau purports to discover the causes of moral and political 
disparities among men.7  Natural man is a simple creature with no desires beyond 
immediate satiation; he is “numerical unity…the absolute whole which is relative only to 
itself or its kind.”8  Natural man is dependent only on himself, though at times he may 
pity others; indeed, he may be able to see himself in others, but he never requires their 
recognition.  On Rousseau’s account, self-love [amour de soi] and natural amour propre 
inevitably degenerate into unnatural amour propre9 and natural man, in turn, degenerates 
                                                
7 SD, 33, 38. 
   
8 Emile, 39. 
  
9 Rousseau does not suggest amour propre is entirely unnatural.  The disastrous psychological 
consequences of making vain comparisons to others is evident enough, though it is rather odd to read 
Rousseau as being so naïve as to suggest the mere act of comparing oneself to others is unnatural.  John 
Rawls adopts what he calls a “wide view” of Rousseau’s conception of amour propre and he clarifies the 
distinction quite nicely: “amour propre…is a need which directs us to secure for ourselves equal standing 
along with others and a position among our associates in which we are accepted as having needs and 
aspirations which must be taken into account on the same basis as those of everyone else.”  This is simply 
to say that we naturally recognize “the rightful limits that [others’] needs and rightful claims impose on 
us…provided our equal standing is accepted and made secure in social arrangements.”  Unnatural amour 
propre is the perversion of this need and is revealed “in such vices as vanity and arrogance, in the desire to 
be superior to and dominate others, and to be admired by them.”  Rawls, Lectures on the History of 
 54 
into civil man.  In his notes to the text, Allan Bloom underscores the centrality of amour 
propre to Emile and appreciates the relational feature Rousseau attributes to it.10  
However, Bloom seems to overlook the very point at which Rousseau makes the (albeit 
subtle) distinction between natural and unnatural amour propre:  
The sole passion natural to man is amour de soi or amour propre taken in an 
extended sense.  This amour propre in itself or relative to us is good and useful; 
and since it has no necessary relation to others, it is in this respect naturally 
neutral.  It becomes good or bad only by the application made of it and the 
relations given to it.11   
 
Rousseau’s point is not simply to demonstrate the incompatibility of natural and civil 
freedom.  To be sure, the man who lives according to nature and the man who lives in 
perpetual dependence on others are opposed; the social necessarily entails an annihilation 
of the natural.  However, “[f]orced to combat nature or the social institutions, one must 
choose between making a man or making a citizen, for one cannot make both at the same 
time.”12  This not only encapsulates Rousseau’s indifference to schemes of public and 
private education, it also seems to capture the core of what is presumably his paradox.   
For Rousseau, there are two ways to approach the problem of moral and civic 
education, though neither will yield perfect results.  Moreover, our approach will depend 
entirely on the condition in which we find a given people.  On the one hand, we can 
approach the problem with an eye toward making a particular society the best it can be, 
                                                
Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 198-99.  Cf. N.H. Dent, A Rousseau 
Dictionary (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) and Grant, “Integrity and Politics.” 
 
10 See Emile, 483-4 and Bloom’s note at 484 n.17. 
 
11 Emile, 92 (emphasis added).  Cf. Emile, 125. 
  
12 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
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that is, we can work within the insurmountable constraints a society already faces.13  On 
the other hand, Rousseau thinks we might be able to augment this approach by asking: 
What, if anything, can be done to bring a society to the point where it can begin to 
approach the ideal?  
Since civil society is unavoidable and necessary, any sound theory of moral and 
civic education must “take men as they are and laws as they can be.”14  It makes no sense 
to consider man’s potentiality apart from the influence of either social convention or 
nature.15  However, that the foundation of civil society is necessarily grounded in 
conventional right does not imply that natural right is unimportant or unrecoverable.  It 
does mean the human condition is such that conventional right is necessary to the partial, 
or approximate recovery of natural right.  Man’s potential is doubly constrained by 
convention (the laws) and by his natural constitution, but when convention seeks 
constantly to operate against rather than in conjunction with man’s natural constitution, 
this is a recipe for disaster.   
It might seem that political right requires convention to operate against man’s 
nature; there is, after all, a reason why the legislator is deemed “necessary.”16  But this is 
only half of the picture Rousseau wishes to paint.  If submission to “the supreme 
direction of the general will,”17 is the ostensible solution to the problem of creating 
                                                
13 This is Rousseau’s approach in Corsica and Poland.  For a recent treatment of this subject, see Jeffrey 
Smith, “Nature, Nation-Building, and the Seasons of Justice in Rousseau’s Political Thought,” The Review 
of Politics 68 (2006): 20-48. 
 
14 SC, Preface. 
 
15 Cf. Discourse on Political Economy. 
 
16 SC, II.vii. 
 
17 Ibid.   
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citizens, how are individuals in Rousseau’s prepolitical society capable of responding to 
such a call?  The legislator is to educate an uncorrupted society in a way that allows them 
to locate and follow the general will that is inside of them.  But the existence of such a 
society is taken for granted in the Social Contract—it is already there, untainted, waiting 
to receive what the legislator has to offer.  However, no such society actually exists.  In a 
non-ideal world, a world plagued by decadence and corruption, we must ask: How might 
such a society to come into being?  One possibility is to consider the legislator’s work as 
both necessary and sufficient to the foundation of a political order based on principles of 
political right.18   
On such a reading, the work of the legislator—the establishment of good 
institutions and a civic morality (a civic ethos)—would be necessarily anterior and 
superior to anything any hypothetical tutor(s) might hope to accomplish.  To be sure, the 
sufficiency of the legislator would seem to render all other “educations” unnecessary or 
superfluous at best.  The original compact, or the original convention from which a 
society comes into being might give the “body politic existence and life,” but it would 
still be necessary to “give it movement and will” by means of legislation, “[f]or the 
original [convention]…in no respect determines what [the body politic] ought to do for 
its preservation.”19  In other words, the social compact is sufficient to constitute a people, 
but social convention alone is unlikely to comport with the eternal and immutable 
precepts of right—standards that issue directly from God, as it were, but are nevertheless 
not immediately recognizable by all.  Indeed, “if we knew how to receive so high an 
inspiration, we should need neither government nor laws.  Doubtless, there is a universal 
                                                
18 Such a conclusion is possible only if we consider the Social Contract apart from Emile. 
   
19 SC, II.vi 
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justice emanating from reason alone; but this justice, to be admitted among us, must be 
mutual.”20  Here, the “laws of justice” are, in certain respects, akin to Locke’s natural 
law.  Likewise, the means by which humans apprehend Rousseau’s “universal justice” 
are not unlike the means by which humans grasp Locke’s natural law, namely via reason.  
But it is one thing to say the principles of right can be found in the hearts of men 
everywhere and that the capacity for reason is innate; it is another thing to assume either 
an instinctual apprehension of right or an innately perfect faculty of reason.  Reason is 
necessary but insufficient for the apprehension of right.  It is a capability and, like all 
capabilities, must be cultivated.  A person must be brought from childhood to the age of 
reason; reason does not simply emerge unassisted  
If the social compact can constitute a people but cannot make everyone 
reasonable enough to apprehend transcendent right, something else must be necessary.  
Indeed, “[c]onventions and laws are [necessary] to join rights to duties and refer justice to 
its object,”21 but this, it seems, is simply another way of saying the object of justice (the 
common good) must be demonstrated to a people via binding (tacit) agreements that take 
the form of fundamental, supreme laws—laws that are, in spirit and form, grounded in 
the eternal precepts of right.  A people may, over time, by social convention constitute 
itself as a people; but if a people is not reasonable enough to apprehend right, that is, to 
know always how to distinguish mere desires or preferences from true interests, how can 
it possibly give itself a political constitution?  If a people does not truly know “what it 
                                                
20 Ibid.  Though the arguments are by no means identical, James Madison’s claim in Federalist 51 echoes 
Rousseau on this point: “[W]hat is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human nature?  If 
men were angels, no government would be necessary.”  Cf. James Madison, Federalist 43. 
 
21 SC, II.vi. 
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wills, because it rarely knows what is good for it,”22 how can a people possibly engage in, 
much less succeed at the project of foundational statecraft?  Here, Rousseau is quite 
emphatic:  
The general will is always in the right, but the judgment which guides it is not 
always enlightened…[I]ndividuals see the good they reject; the public wills the 
good it does not see.  All stand equally in need of guidance.  The former must be 
compelled to bring their wills into conformity with their reason; the latter must be 
taught to know what it wills.  If that is done, public enlightenment leads to the 
union of understanding and will in the social body: the parts are made to work 
exactly together, and the whole is raised to its highest power.  This makes a 
legislator necessary.23   
 
The fallibility of human reason is, from time to time, bound to cause public judgment to 
go awry and, notwithstanding the knowledge that they betray the public good, individuals 
are likely to be seduced by self-interest.  Thus, all (the individuals and the public) “stand 
in need of guidance,” which is simply to say education is necessary not merely for the 
sake of utility and order, but to unite “understanding and will,” that is, for the public both 
to know and to will the common good.   
 Only a wise legislator can fulfill the public’s need for guidance.  Rousseau likens 
this figure to an “engineer…who invents the [constitutional] machine” which helps to 
“mould” the people into the citizens they ought to be.24  But the people are unlikely to 
recognize a legislator’s superior wisdom and they will likely be incapable of grasping his 
abstractions, for his “ideas…[are] too general” and the objects to which they refer “too 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
 
24 Ibid., II.vii. 
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remote.”25  Like the authors of The Federalist, Rousseau is acutely aware that people are 
motivated first and foremost by interest26:  
[E]ach individual, having no taste for any other plan of government than that 
which suits his particular interest, finds it difficult to realize the advantages he 
might hope to draw from the continual privations good laws impose.  For a young 
people to be able to relish sound principles of political theory and follow the 
fundamental rules of statecraft, the effect would have to become the cause; the 
social spirit, which should be created by these institutions, would have to preside 
over their very foundation; and men would have to be before law what they 
should become by means of law.27 
 
Since reason will be ineffectual in the legislator’s attempts to “persuade” the public, he 
must “have recourse to an authority of a different order.”28  Like children, only 
immediate and palpable interests motivate a public; it is incapable of being persuaded by 
ideas it cannot comprehend.  Thus, the legislator must repair to divinity as the source of 
his wisdom, for this is the only means by which he can “persuade” a people that its 
submission to the “laws of the State [and]…of nature” is both necessary and (ostensibly) 
voluntary.29  It should go without saying that while the legislator must have recourse to 
divinity, his knowledge of moral and political right must nevertheless be genuine.  It is 
easy to fool a mass of individuals who are, more or less, as reasonable as children, but 
                                                
25 Ibid.  
 
26 Though I can only broach the topic here, it is worth noting that Madison did not fully embrace the view 
that interests alone motivate human conduct.  While it might not be entirely evident from Madison’s 
contributions to The Federalist, he, unlike Hamilton, did in fact make greater room for the power of ideas 
(and ideals) in his political theory.  Like Jefferson, Madison took interest to be a significant motivator for 
human action and conduct, but in no way did either man see interest as the most significant force at work.  
For an unsurpassed treatment of this subject as well as a brief (though, I think, not entirely correct) 
assessment of Rousseau’s theory of public opinion vis-à-vis Madison’s, see Colleen Sheehan, James 
Madison and the Spirit of Republican Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 
27 SC, II.vii. 
 
28 Ibid. 
 
29 Ibid. 
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indulgence, extravagance, and trickery are capable of producing at best only a transient 
foundation.  “Idle tricks,” Rousseau says, “form only a passing tie; only [the] wisdom [of 
great men] can make it lasting.”  Truly admirable is the “genius which presides over 
[institutions] made to endure.”30   
Yet, it seems a legislator can only accomplish so much by establishing good 
institutions, however much these institutions comport with right, for the human condition 
is such that “what right sanctions” will inevitably conflict with “what is prescribed by 
interest.”31  That Rousseau takes the legislator to be necessary in no way implies the 
legislator is sufficient.  “Individuals must be compelled,” while the “public…must be 
taught to know what it wills.”32  The public is taught, as it were, through institutions and 
foundational law; individuals must be compelled to learn.33 
It appears to be the case that the perpetuation of institutions and the fortification 
of civic morality, though conducive to political stability, are insufficient to guarantee 
“justice and utility may in no case be divided.”34  Founding-legislation (a political 
constitution) may comport to a greater or lesser degree with the principles of political 
right in form, but this in no way warrants political right in practice.  The founding of a 
political order that is merely based on principles of right is not ipso facto a political order 
                                                
30 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
   
31 Ibid., Preface. 
  
32 Ibid., II.vi (emphasis added). 
 
33 Individuals must be compulsorily educated “to bring their wills into conformity with their reason.”  
(Ibid.)  Of course, Rousseau is not merely referring to compulsory education, but also the force of law. 
  
34 Ibid., Preface. 
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that accords with right.  Such a founding is thus neither complete nor genuine.35  Nor can 
political right be established unilaterally or from one direction: a legislator may establish 
a constitutional foundation that provides a modicum of public “goodness,” but it is not 
possible to legislate public virtue.  A legislator might make a public “good” by giving it a 
sound constitutional foundation, but he is capable of nothing more.  All he can do (and all 
institutions can do) is “teach” the public “to know what it wills.” 
Since the generality of the popular will—the extent to which the popular will 
conforms to the standards of transcendent right (or, the extent to which it approaches the 
“limit” of right)—is the surest measure of political legitimacy, it can hardly be concluded 
that the work of the legislator is sufficient.  In creating “good enough” citizens, the 
legislator accomplishes only half of what is necessary.  Political right demands a 
legitimate popular will, which requires uncompromised public reason, which is to say 
that if individuals can guard against natural reason36 being swayed by amour propre, they 
will be more capable of placing the “I into the common.”37   
Ultimately, political right demands more than “good enough” citizens; it requires 
public virtue, something the legislator simply cannot legislate.  This problem did not 
escape Rousseau.  In fact, he was well attuned to the difficulties associated with locating, 
let alone molding an uncorrupted people into a bona fide nation, or a political order that 
                                                
35 A genuine founding is not something that is accomplished with the stroke of a pen (or even an act of 
force).  That the United States was not necessarily “founded” with the drafting and ratification of the 
Constitution in 1787-88 is obvious.  However, the conceptual license I take with the term “founding” is, I 
believe, warranted.  Moreover, casting the act of political founding in such exaggerated terms is consistent 
with Rousseau’s own tendency toward hyperbole. 
 
36 Pure, or natural reason is reason aided by compassion; impure, or unnatural reason is reason 
compromised by unnatural amour propre and the passions, and is marked, for example, by a failure to 
extend amour de soi to others.  See SD, 54-5. 
 
37 Emile, 39-40. 
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comports with right.  If the creation of “good enough” citizens fails to meet the demands 
of justice, then we must consider a different approach.  We must ask whether it is 
necessary and sufficient to create men before we create citizens so that interest may 
comport with right.  In the next section, I consider the possibility of just such a bottom-up 
approach to moral and civic education, or the question of whether a founding of moral 
right in the individual is necessary and sufficient to the foundation of political right. 
 
III.  Fathers as Founders: “Steep them in the water of the Styx…”  
It is typical to read Rousseau as saying that the creation of both men and citizens is 
impossible.  Creating an ideal individual—one who is self-sufficient and good, and who 
willingly bears the “yoke of necessity”—would seem to involve shielding that individual 
from the corrupting effects of a society afflicted with unbridled amour propre.  The 
creation of ideal citizens, on the other hand, requires a society to be engineered such that 
individuals are capable of supplanting their private interests for the interests of the 
common.  Yet, as we have seen, the latter assumes the existence of an uncorrupted 
society, a clean slate, so to speak, wherein a wise legislator simply sets an institutional 
machine into motion.  Since human nature is not a blank slate—since there are innate 
features of the human psyche that cannot simply be overridden by institutional design and 
positive educational mechanisms—it seems the deeper question is not: What is the best 
way to mold citizens or educate people for citizenship?38  Instead, we should ask: Given 
that “there is, at the bottom of all souls, an innate principle of justice and moral 
                                                
38 This question amounts to nothing more than: How do we go about shaping human beings so that they 
conform to a misguided standard of political right? 
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truth…prior to all…maxims of education,”39 and, given that humans are weak by nature 
and easily seduced by temptations contrary to right, what is the best way to cultivate and 
preserve, to the greatest extent possible, the natural disposition to goodness?   
Rousseau suggests that we cannot make men and citizens “at the same time.”40  
However, that we cannot make both simultaneously in no way implies that we cannot 
(and should not) attempt to make both.  Even in an ideal situation, institutions are capable 
only of producing merely “good enough” citizens.  But we cannot hope to make ideal 
men (men who are good and virtuous) apart from civil society and political institutions.  
Thus, the non-ideal scenario requires something supplemental to the foundation of good 
institutions.  If justice and the happiness [bonheur] of society are taken to be the ultimate 
ends of any legitimate political order, and since right dictates that the object of the 
general will is the common good, it follows that the popular will ought to aim for justice 
and public happiness (which can only mean that each individual must also will the same).   
This brings us to the crux of Rousseau’s problem: how to get self-interested 
individuals to apprehend the true form of justice and will public happiness.  
Unfortunately, neither object is visible or palpable, so neither is likely to move the 
individual.  But if the sentiment of justice is indeed innate and if properly cultivated 
reason can galvanize this sentiment, perhaps the prospects for justice and public 
happiness might not be as bleak as they seem.  What we need is to find a way to work 
                                                
39 Rousseau, “Moral Letters,” in Collected Writings of Rousseau, vol. 12, eds., Roger D. Masters and 
Christopher Kelly, trans. Christopher Kelly (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 2006): 175-
203. 
 
40 Emile, 39. 
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with nature, rather than against it; we must find a way to cultivate and preserve the latent 
capacity for goodness in human beings.   
Where we go wrong, Rousseau believes, is in our very attempt to create men and 
citizens simultaneously.41  Our fundamental error is to ignore the priority of moral right 
to political right, or to deny that political right, though established by convention, must 
comport with moral right.42  Natural right implies a right to freedom (man’s primary 
right), a right that is sacred and inviolable, but the necessity of social order demands the 
natural right to freedom be circumscribed; civil man must recognize the fact of 
interdependence and the impossibility of maintaining his absolute existence.  
Conventional right thus becomes sacred, but we must not fail to judge it based on the 
degree to which it approximates and preserves natural right.  The fact of interdependence 
and the necessity of sociability in no way negate man’s right to freedom; these conditions 
simply place conventional limits on natural freedom.  
Thus, it seems that in order to make the individual both a man and a citizen, he 
must be educated like Emile, for only then will he be able to learn—to know—his rights 
and duties and those of humanity.  The education Emile receives as a child enables him 
to become first a man: a being who is self-sufficient, independent, and cognizant of his 
natural rights and duties—a being who is good for himself.  Second, this education helps 
Emile to become a sociable man: a being who recognizes and respects the rights of others 
and is mindful of his duties—a being who is morally good, that is, not merely good for 
                                                
41 According to Rousseau, this is Locke’s fundamental error.  Although he praises Locke on several 
occasions, Rousseau ultimately believes that Locke’s method (and, by implication, the method of educating 
“gentlemen” that was common throughout Europe at the time) is backwards and inappropriate.  See John 
Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education. 
 
42 See SC, I.i: “[T]he social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights.  Nevertheless, this 
right does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.”  
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himself, but good for others.  This much can be accomplished if the tutor is diligent and 
ensures that Emile’s education consists not in precepts or commands, but in experience.  
Finally, as we shall see, this education also enables Emile to become a citizen.  
Ultimately, Rousseau is concerned to cultivate in Emile the natural sentiments 
civil society tends to erode.43  If Emile’s primary right (and primary interest) is liberty, 
this is where his education should begin.  Rather than begin with reason (as Locke would 
have it), Rousseau follows nature’s course and begins with sensation.  Accordingly, 
Emile enters the age of reason free from dependence on the opinions of others.  He will 
have experienced childhood as it was meant to be experienced; he will have learned what 
it means to be good and decent, to respect and honor the dignity of humanity.  
Experiencing childhood in its natural grandeur serves a dual purpose for Emile: it helps 
him to find true happiness (for man’s miseries consist largely in seeking happiness in all 
the wrong ways and all the wrong places) and it teaches him to “bear the yoke of 
necessity.”  This, Rousseau believes, is the key to producing not merely an individual, but 
a genuinely sociable man.44   
In learning to secure his own happiness and not extend his desires beyond his 
capabilities, Emile will, theoretically, remain whole and sufficient unto himself.  
                                                
43 Rousseau’s aim is not, as some have claimed, to create a civilized savage.  Emile’s natural sentiments 
might, in Rousseau’s estimation, be on a par with those of savage man, but the ultimate goal is to cultivate 
and preserve Emile’s natural reason and liberty.  Though Rousseau’s moral sense psychology is apparent 
across his works, a thorough treatment of the topic is taken up in Emile, wherein the tutor is concerned with 
“the cultivation of a sort of sixth sense called common sense, less because it is common to all men than 
because it results from the well-regulated use of the other senses, and because it instructs us about the 
nature of things by the conjunction of all their appearances.”  Emile, 157.   
 
44 Rousseau’s exhortation to fathers everywhere is simple: “Men, be humane.  This is your first 
duty…Fathers, do you know the moment when death awaits your children?  Do not prepare regrets for 
yourself in depriving them of the few instants nature gives them.  As soon as they can sense the pleasure of 
being, arrange it so that they can enjoy it, arrange it so that at whatever hour God summons them they do 
not die without having tasted life.”  Emile, 79. 
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However, Emile will be unable to find happiness as an adult unless he learns to conquer 
his passions.45  Heretofore, the tutor will have protected Emile from the “empire of the 
passions” and helped him to secure a certain emotional disposition, a Stoic “inner calm,” 
as it were.  “But,” the tutor says, “it is in vain that I have dipped your soul in the Styx; I 
was not able to make it everywhere invulnerable.  A new enemy is arising which you 
have not learned to conquer and from which I can no longer save you.  This enemy is 
yourself.”46  Prior to the age of reason, Emile was bound only by the constraints nature 
imposed on him.  Now Emile is also subjected to his desires, “bound to all the 
attachments” he chooses to give himself.  If he is to remain free, he must learn to impose 
constraints upon his heart, for the disorders of life “[arise] from our affections far more 
than from our needs.”47 
If Rousseau is correct and the heart indeed has its own appetites, then we must 
learn to satisfy them.  However, since it is not always clear exactly how to satisfy these 
appetites, it is possible to mistake what we desire for what we need.  Likewise, it is 
possible to succumb to desires that result in the creation of certain necessary attachments 
(in Emile’s case, his attachment to Sophie).  With the extension of our desires comes an 
inevitable diminution of our capacity to fulfill them.  Man’s genuine needs are few, but 
                                                
45 To impart this lesson, the tutor appeals to Emile’s one and only passion, namely his beloved, Sophie.  
“What would you do…if Sophie [were] dead?” he asks, to which Emile responds with indignation.  After 
reassuring Emile that Sophie is alive and well, the tutor reveals the point behind this lesson and what is to 
follow: “The passion with which [Emile] is preoccupied no longer permits him to give himself to purely 
reasoned conversations as he had before.  I have to interest him by this very passion to make him attentive 
to my lessons.  This is what I have done by the terrible preamble.”  Emile, 442 (emphasis added). 
 
46 Ibid. 
 
47 Ibid., 443. 
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by his own volition, man develops numerous, crippling dependencies.48  In giving 
himself over to his beloved—in creating an attachment (albeit a necessary one in the 
end)—Emile comes to grips with the fact that he will eventually lose Sophie; he comes to 
apprehend the transitory nature of all things and all relationships in this world.  
What, then, is Emile to do?  How can he remain happy in a world of uncertainty 
and anxiety, a world of inquiétude and merely transitory relationships?  What is to 
become of the self-sufficient man, the whole and complete being whose existence is now, 
of his own free will, partial and incomplete, dependent, as it were, on the will of his 
beloved?  This is a pivotal moment—if not the pivotal moment—in the education of a 
man, for it is here that Emile learns the road to true happiness.  “You must be happy,” the 
tutor reiterates, for  
[happiness] is the goal of every being which senses.  That is the first desire which 
nature has impressed on us, and the only one which never leaves us.  But where is 
happiness?...[W]hen I took you in my arms at your birth and, calling to the 
Supreme Being to be witness of the commitment I dared to contract, dedicated my 
days to the happiness of yours, did I myself know what I was committing myself 
to?  No, I only knew that in making you happy, I was sure to be.  In making this 
useful quest for you, I was making it for both of us in common.49 
 
The tutor is not unaware of the nature of the commitment he made at Emile’s birth.  It is 
he alone who voluntarily obligated himself to helping Emile learn to be a happy child, a 
child that would, someday, be able to find happiness on his own as an adult.  The tutor is 
not ignorant of the content of his obligation, but he is far from certain precisely how 
                                                
48 Ibid. 
 
49 Ibid., 442. 
 
 68 
things will turn out.  And this makes perfect sense, for Rousseau does not fail to ascribe 
fallibility even to his gouverneurs, who are, after all, only human.50  
The tutor knows he has committed himself to Emile’s happiness, which implies 
that the tutor knows what human happiness is.  As it turns out, human happiness is not all 
that complex, though it is rather difficult to attain.  Yet happiness is elusive only because 
we choose to make it so:  “[U]nhappiness consists…in the disproportion between our 
desires and our faculties.  A being endowed with senses whose faculties equaled his 
desires would be an absolutely happy being.”51  Of course, no such human being exists.  
Thus, the road to true happiness consists not in suppressing desire, but in “diminishing 
the excess…and putting power and will in perfect equality.”52  This is the best the tutor 
can hope for, which suggests that even in the ideal world human potential is not 
unlimited.  Emile will become an adult who knows how to keep his desires proportional 
to his faculties; he will neither desire what he cannot have nor try to have that which he 
ought not to desire. 
We must bear in mind that the tutor is a proxy, or surrogate father who voluntarily 
incurs the obligation of raising Emile.  In doing so, he expressly consents to the terms 
such a commitment necessarily entails.  But the tutor goes one step further: he commits 
himself to Emile’s happiness, both present and future.  So the question is this: Though 
the tutor expressly commits himself to Emile’s happiness, is such a commitment already 
(and necessarily) implied by the promise?  Can one even promise to undertake a 
commitment to raise a child without simultaneously promising to fulfill, to the best of 
                                                
50 Even the legislator is but an “extraordinary man in the state.”  SC, II.vii (emphasis added). 
 
51 Emile, 80. 
  
52 Ibid. 
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one’s ability, the obligation to ensure the child’s well-being?  Put differently, is an 
obligation to ensure a child’s well-being embedded within the more general promise to 
“raise” a child?  In voluntarily agreeing to take on the duties of Emile’s actual parents, 
the tutor agreed therewith to be bound by a certain authority—not the authority of 
Emile’s parents, but rather a supreme moral authority. 
While the obligation to raise Emile derives from the tutor’s explicit promise, his 
consent obligates him not merely to raise Emile, but to ensure his well-being, that is, to 
make him a morally autonomous individual—a man.53  The tutor’s responsibility is to 
help Emile get to the point where he can find his own happiness, to cultivate Emile’s 
capacity to discover his own imperatives.  The tutor helps, but he neither cossets nor 
coddles; nor does he positively assist.  Emile learns under the artifice of the tutor, though 
he never utters those potentially destructive words, “aidez-moi,” nor is he compelled to 
do so.  The tutor’s obligation is indeed grounded in an act of voluntary consent, yet from 
the beginning the content of that obligation seems to have derived from something 
deeper—namely, from the recognition of a uniquely human need, a need that extends 
beyond the care and protection necessary to infant survival, beyond the need for an adult 
to render assistance to a being incapable of caring for itself.  This uniquely human need is 
love: though unable to speak at birth, an infant’s cries are not merely cries for help; they 
are also, and more importantly, disguised, though resonant utterances of “aimez-moi.”  
The human capacity for autonomy can be cultivated neither by precept nor by positive 
assistance alone.  Full development of the capacity requires the help of others, to be sure, 
                                                
53 Actual parents, however, do not expressly consent, nor do they need to.  Likewise, the tacit consent of 
actual parents is neither required nor possible.  Actual parents voluntarily incur the obligation to ensure 
their children’s well-being insofar as the act of conception is purely voluntary.  However, there must be a 
point at which voluntarism fails to account for the obligations parents have to their offspring. 
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but this help must be rendered in a particular form, namely the form of love.  Hence, the 
tutor’s guidance—his governing—consists not in le donner de l’aide, but in le donner de 
l’amour. 
Just as the tutor had to find the strength necessary to raise Emile—that is, to give 
Emile the love that the cultivation of autonomy requires—Emile must now find that same 
strength in himself if he is to find happiness.  But, again, happiness is a rather elusive 
thing, particularly for those with weak hearts and uncontrollable passions.  Indeed, one 
must be courageous in seeking happiness.54  Emile must learn to conquer his affections; 
he must learn “to put power and will in perfect equality,” lest he permanently enslave 
himself to his passions; he must learn to galvanize his will and be strong—he must learn 
to be virtuous.  And the virtuous man is simply the man who can “conquer his 
affections,” for in learning to do so, such a man “follows his reason and his 
conscience…does his duty…keeps himself in order, and nothing can make him deviate 
from it.”55   
 Rousseau’s point, I think, is rather simple (if controversial): freedom and virtue 
are two sides of the same coin.  In order to be truly free, the passions must be 
circumscribed and the heart reigned in by reason.  The more we are enslaved to the 
passions, the weaker we become (and the more our desires expand).  However, Rousseau 
is not advocating suppressing the passions, for the passions are natural and even good if 
controlled; suppression is wholly unnatural and undesirable.  Only when we allow 
                                                
54 The tutor cautions Emile: “My child, there is no happiness without courage nor virtue without 
struggle…Strength is the foundation of all virtue.  Virtue belongs to a being that is weak by nature and 
strong by will.  It is in this that the merit of the just man consists.”  Emile, 444. 
 
55 Ibid., 444-5. 
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ourselves to be enslaved by the passions do they become problematic (or bad).  Although 
we can neither subdue the passions nor eliminate the causes, we can control their effects 
on the will.  
 Assuming he can learn to circumscribe his passions, Emile will have become the 
morally virtuous being he ought to be.  But citizenship requires more: Emile must 
experience the world as it is, behind the mask; and he must learn to judge and act in 
accordance with a certain standard of political right.  Emile will study the moral and 
political vices of other peoples, after which he will return home to become a father; then, 
and only then, will he rightfully become both a man and a citizen.  Let us turn now to the 
final stage of Emile’s education and examine the link between the legislator and the tutor 
and the convergence of their “fatherly” roles. 
 
IV.  Linking the Tutor and the Legislator: Creating the Patrie, or The Problem of 
Perpetual Founding  
 
Jean Bloch identifies the tension between Emile and the Social Contract as a tension 
between opposing theses of private and public education.56  Like Shklar, Bloch suggests 
that although Rousseau appears to have wanted to reconcile this tension by way of 
synthesis, he actually never intended to do so.  I argue that such a reading is misguided, 
that men can indeed be made citizens though, as Rousseau rightfully maintains, not 
simultaneously.  It might seem as if one is not a citizen unless one is first a man.  To the 
contrary, the making of a citizen actually requires both the artifice of the legislator and 
the artifice of the tutor.  It requires first the making of a man, a morally autonomous 
                                                
56 Jean Bloch, Rousseauism and Education in Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 
1995), 9-10. 
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individual: one who can conquer his affections; one who is not enslaved to his passions; 
one who is not subjected to the opinions of others; one who knows right and is subjected 
to virtue.  Just as the moral individual is capable of conquering his affections and 
recognizing both his rights and duties to others, a citizen is capable of the same.  This 
simply amounts to finding the general will that is inside of oneself, or knowing how to 
act in accordance with moral and public right despite self-interest.  Thus, both public and 
private virtue seem to amount to the same thing: being and doing good not only for 
oneself, but also for others.57 
However, an important question remains: How are we to reconcile Rousseau’s 
apparently incommensurate positions in the Social Contract and Emile?  Rousseau 
appears to be endorsing both public and private education, though he clearly indicates it 
is not possible to succeed at both.  William Boyd illustrates this discrepancy by pointing 
to Rousseau’s subjects in both Emile and Poland.58  In the former, Rousseau’s concern is 
education of the individual, or private education with the purpose of bringing the 
individual to his fullest potential.  In the latter, Rousseau’s aim is to offer practical 
prescriptions for a people incapable of receiving the legislator’s instruction (a people too 
corrupted by the deleterious effects of amour propre).  Henry Perkinson suggests that this 
view fails to account for Rousseau’s true intentions, spelled out only subtly in Emile: 
                                                
57 This seems to be the point of the scene in Book V where Emile breaks his promise to Sophie and arrives 
late as a result of having to render aid to an injured man and his pregnant wife.  To a piqued Sophie, Emile 
emphatically declares: “‘[Y]ou are the arbiter of my fate...You can make me die of pain.  But do not hope 
to make me forget the rights of humanity.  They are more sacred to me than yours’.”  The example of 
Emile helping the injured man and the pregnant woman seems to suggest a “can implies ought” maxim.  
Emile had an obligation to Sophie insofar as he promised to meet her at a certain time; he was thus morally 
obligated to make good on that promise.  However, since human life was at stake and Emile was capable of 
rendering aid, his obligation to Sophie was overridden.  See Emile, 439-441ff. 
   
58 See William Boyd, The Educational Theory of Jean-Jacques Rousseau (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1963) 
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“The public institute does not and cannot exist, for there is neither country nor patriot.  
The very words should be struck out of our language.”59  A comparison of this translation 
(Perkinson’s own) to Allan Bloom’s is revealing: “Public instruction no longer exists and 
can no longer exist, because where there is no longer fatherland [patrie], there can no 
longer be citizens.  These two words, fatherland and citizen, should be effaced from 
modern languages.”60   
While the first translation points to Rousseau’s distrust of illegitimate 
governments and their inability to produce true citizens, Bloom’s translation suggests 
something more significant, something more in tune with Rousseau’s (perhaps overly-
romanticized) republican vision: the need not simply to educate the individual toward the 
goal of perpetuating the common good, but to educate the individual in a way that is 
conducive to reclaiming or rediscovering the seemingly lost principles of republican 
citizenship.  At the very least, Rousseau wants to piece together and reinforce the last 
remaining vestiges of the republican ideal; he wants to find a new way to mold morally 
responsible and civically virtuous citizens.  Although Perkinson’s analysis does suggest 
that Rousseau’s ultimate aim was always citizenship in a legitimate political society, 
Rousseau’s affinity for patrie clearly escapes him. 
Having become an ideal man, Emile will become an ideal citizen by doing two 
things.  First, he will leave his beloved Sophie temporarily to travel the world and study 
foreign political orders.  Second, upon his return, Emile will become a father.  In the 
course of his observations, he will learn to assess the merits of positive political right 
                                                
59 Emile, cited in Perkinson, 91. 
  
60 Emile, 40 (emphasis added). 
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(laws and institutions) according to standard (transcendent) principles of political right, 
for “[i]t is necessary to know what ought to be in order to judge soundly about what is.”61  
But there lies a difficulty in such an enterprise: in order to get Emile to care sincerely 
about positive political right, it is not enough simply for him to know the standards by 
which to measure it; he must also have a palpable interest in both.   
Rousseau takes “interest” to be the primary motivator for human conduct and, 
accordingly, this is where Emile’s education began.  As a child, he learned only useful 
things and his rudimentary reasoning skills were cultivated in conjunction with his 
natural sentiments via experience, as was his simple yet unrefined understanding of basic 
rights and duties.62  Emile’s adolescent education consisted in transforming these 
experiences and sensations into perceptions or ideas, in cultivating and sharpening his 
reasoning skills, and in acquiring a broader understanding of his rights and interests and 
the ways in which they relate to the rights and interests of others.  Now, as a young man, 
interest must remain the primary mover.  Thus, regarding the purely civic component of 
Emile’s education, Rousseau insists that the “greatest difficulty” lies in getting Emile to 
have a sincere interest in “answering these two questions: What importance does it have 
for me? and What can I do about it?”63 
In order to be an ideal citizen, Emile must be able to acknowledge the common 
interests his community.  He must be capable of supplanting his private interest for the 
common good.  As an ideal citizen, Emile will remain as free as he was prior to 
                                                
61 Ibid., 458. 
 
62 Some notable examples include, among others: the lesson in property rights with the gardener, the cake 
race (a lesson in personal excellence), and the scene with the magician (a lesson in humility). 
 
63 Emile, 458. 
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becoming an adult not because he will have submitted his will to the will of all, but 
because his moral constitution is such that the voice of right will always be audible.  
Moreover, he will have the courage to be strong in his will; he will have the strength of 
will always to do what is right—he will be virtuous.  The true citizen, then, is the very 
being in whom the common is realized completely.64 
Although Emile is self-sufficient by the end of his education, Rousseau rightfully 
insists that civil society is necessary and the tutor insists Emile not abandon it.  
According to Bloch, although Rousseau detested the miserable failures of eighteenth 
century public education, he actually favored public over private education, claiming that 
it would never be possible for the privately educated man to become virtuous.65  In no 
uncertain terms, the tutor urges Emile to submit to the general will, to revere and serve 
the patrie.  While not necessarily enabling Emile to become virtuous, the patrie has 
afforded him the opportunity to develop his potential and, accordingly, the tutor exhorts 
Emile to recognize and honor the commitment he has tacitly incurred.66 
Yet, if public education is indeed the best way to teach individuals to supplant 
their private interests for the common good, it must still be the case that such an 
undertaking is possible only in an uncorrupted society.67  It seems that the ideal citizen 
cannot be constructed from the samples provided by civil society, samples that are 
                                                
64 This is consonant with Rousseau’s claim that, prior to the establishment of civil society, human existence 
was wholly inward, “an existence defined by the absence of the in-common.”  See Strong, 52. 
  
65 Bloch, 12-13. 
  
66 See Emile, 473: “Where is the good man who owes nothing to his country?  Whatever country it is, he 
owes it what is most precious to man—the morality of his actions and the love of virtue.”  Cf. Aristotle, 
Politics, 1253a. 
   
67 Bloch, 13.  Cf. Discourse on Political Economy. 
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ostensibly corrupted beyond repair.  For Rousseau, the only way to produce a genuine 
citizen is to educate him as nature would educate him were there no civil society and then 
introduce him to civil society once he is capable of apprehending the meaning and 
significance of his duties.  Emile’s entrance into early adulthood is thus a pivotal point in 
his education.  In order for Emile to be integrated effectively into civil society, the tutor 
must desist in sheltering him from the rest of the world; he must no longer prevent Emile 
from bearing witness to men as they are: denatured (in a corrupt way) and dissembling.68  
What Emile will now learn is that, unlike most others, he does not live behind a guise.  
He is not a slave to amour propre and, like natural man, Emile experiences complete 
freedom and autonomy because he is not dependent on others for help and recognition. 
At this point the negative education of the tutor ceases and is replaced by self-
discipline.69  However, because Emile is truly autonomous, a problem arises: if he is to 
enter civil society and remain uncorrupted, he must permit the tutor to continue educating 
him.  Yet, his autonomy precludes him from being involuntarily subjected to the tutor’s 
will.  Rousseau is confident the tutor’s work will have succeeded up to this point and 
foresees the obstacle that is Emile’s autonomy.  Emile must voluntarily consent to the 
tutor’s educative authority if he is to learn how to deal with civil men, or men who live 
behind masks in a world of false appearances.  Since “Emile is not made to remain 
always solitary” and, “ [a]s a member of society he ought to fulfill its duties,”70 Emile 
must contract with the tutor.  Only in doing so will Emile learn to be his “own master and 
                                                
68 See Emile, 230. 
 
69 Geraint Parry, “Emile: Learning to Be Men, Women, and Citizens,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Rousseau, ed. Patrick Riley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 259. 
 
70 Emile, 327. 
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to obey not [his] senses but [his] reason.”71  In short, Emile’s education guarantees that 
since he is self-sufficient and free from the baneful effects of amour propre, he will find 
it easy to suppress his private will for the sake of the common good (for his education has 
allowed him to retain that which is natural, namely pitié, or the extension of amour de soi 
to others).     
Let us return now to Rousseau’s understanding of patrie.  Geraint Parry insists 
that Emile’s political education is not meant to compel him to engage in politics.72  This 
conclusion is typical of many interpretations and seems consistent with the tutor’s speech 
on political right in Book V.  However, ending here fails to account for the true 
significance of the tutor’s exhortation not only for Emile to serve the common good, but 
also to become a father.  For Rousseau, the first society is the family: “[it] is…the 
prototype of political societies; the leader is the image of the father, the populace [that] of 
the children.”73  This conception mirrors precisely the relationship between tutor and 
pupil: the tutor establishes an artificial bond that appears natural, though once Emile 
reaches adulthood the bond is altered and Emile remains united to the tutor voluntarily.  
Yet, this also mirrors the relationship between the legislator and the people in the Social 
Contract.  Thus, we must ask: Is the tutor analogous to the legislator or is one necessary 
to the other?  The analogy seems to hold, though in reality the work of the legislator 
would in fact be necessary to the existence of the tutor.  Moreover, it seems that the work 
of the tutor would be necessary to get a people to the point where the legislator’s work is 
                                                
71 Ibid., 325. 
 
72 Parry, 260. 
 
73 SC, I.ii.  Cf. Rousseau’s remarks on paternal right and filial obligation in SD, 73. 
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no longer needed (an ideal, of course, and a condition which is unlikely to be met; but 
approximation of the ideal is the point, not perfection).  
The final words of Emile, I think, point to the possibility of the tutor qua 
legislator at the level of the individual, for there is indeed nothing in the Social Contract 
to suggest the legislator stands over and above the community.74  The tutor is, at least 
symbolically, the “father” of a nation by first being a father to Emile.  When Emile’s 
“functions as a man begin”—when he becomes a father—the tutor effectively becomes a 
legislator (though perhaps not the legislator).  The parallel is thus: the tutor (the ideal 
father) educates his pupil (his son) to be an ideal father who, by emulation, serves as an 
example for his own son (and other future fathers),75 thereby creating what we might call 
a literal patrie, a fatherland, or a land of fathers.  Emile’s own exhortation to his tutor to 
continue instructing others testifies to Emile’s true aim in society, his true civic duty:  
My master, congratulate your child.  He hopes soon to have the honor of being a 
father…God forbid that I let you also raise the son after having raised the 
father…But remain the master of the young masters…I need you more than ever 
now that my functions as a man begin.  You have fulfilled yours.  Guide me so 
that I can imitate you.76 
 
Still, the possibility of fathers creating ideal men and citizens depends first upon 
the existence of a socio-political order in which to rear children into morally autonomous 
adults.  Institutions must be established first in order for popular sovereignty to be 
actualized, that is, in order to have a formal mechanism in and through which public 
deliberation can occur, and a means by which the popular will can be gauged.  But the 
                                                
74 See n.50 above.  
 
75 See Emile, 161: “He is made for guiding, for governing his equals…”  
  
76 Ibid., 480. 
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popular will, in order to be legitimate, must be general: its content must conform to (or 
closely approximate) “the transcendent idea of justice.”77  Thus, the foundations78 of 
political right seem multidimensional.  There are necessarily two sides to any genuine 
founding: the institutional and the individual.  The legislator “founds” from the top down, 
working against nature, establishing good institutions—institutions that “mould” an 
uncorrupted people and all subsequent generations.  But, while the legislator’s efforts 
might replace complete natural freedom by a partial moral freedom, there is only so much 
his “legislating” can accomplish.  The tutor, on the other hand, “founds” from the bottom 
up, working with nature, establishing the foundations for moral autonomy.   
On such a reading, the tutor’s work seems to compliment, if not succeed that of 
the legislator insofar as it produces moral freedom.  The legislator can only get a people 
to the cusp of the age of reason; the tutor, however, is capable of getting the child through 
youth, to the age of reason, and into adulthood.  The logic is thus: from the legislator’s 
legislating, the tutors; then, from the tutors, self-legislators; then the work of the 
legislator in conjunction with the work of the tutors.  To be sure, a wise legislator is 
needed first, but since public virtue is necessary to political right, tutors are needed after 
the initial founding.79  There is a point at which the educative means and ends of the 
legislator and tutor converge.  A genuine founding is thus a founding-in-perpetuity, a 
process of perpetual becoming at both the institutional and individual levels.  The 
legislator’s educative task is to found institutions based on principles of political right.  
                                                
77 Williams, 113. 
 
78 There is no “foundation” or “founding,” but rather only “foundations” and “foundings.” 
 
79 Since “the social order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights,” and since “this right does 
not come from nature,” it is necessary that it “be founded on conventions.”  SC, I.i. 
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However, the sovereign must will actual legislation, just as Emile must will on his own to 
leave the tutor and become a father.  Hence, the legislator is analogous to the tutor: he 
leaves when a people will to legislate on their own, just as the tutor takes his leave when 
Emile wills to go off and emulate him.  The point, then, is that just as a child can become 
morally autonomous only if he receives a proper education from the earliest stages of 
development, so too can a people become truly self-governing only if it receives what the 
legislator has to offer at an early stage of development.   
 
V.  Conclusion 
I would like to conclude by returning to Shklar’s remarks on reconciling Rousseau’s 
paradox.  Shklar insists that we are not obliged to attempt reconciliation, that we must 
appreciate the impossibility of “mak[ing] both men and citizens.”  Viewing the texts in 
the way I have suggested should not necessarily incline us to settle on such a conclusion.  
Rousseau did not create two mutually exclusive models for education; rather, his ultimate 
goal was the reform of public education as a means to the end of legitimate republican 
government, or a political order perpetually founded in accordance with principles of 
political right.  Still, there is some truth in Shklar’s conclusion: given the “moral realities 
of social life,”80 such a reform would be largely impossible.  Where are we to begin?  
Fashioning the education of one or a few individuals to comport with Rousseau’s 
standards would ultimately do little (if any) public good.   
The real question, then, is: How might we begin to educate all educable 
individuals the way Emile is educated?  Rousseau begins with a clean slate, where 
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mothers, in a sense, sell their children to the state.  Indeed, Rousseau must begin with a 
clean slate, a child untainted by the ill effects of bourgeois civil society, for he cannot 
hope to reeducate an individual who has already been corrupted.81  The tutor “natures” 
Emile, so to speak, and then, by traveling the world, “denatures” him in order to bring 
him into civil society.  The point, then, for Rousseau, is to reform from within: like 
Emile, individuals must be educated according to nature within the constraints of an 
existing political constitution, for this is the only way to create a genuine patrie, and there 
must be a patrie before there can be genuine citoyens. 
Rousseau’s prescriptions aim to “generalize” the individual or particular wills in a 
society.  Both the legislator and the tutor are necessary to approach the democratic ideal.  
But to say that we must cultivate good men who can become good citizens still leaves 
much to be determined.  Here we have Rousseau’s response to those who object to his 
system of private education.  Of Emile, a boy educated for himself, they ask: What use is 
he to others?  His use, I think, is in reforming others: Emile becomes a father and the 
ultimate responsibility of a father is to serve as an exemplary model for his child, a child 
that will in turn serve as a model for others.  Fathers will emulate Emile as Emile 
emulates the tutor, thus paving the way for a genuine patrie.  Educated in this way, 
people in the patrie will become dependent on laws just as children become dependent on 
things: “If the laws of nations could, like those of nature, have an inflexibility that no 
                                                
81 There is, however, good reason to believe that such “reeducation,” though extremely difficult, would not 
be impossible.  Rousseau seems to demonstrate this much in the Confessions and, in a slightly more 
systematic way, in Book IV of Emile (to wit, the “Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar”). 
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human force could ever conquer, dependence on men would then become dependence on 
things again.”82 
Ultimately, the point is that people must be governed.83  Moreover, there lies 
within Rousseau’s political theory a deep and unsettling irony: it turns out that the best 
way to govern—the best way to lead a people, collectively and as individuals, to the 
highest degree of freedom attainable in civil society—is through artifice and contrivance.  
Artifice and contrivance are necessary not because evil inheres in human nature, but 
because humans are naturally predisposed to self-love and self-interest.  If left 
unchecked, self-love can easily degenerate into amour propre and, under certain 
conditions, can produce a dangerous indifference toward humanity in the individual.  In 
Rousseau’s view, unbridled amour propre is the fundamental problem in, though not 
necessarily with civil society, and it is the fundamental obstacle to moral and political 
right. 
I have suggested that the best way to understand Rousseau’s theory of moral and 
civic education is not in terms of two mutually exclusive choices—of creating either 
citizens or men—but in terms of a convergence between two necessary educational 
means and ends.  The Social Contract gives us the standards by which we are to judge 
political right and it gives us part of the means by which the foundations of political right 
are to be laid in practice.  Emile provides us with the missing pieces of the puzzle: it 
provides the standards by which we can judge and the means by which we can cultivate 
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83 Rousseau’s gouverneurs—the legislator, the tutor, Sophie, Julie (and perhaps even Mme. de Warrens)—
are all “educators” insofar as they all “rule” but do not command.  It remains to be determined by what 
moral authority these gouverneurs act. 
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moral right in the individual; it shows why such cultivation is necessary, in conjunction 
with sound institutions and the rule of law, to realize humanity’s latent potential to 
advance toward, or approximate political right. 
 84 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Rousseauian Romanticism in the Moral and Political Thought of Thomas Jefferson 
 
I.  Introduction 
In Chapter One, I explored several facets of Rousseau’s political theory in order to 
illuminate his republican ideal more broadly.  In Chapter Two, tried to show how 
Rousseau’s theory of moral and civic education conduces to the ends of his republican 
ideal.  In the next two chapters, I explore the ways in which Thomas Jefferson’s moral 
and political thought eventually came to mirror much of Rousseau’s.  I begin with a 
rather broad but significant claim: Thomas Jefferson and Jean-Jacques Rousseau each 
embrace a notion of transcendent moral and political right and each subscribes to a 
natural rights philosophy that is informed by that standard.1  However, scholars either 
reject the Rousseauian overtones that are apparent in Jefferson’s thought or fail to 
appreciate fully those facets of his thought that substantiate the heretofore unrecognized 
affinity between Rousseauian and Jeffersonian idealism.  While there have been a few 
(misguided) attempts to show that Jefferson was really quite the Rousseauist, I do not 
wish to entertain such a claim.2   Rather, I want to show that Jefferson’s moral and 
political thought has more in common with Rousseau’s at the level of principle than 
                                                
1 The extent to which either Rousseau or Jefferson embraced elements of the natural law tradition is 
debatable.  For a thorough treatment of this topic, see Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic and Stephen A. 
Conrad, “Putting Rights Talk in Its Place: The Summary View Revisited,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, ed. 
Peter S. Onuf (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1993): 254-281. 
 
2 See, for instance, Hamilton Basso, “Farewell and Hail to Thomas Jefferson: The American as Democrat,” 
in Mainstream: A Book about America and the Making of Americans (New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 
1943), 23-43; Paul H. Kreisberg, “Hamiltonian and Jeffersonian Ideals in the Administration of the State,” 
Journal of Social Studies 6 (1950): 24-32; and Morton J. Frisch, “Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures and 
Political Philosophy,” Publius 8, no. 3 (1978): 129-139.  For a brief commentary on both John Adams and 
Thomas Jefferson’s dislike of Rousseau, see Louis B. Wright, The Obligation of Intellectuals to Be 
Intelligent: Some Commentary from Jefferson and Adams (Charlottesville, VA: Thomas Jefferson 
Memorial Foundation, 1974).  For a slightly more convincing, albeit very brief attempt to link Jefferson 
and Rousseau, see Barber, “Education and Democracy.”    
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many scholars (and perhaps Jefferson himself) seem ready to recognize. 
In the first section, I try to identify the core of Jefferson’s republican ideal, or 
those fundamental features of the Virginian’s republican vision that inform his political 
theory more broadly.  In other words, I attempt to offer an account of Jeffersonian 
republicanism that is more holistic, more systematic, and less inconsistent than many 
scholars have recently (and not so recently) claimed.  I argue that a proper understanding 
of Jefferson’s political theory requires not a disaggregation of his ideas and principles as 
distinct and seemingly irreconcilable.  Rather, I suggest a more synthetic approach that 
views Jefferson’s moral and political thought as a set of continually evolving ideas and 
principles that, with time and maturation, revision and reformation, became increasingly 
unified and approached (though never quite reached) systematicity.   
Next, I show how this set of ideas and principles—the core components of 
Jefferson’s peculiar brand of republicanism—turns out to be rather Rousseauian in form.  
Specifically, I consider three particular elements of Jefferson’s political thought that 
parallel Rousseau’s: Jefferson’s understanding and defense of majority rule and the ways 
in which it mirrors Rousseau’s conception of the general will; the Virginian’s reluctant 
embrace of political representation; and his theory of generational sovereignty.  I argue 
that Jefferson attempted to graft fragments of the ideal onto the social and political 
realities of his time.  Jefferson’s eventual support for the Constitution and his praise for 
the Federalist3 might suggest that his republicanism is not altogether different from that 
                                                
3 See Jefferson to James Madison, 18 November 1788, PTJ 14:187-90.  It should not be assumed that 
Jefferson merely acquiesced to the Constitution.  Neither should we assume that he wholly embraced the 
document that emerged from the Convention at Philadelphia.  The absence of a bill of rights was certainly 
at the top of Jefferson’s list of complaints, though it was not simply the lack of a mere enumeration of 
rights (or negative claims against the government) that worried Jefferson.  His concern was for a bill that 
would sufficiently secure the people’s specific rights and liberties against a potentially abusive 
government—in other words, a bill that was, in scope and precision, more effectual than the English Bill of 
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of, say, John Adams.4  While Jefferson’s characteristic faith in the common man certainly 
places him at odds with Adams (and others) who believed that the rule of law and a strict 
separation of powers were the quintessential features of good republican government, this 
is not to say that Jefferson rejected either (in principle or in practice).  In fact, the heart of 
Jeffersonian republicanism is the rule of law, that is, the rule of law as constituted by a 
legitimate popular will—a will that is reasonable, though nevertheless still popular, and 
hence not overridable.  This untiring faith in the people, a faith both political and moral, 
is one, though certainly not the only crucial difference between Jefferson’s brand of 
republicanism and that of Adams.  It is also one crucial link (among several) between 
                                                
Rights of 1689.  For a more comprehensive picture of Jefferson’s objections, see See TJ to James Madison, 
20 December 1787, PTJ 12:438-43 and TJ to James Madison, 15 March 1789, PTJ 14:659-63.  Aside from 
the failure to include a bill of rights, Jefferson expressed other reservations about the Constitution (many of 
which are articulated in the letter to Madison of 20 December 1787).  Nevertheless, Jefferson did extol The 
Federalist, which might lead us to conclude that, by implication, he also extolled the Constitution.  
Notwithstanding the criticisms Jefferson levels against the Constitution in this letter to Madison, the letter 
is often invoked as evidence that Jefferson whole-heartedly subscribed to the principles articulated by 
Publius.  But when we look carefully at what Jefferson actually wrote to Madison—and when we bear in 
mind that Jefferson knew Publius’s true tripartite identity—we are forced to conclude that his praise for the 
essays is indeed a qualified praise (and, perhaps more importantly, that the praise is intended specifically 
for Madison’s contributions).  “With respect to the Federalist,” he writes, “the three authors had been 
named to me.  I read it with care, pleasure and improvement, and was satisfied there was nothing in it by 
one of those hands [John Jay], and not a great deal by a second [Alexander Hamilton].  It does the highest 
honor to the third [James Madison], as being, in my opinion, the best commentary on the principles of 
government which ever was written.  In some parts it is discoverable that the author means only to say what 
may be best said in defence of opinions in which he did not concur.  But in general it establishes firmly the 
plan of government.  I confess it has rectified me in several points.”  PTJ 14:188 (emphasis added).  See 
also James Madison to TJ, 10 August 1788, PTJ 13:497-99, wherein Madison reveals (in secret code) not 
only the identity of the authors, but also the fact that although the project was “carried on in concert the 
writers are not mutually answerable for all the ideas of each other.”   
 
4 Both Adams and Jefferson insist that good, legitimate government requires the consent of the people.  But 
consent alone is insufficient: government may neither be established without the consent of the people, nor 
may it act independently of the people’s will; the legislative process (or, more generally, the act of 
governing) must be conducted in continual consultation with the people.  However, contrary to Jefferson, 
Adams did not believe a government that was closer in form to pure democracy could adequately sustain 
liberty.  Such a government, on Adams’s account, would not—indeed, could not—remain a free 
government for long, for a government that responds to and operates so closely alongside the popular will 
could not properly be reconciled with the rule of law.  See John Adams, “Thoughts on Government” as 
well as his Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America.  See, inter alia, 
John Adams to TJ, 13 July 1813; 15 July 1813; and 15 November 1813, in Papers of Thomas Jefferson: 
Retirement Series, Vol. 6, ed., J. Jefferson Looney (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 286-
88; 296-98; 621-27.  Hereafter PTJ:RS; See also John Adams to TJ, 16 July 1814, AJL, 434-39.  
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Jefferson and Rousseau that merits significant attention.   
 
II.  Jefferson’s Republican Ideal: Tracing the Intellectual Origins of Jefferson’s 
Political Thought 
 
The literature documenting the intellectual influences on Jefferson’s moral and political 
thought is extensive.  Among other things, Jefferson is cast as a pure, though unoriginal 
natural rights theorist.5  Occasionally Jefferson’s system is defined as a blend of classical 
republicanism and Lockean liberalism.6  Others overemphasize the influence of Francis 
Hutcheson and the Scottish moral sense tradition on Jefferson.7  Still others insist that 
Jefferson infused various elements of each into a uniquely American take on the Atlantic 
republican tradition.8  While there is some truth in each of these interpretations, many 
scholars tend to evaluate Jefferson’s political thought in relative isolation.  More often 
than not, such analyses leave us with nothing more than half-truths about the Virginian’s 
political philosophy.   
 The problem with Jefferson is that his political philosophy is scattered throughout 
numerous speeches, pamphlets and essays, one full-length treatise, and tens of thousands 
of personal missives that span over a half-century.  Thus, it is not possible to get a clear 
                                                
5 See Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic. 
  
6 See, among others, Garrett Ward Sheldon, The Political Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson (Baltimore, MD: 
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Thomas L. Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism: The 
Moral Vision of the American Founding and the Philosophy of Locke (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990); Lance Banning, The Jeffersonian Persuasion: Evolution of a Party Ideology (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1980). 
 
7 For example, Jean Yarbrough, “Thomas Jefferson and Republicanism,” in Thomas Jefferson and the 
Politics of Nature, ed. Thomas S. Engeman (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 59-
80.  See also Frank D. Balog, “The Scottish Enlightenment and the Liberal Political Tradition,” in 
Confronting the Constitution, ed. Allan Bloom (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 1990), 191-208. 
 
8 See especially Peter S. Onuf, The Mind of Thomas Jefferson (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of 
Virginia, 2007); Andrew Burstein, The Inner Jefferson (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 
1996); Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York: Random House, 2010). 
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understanding of his political philosophy by examining one or two pieces of writing, 
especially when those pieces are easily taken out of context.  Michael Zuckert’s analysis 
of Jeffersonian republicanism is one of the most lucid and discerning.  While Zuckert’s 
thesis—what I shall loosely term the “new” republican synthesis—locates the Virginian’s 
political philosophy firmly within the natural rights tradition, Zuckert is careful to 
delineate the influences of both classical republicanism and its modern variants on 
Jefferson’s political thought (early and mature).  On Zuckert’s reading, the so-called 
liberal-republican synthesis fashioned by the likes of Bailyn, Pocock, and Wood, among 
others, is largely inadequate as an interpretation of Jefferson’s political thought insofar as 
it fails to situate the natural rights tradition and the republican tradition properly 
alongside each other.9  As such, Zuckert argues that the synthesis requires a reconception 
of sorts and, moreover, he insists that Jefferson’s own synthesis “most adequately 
expresses the American ‘tradition’ as it was shaped in the eighteenth century.”10  
 According to Zuckert, Jefferson’s brand of republicanism, while not completely 
free from classical influence, is essentially modern in form.  More precisely, Jefferson’s 
“robust version of democratic republicanism…is a thinking through of the natural rights 
philosophy he had given authoritative expression to for America in the Declaration of 
Independence.”11  Indeed, the Declaration is where Zuckert finds Jefferson offering 
                                                
9 Primary sources for the original debate are: Bernard Bailyn, Ideological Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967); Bailyn, “The Central Themes of the 
American Revolution: An Interpretation,” in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz and 
James Hudson (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1973); J.G.A. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); and Gordon S. Wood, The 
Creation of the American Republic (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1969).  
 
10 Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic, 210. 
 
11 Zuckert, 239. 
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something more than merely an expression of “the American mind”;12 the Declaration is 
something of an executive summary of Jefferson’s theory of natural right.  In order to 
understand Jefferson’s position—in order to appreciate the thrust of his natural rights 
argument and the significance of the “moral history”13 he tries to transmit in the 
Declaration—a rigorous structural and contextual reading of the document is necessary, 
and this is precisely what Zuckert has taken great pains to accomplish. 
 Zuckert begins by putting the Declaration’s statements about equality into proper 
context.  The fact of being “created equal” is, for Jefferson, a self-evident truth, though 
much ink has been spilled since 1776 over the precise meaning of this phrase (as well as 
its moral and political implications).  Nevertheless, Zuckert insists that what Jefferson has 
in mind is not the sort of wholesale equality that many have been tempted to derive from 
(or read into) the Declaration.  The equality of which Jefferson speaks is a fundamental 
natural equality, an equality not of the Aristotelian variety, but of the Lockean form.  
Understood as properly pre-political, equality means nothing more (and nothing less) 
than “not [being] subject to the authority of any other.”14   
 But what of the connection between equality and natural rights?  If “created equal” 
simply means that human beings have no rightful, natural authority over one another, that 
rightful rule can derive only from voluntary consent and is, ultimately, the product of 
convention, then what, precisely, is the relationship between equality and rights?15  It is 
                                                
12 See TJ to Henry Lee, 8 May 1825, Writings, 1500-02. 
 
13 Zuckert, 23. 
 
14 Ibid., 18. 
 
15 As often used by contemporary philosophers of political obligation, consent is opposed to convention, 
which emerges unconscisouly. 
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not the case that Jefferson was simply making a sweeping claim about equality and 
rights.  Although he did wish to affirm that all human beings were, by nature, equal in 
terms of their basic rights, Zuckert argues that Jefferson must have meant something 
more precise, that he must have been referring to something more than the mere fact of 
natural endowment or possession.  Jefferson is, in fact, more precise in his “rough 
draught” of the Declaration.  Instead of the more succinct, though admittedly vague 
phrasing of the final draft, Jefferson originally penned, “all men are created equal and 
independent.”  As Zuckert understands it, Jefferson’s reliance on Locke as an authority 
can mean only one thing with respect to the interpretation of this phrase: Jefferson must 
mean “equality with respect to dominion.”16 
 Like Zuckert, Joyce Appleby sees a unique sort of republicanism emerging in 
Jefferson’s thought during the post-presidential years.  However, where Zuckert finds in 
Jefferson a reworking or reconceptualization of the republican ideal that is grounded 
primarily in the “natural rights philosophy,”17 Appleby identifies “a blend of 
egalitarianism and individualism” which, she claims, characterizes not only Jefferson’s 
more mature political thinking, but also “American culture” more broadly.18   
What was truly remarkable was that Jefferson was astute enough to see that to 
liberate and democratize Americans would entail changes in attitudes, behavior, 
affect, and desire, not just opinion.  Our own familiarity with democratic mores 
has obscured the fact that, like any set of cultural preferences, democratic ones 
had to be carefully learned, and then only after the habits and sensibilities of 
American adults—once monarchical subjects—had been eradicated.19 
                                                
16 Ibid., 19.   
 
17 Zuckert, 233. 
 
18 Joyce Appleby, “Thomas Jefferson and the Psychology of Democracy,” in James J. Horn, Jan Lewis, and 
Peter S. Onuf, (eds.), The Revolution of 1800: Democracy, Race, and the New Republic (Charlottesville, 
VA: University Press of Virginia, 2002), 156 (emphasis in original). 
 
19 Ibid. 
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According to Appleby, Jefferson was keenly aware of the importance of making a clean 
break from Britain, from the real and the metaphorical shackles of monarchy.  Such a 
break was necessary if genuine republican government—and, by Jefferson’s definition, a 
genuinely republican people—was to survive.  In fact, republicanism entailed more than 
the mere establishment of sound political institutions and the cultivation of appropriate 
political convictions.   
On Appleby’s reading, Jefferson sees American republicanism unfolding 
simultaneously in both the political and the social spheres.  Jefferson was aware that in 
order for American republicanism to do more than merely subsist, certain bonds had to be 
forged, bonds connecting citizens to one another and bonds linking citizens to their 
government.  James Madison, in response to George Clinton’s concerns over the federal 
government’s inability to govern effectively across a vast, expansive territory would later 
refer to these same bonds as the “cords of affection” that bind seemingly disparate 
peoples together across the land.20  But Jefferson understood better than Madison that 
these cords could indeed be strained, if not broken, and that American republicanism 
depended upon more than common convictions and shared beliefs.  Jefferson knew that 
Americans needed to break free from the shackles of monarchy, politically and 
psychologically, and he realized that this would be no easy task.  Yet, as Appleby points 
out, this might not have been as obvious to others as it was to Jefferson,   
Nor was this the insight typical of reformers who are usually animated by the 
didactic impulse to tell people what is good for them…[Jefferson] perceptively 
gauged the insufficiency of lecturing his people into progressive practices.  
Instead, he set in motion a variety of convention-shattering initiatives, based on 
                                                
 
20 Compare Madison, Federalist 14.   
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the assumption that the body had to move out of the box before the brain could 
imagine different ways of behaving.21 
 
In other words, the development of republican institutions does not (and cannot) simply 
emerge from a vacuum; the founding and cultivation of republican mores in the body of 
citizens is, it seems, a prerequisite to any such enterprise, and Jefferson was very much 
aware of this problem—namely, the so-called founder’s dilemma, or paradox of founding 
(the same problem that forms the core of Rousseau’s project).  While there is much in 
Appleby’s study to suggest that Jefferson was aware of this dilemma, Appleby does not 
explicitly address Jefferson’s own estimation of the problem (or it’s potential solutions).22  
Jefferson had to find ways to work from within.  Among other things, Jefferson’s 
social practices in the White House “provided the contrast with the Federalists that 
Jefferson wished to sharpen [and] embodied the republican simplicity that he had extolled 
in his presidential campaign,” all while fostering the development of what Appleby calls 
a peculiar “psychology of democracy.”23  Though a member of the Virginia gentry, 
Jefferson railed against the formality and artificiality of early American and European 
high society.  His disdain for Federalist pomp certainly shines through in his 
correspondence, though, as Appleby notes, it is also quite evident in Jefferson’s attempts 
to dismantle the “ranks and degrees” of American society during his tenure in the White 
House.24  By removing himself (and, perhaps more importantly, by removing the office 
                                                
21 Appleby, 157.  Compare Rousseau on the value of lecturing and precepts. 
 
22 In Chapter Five, I try to sharpen or build upon Appleby’s analysis of Jeffersonian democracy, or the 
ways in which Jefferson attempted to cultivate a uniquely American republican order from the bottom up 
(that is, from the level of the individual, given the institutions he had to work with).   
 
23 Ibid., 157-8.  Compare to Emile’s simplicity in nearly all matters. 
 
24 Ibid., 160. 
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of the Presidency) from the “mannerisms” and the “choreograph[ed] status” of his 
Federalist counterparts, Jefferson was attempting to eradicate the “political message 
inherent in etiquette” and privilege.25  Jefferson’s social practices as President—for 
example, his insistence on walking instead of riding in a carriage; his informality (if not 
his nonchalance) in receiving guests in the White House—all point to a desire to make 
the American public aware of the unnaturalness and irrationality of routinized formality 
and pretension.   
This breaking of irrational habits and forced routinization in society was, in many 
ways, a key to Jefferson’s conception of American liberty.  For Federalists like Adams, 
liberty may have entailed something altogether different.  Where Jefferson saw a unique, 
if not special people inhabiting the newly minted Republic—a people free from the vice 
and vanity that characterized its European counterpart—Adams saw a people separated 
from, yet not so far removed from the political dispositions of its British brethren.  For 
Adams and his like-minded allies, the exceptionalness of the United States “lay not in 
signaling a new dispensation for the human race but in offering enlightened statesmen an 
opportunity to apply the lessons of the past.”26  Adams thus understood America’s 
struggle for independence in terms of transplantation: the goal was decidedly not to 
replace an existing order with something altogether new; rather, it was to dispense with 
those facets of British politics that had corrupted the “pure model” (or, as Jefferson 
would have it, the “ancient constitution”).  “When the American colonies separated from 
Great Britain, they freed themselves from the mother country’s corruptions, but not from 
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the pure model itself.  Their history taught that order preceded liberty and that gentlemen 
filtered from the mass of voters could best preserve the order.27   
This understanding of history and the notion that order is prior to liberty seems to 
be John Adams’s sentiment—a point on which he and Jefferson (and Rousseau) sharply 
differ.  For Jefferson and Rousseau, liberty is something that is prior to order, both 
empirically and normatively.  While order (of a certain degree) is indeed necessary to 
sustain a useful and desirable form of liberty, in order to comport with right, the latter 
must precede the former.  This is, of course, not to say that natural order does not figure 
into the problem.  But natural order and political order are not synonymous.  Although 
there may be a transcendent form of political right, political order is always a product of 
convention.  The degree to which that convention approximates or approaches the 
transcendent, or standard of right, is a separate question.   
The point is simply that political orders—political institutions and 
arrangements—always arise from conventions; they are never given.  Natural order is, of 
course, non-conventional, and is encompassed by the precepts of natural right.  In other 
words, whatever is contrary to the natural order of things is, by definition, contrary to 
natural right.  This does not necessarily imply that all conventional orders are wrong; it 
simply suggests that conventional orders are, at best, approximations of what is naturally 
right or just.  In this sense, then, justice might be a matter of convention insofar as a 
given society’s understanding of (and agreement upon) the precepts of natural right will 
inform the content of their particular laws and practices.  Moreover, this society’s 
understanding of natural right will likely differ from the particular understanding of 
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another society.  But this in no way suggests that justice is entirely a matter of 
convention—that is, that justice is historically contingent; that the moral precepts which 
inform standards of justice across time and place are relative constructs; that natural right 
(and natural law) is a mere farce, as demonstrated throughout history by the examples of 
brutish and barbarian peoples, empires, and, lest we forget the indelible mark left upon 
our nation’s own back, the institution of slavery.  That we (or any other people for that 
matter) have failed to achieve the ideal—that we have failed to live up to the promise 
articulated by Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence (a promise reaffirmed some 
eighty seven years later by Lincoln at Gettysburg)—is no evidence to indict natural right. 
Of course, Jefferson’s understanding of human liberty and human nature did not 
square with the Federalists’, who tended to embrace a view more closely aligned with the 
pessimism of Hobbes rather than the slightly more optimistic outlook of Locke.28  
Government, for the High Federalists, was a safe-haven of sorts.  Yet where they 
“connected man’s fallen nature to the civic duty to follow righteous leaders, Jefferson 
indicted just this disempowering belief...He blamed elitist political practices, not the 
fallen state of man, for the misrule history recorded.”29   
Where the Federalists stressed the importance of things like virtue and personal 
responsibility, Appleby suggests that Jefferson subordinated these things to a general, all-
encompassing sort of freedom: of exploration, of expression, of thought, and opinion, 
                                                
28 John Adams’s seeming pessimism certainly comes to mind here, though he is certainly not the only 
Hobbesian to be counted among the Federalists.  In Federalist 1, Alexander Hamilton even goes so far as to 
present his readers with a choice that seems to have been lifted right off the pages of Hobbes’s Leviathan: 
the choice is either to accept and submit to the authority of the proposed constitution (i.e., something akin 
to an absolute sovereign) or remain suspended in confederation (something that is, at least in Hamilton’s 
estimation, not unlike the state of nature).   
 
29 Appleby, 161.  Compare Rousseau’s account of man’s fall from grace in SD, Part I. 
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among others.30  Yet this is not to say that virtue and responsibility are completely absent 
from Jefferson’s political theory.  Appleby’s implication is that Jefferson is indifferent, if 
not averse to order.  However, this view seems mistaken.  Indeed, Jefferson would reject 
the imposition of any sort of ordering scheme: social engineering of any variety; the 
various visions of utopian and socialist reform that emerged in the United States in the 
mid to late nineteenth century; and, of course, utopian philosophies such as that 
articulated by Plato in the Republic, to name a few.  Where his Federalist counterparts 
assume that human beings are corrupt by nature and, as such, require something of a 
paternalistic state to keep them in check, Jefferson embraces the natural goodness and 
inherent educability of man.  According to Appleby,   
Much like…Rousseau, Jefferson blamed the artificial inventions of rank and the 
overwhelming arrogance of authority for interfering with men’s natural 
goodness…[Contrary to the Federalists and Adams] Jefferson…gloried in his 
rejection of ostentation, as his Philadelphia Aurora article indicated, laying it at 
the feet of ‘certain self-styled friends of order, but truly styled friends of 
privileged orders.’31 
 
Amid these competing interpretations of Jefferson’s political philosophy, Bernard 
Bailyn asks whether, in the face of things like the Bill for Establishing Religious 
Freedom, the Virginian was, in fact, the ultimate libertarian.32  For Bailyn, Jefferson’s 
crusade against centralized government and his untiring defense of civil liberties seems to 
                                                
30 Appleby, 162. 
 
31 Ibid., 167-8.  Here it might be useful to consider Rousseau’s objective in Julie.  Rousseau paints a picture 
of the ideal, pastoral republic set at the estate of Clarens, though it seems to undermine everything he says 
about liberty and authenticity in the novel (and elsewhere).  Yet, Rousseau paints the picture for a reason: 
not because he thinks it is practicable but because it is meant to illustrate the hopelessness of utopian 
thinking and the dangers with which utopian planning is fraught.  However, the image also serves as 
something of an ideal or standard.  Thus the question is not about the ends so much as it is the means. 
 
32 Bernard Bailyn, “Jefferson and the Ambiguities of Freedom,” Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society, Vol. 137, No. 4: 499. 
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demand an affirmative answer to this question.  Bailyn summarizes Jefferson’s political 
theory (and practice) as a decided effort “[t]o break through the barriers of the ancien 
régime, and to formulate and act on the pure principles of freedom” so that the mind, 
unadulterated and without impediment, would someday “usher in a new era in human 
history.”33  That new era would, of course, be the so-called era of enlightenment, an era 
in which “popular majorities would rule…power itself would be restricted; 
establishments of religion would be forever banished; and the human freedoms for which 
mankind had yearned…would be perfectly protected by the instruments of free 
government.”34   
Jefferson’s vision extended well beyond the political sphere and into the  
realm of the purely private.  Here Bailyn seems to capture the core of Jefferson’s 
republican vision.  In the years of the Early Republic, Jefferson’s republicanism was, 
perhaps, more romanticized—some might say overly idealized—than his 
contemporaries’.  Jefferson developed (and, according to Bailyn, never let go of) a certain 
“vision of human felicity” in which citizens were  
sensible, hard-working, [and] independent…secure in their possession of land, 
free of the corruptions of urban poverty and cynicism, free of dependence on a 
self-indulgent aristocracy of birth, responsible to the common good as well as to 
personal betterment, educated in the essentials of free government and committed 
to the principles of freedom—peaceful, self-reliant, self-respecting, and 
unintimidated people.35 
 
When it came to realizing these lofty goals, Jefferson seems to be rather 
ambivalent about the prospects for success and his misgivings on the matter stem first 
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35 Ibid.  Compare Rousseau’s romanticized visions in the Social Contract, Emile, and Julie, in which 
citizens are committed to both the common good and personal betterment on multiple levels. 
   
 98 
and foremost from American colonial experiences and the struggles against malefactions 
of the Crown.  Yet the worries Jefferson expresses about the fragile nature and future of 
American liberty derive from his concerns over unrestrained, seemingly limitless 
governmental power.  Naturally, the struggle between power and liberty would be 
perpetual; of necessity, Jefferson was willing to countenance this much.  Instead, it was 
the contours of the struggle between the ambitious few and the unassuming many that 
concerned Jefferson.  That is to say, Jefferson was worried less about those intractable 
features of human nature that lead to conflict than he was about the ways in which 
designing and dissembling men might expand and exploit governmental power to their 
advantage—as, for instance, the British crown had done for centuries as “country virtue” 
slowly gave way to “court corruption” and liberty and self-reliance were replaced by 
vice, iniquity, and subservience.  Though Jefferson would eventually acknowledges the 
historical inaccuracy of his account, the appeal to the so-called “golden age” of Saxon 
liberty and the venerable “ancient constitution” serve to highlight the very real 
sublimation of “country virtue” to “court corruption” in Britain.36  
 Despite the fact that Jefferson appealed to a mythical “ancient constitution,” a 
fictive Saxon freedom, and a non-existent (or, at the very least, over-exaggerated) civic 
virtue—in short, a contrived republicanism—the Summary View nevertheless served a 
useful political purpose.  While Jefferson venerated the “ancient Saxon laws,” he was 
well aware of the historical inaccuracy of his account and he appreciated the power that 
such appeals could have in the heat of revolutionary turmoil.  Thus, in numerous 
revolutionary writings, most notable the Summary View, Jefferson opts for rhetorical 
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force and political expediency over cool, calculated reason.  In Jefferson’s notes from the 
Virginia Delegation in August, 1774, he admits that his account was decidedly flawed 
and that it contained “some uncertainties and inaccuracies of historical facts.”37  
Nevertheless, Jefferson maintained that, given the political crisis that was at hand in 
1776, the question of historical validity was but a “speculative point.”  The issue was not 
so much about the historical validity of the “ancient constitution” or the verity of the 
Saxons’ civic virtue; the question was—and continued to be—whether the cultivation of 
that type of virtue—real or imagined—was necessary in the young Republic.38  
 Remarking on the extent to which the ancient “English law” was successfully 
“transplanted” in the colonies, Jefferson admits that he has “never fully considered” 
whether colonial “acts of assembly or acceptance of grants may have converted 
lands…into feuds.”  But this is a moot point, for Jefferson insists that what matters in 
1776 is not so much what the “ancient constitution” was and whether it actually existed, 
but whether the American people “have it in [their] power to make [the present 
constitution] what it ought to be for the public good.”  In other words, Jefferson seems to 
suggest that ancient Saxon virtue was nothing more than a conceptual backdrop against 
which American virtue ought to be gauged.  It matters little if the Saxons were actually a 
virtuous people; they are, in a sense, a political fable with an important lesson that 
Jefferson wished to impart upon the American people.    
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 Even though Jefferson found utility in the legend and lore of the “ancient 
constitution” (at least for the purposes of severing ties with Britain), his ultimate 
commitment was to popular sovereignty, not ancient custom or the dead hand of the past.  
However, a total rejection of tradition and custom was not what Jefferson had in mind; 
though he saw the need to reform a number of long-standing practices in his native 
Virginia in order to promote the ideals of self-government and political equality, this did 
not entail a complete destruction of the common law or of institutions and practices that 
had stood the test of time. 
 
III.  The Rousseauian Features of Jefferson’s Political Thought    
In order to bring Jefferson and Rousseau in closer proximity to one another, it is helpful 
to consider several key features of their respective republicanisms in turn (and in a 
particular order).  First, Jefferson’s defense of majority rule is not simply a matter of 
practicality or political expedience; for Jefferson, a certain wisdom was to be found in the 
people and they were, in his estimation, one of the best bulwarks of liberty.  To be sure, 
the minority has rights that the majority is obliged to respect, but this does not undercut 
the value—indeed, the necessity—of majority rule in a republic.  As Jefferson sees it, 
“the whole body of the nation is the sovereign legislative, judiciary, and executive power 
for itself…It is the will of the nation which makes the law obligatory; it is their will 
which creates or annihilates the organ which is to declare and announce it.”39  Like 
Rousseau’s conception of the general will, Jefferson’s will of the majority appears to be 
the closest approximation to the actual (and proper) will of the nation.   
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 Though it may err from time to time, the will of the majority ought to be 
respected as authoritative and binding.  Yet, in a large republic, discerning the majority’s 
will is a daunting task given the logistical problems associated with assembling the 
people.  Thus, both Jefferson and Rousseau reluctantly accept representation as 
something of a necessary evil, though not without certain qualifications.  
Finally, Rousseau and Jefferson embrace the rule of law as a cornerstone of 
republican government.  However, the rule of law is not to be confused with 
constitutionalism: “the true constitution of the state,” Rousseau says, “is not engraved on 
marble or bronze, but in the hearts of citizens.”40  As such, the constitutions drawn up by 
legislators and approved by citizens might contain the fundamental ordering principles of 
the day, but they are by no means permanent.  In other words, constitutions can and ought 
to change over time in response to societal or moral pressures (in accordance, of course, 
with the will of the majority).  Jefferson embraced this idea in his theory of generational 
sovereignty, or the notion that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living.”41    
Jefferson embraced and defended popular sovereignty to a far greater extent than 
many of his contemporaries.  Jefferson’s democratic impulses are more palpable for two 
important reasons: one the one hand, his opinion of human nature was consistently far 
more optimistic than, say, John Adams or Alexander Hamilton would have it.  On the 
other hand, Jefferson’s estimation of human reason—specifically, the ability of 
individuals to reason effectively in society—was more encouraging than that of most of 
his Republican allies, including James Madison.  Jefferson could certainly concur with 
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Madison’s estimation of human reason in Federalist 49, that “a nation of philosophers is 
to be as little expected as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato.”42  Such a 
perfection of human reason was not attainable and Jefferson harbored no illusions to the 
contrary; still he was more sanguine about the possibility of democracy flourishing (at 
least within the states) and his optimism stemmed largely from his confidence and trust in 
the people.   
According to Jeremy Bailey, upon accepting Washington’s invitation to serve as 
Secretary of State in 1790, Jefferson took the “opportunity to not only align himself with 
the fledgling government and Washington’s administration but to shape the definition of 
democratic government.”43  In his formal address to the citizens of Albemarle County, 
Jefferson offers one of his earliest defenses of the reasonableness and rightfulness of 
majority rule: 
It rests now with ourselves alone to enjoy in peace and concord the blessings of 
self-government, so long denied to mankind: to shew by example the sufficiency 
of human reason for the care of human affairs and the will of the majority, the 
Natural law of every society, is the only sure guardian of the rights of man.  
Perhaps even this may sometimes err.  But its errors are honest, solitary, and 
short-lived.—Let us then, my dear friends, for ever bow down to the general 
reason of the society.  We are safe with that, even in its deviations, for it soon 
returns again to the right way.44 
 
Here, Jefferson admits that the will of the majority is likely to be mistaken at times.  The 
possibility of error notwithstanding, Jefferson remains convinced that majority rule is the 
best possible means of protecting individual rights, since the majority inevitably 
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discovers and corrects its errors in time.  However, as Bailey indicates, Jefferson failed to 
answer what is perhaps a more important question with respect to the will of the majority.  
If the majority ultimately finds its way back to what is right—if it can be counted on to 
return “to the right way”—how does it do so?  In other words, does the majority simply 
find its way back intuitively or does it stand in need of guidance?45  In 1790, Jefferson 
had no answer to this question; in 1801, after assuming the presidency, Jefferson would 
qualify his earlier views and insist that, “though the will of the majority is in all cases to 
prevail, that will to be rightful must be reasonable.”46   
By no stretch of the imagination was Jefferson a pure, unabashed democrat.  His 
faith in the people was certainly greater than that of most of his revolutionary 
collaborators, but his predilection for democracy was, in fact, tempered by reason.47  
Jefferson was confident that the human mind was capable of significant improvement 
and, moreover, that such improvement could vastly enhance the prospects of democracy 
succeeding as a viable alternative to other forms of government.  Indeed, Jefferson was of 
the conviction that man was “formed for society, and endowed by nature with those 
dispositions which fit him for society…that his mind is perfectible to a degree of which 
we cannot as yet form any conception.”48  Still, Jefferson was not naïve: the human mind 
might be “susceptible of much improvement,” especially “in matters of government and 
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46 TJ, “First Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1801.  Exactly how the majority’s will is to be enlightened, or 
made reasonable, is left undetermined by Jefferson in the address.  The answer, of course, is through the 
diffusion of knowledge among the citizenry.  This topic is considered in Chapter Five. 
 
47 Jefferson understood that democracy was possible only on a small scale, but this did not necessarily 
mean that it was impossible to filter the democratic decisions of smaller locales up through the county, 
state, and national levels.  I discuss the details and significance of Jefferson’s “ward” republicanism in 
Chapter Five. 
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religion,” and the success or failure of democratic government indeed turned on this 
improvement.  The people (or, more precisely, the majority) could not be reliably counted 
on to discern the proper will of the nation unless it was sufficiently enlightened.  Thus, 
improvements in government—improvements that presumably go beyond the alternatives 
posited by Hamilton in Federalist 1—depend first and foremost on a “diffusion of 
knowledge among the people.”49  
While in Paris in 1787, Jefferson explained to Madison that, “it is my principle 
that the will of the majority should always prevail.  If they approve of the proposed 
[Constitution] in all its parts, I shall concur in it cheerfully, in hopes they will amend it 
whenever they shall find it work wrong.”50  Though a seemingly benign statement, 
Jefferson’s remarks are actually more revealing than they appear.  It is not the proposed 
constitution that Jefferson reveres; there were, in fact, numerous deficiencies in 
Jefferson’s opinion, and he expressed these reservations to Madison more than once.  The 
Constitution’s shortcomings were the product of a fallible and imperfect human intellect; 
bias and self-interest might have led the convention astray at times, but Jefferson was 
confident that, over time, the Constitution’s imperfections could be corrected by the will 
of the majority.  Indeed, since the rule of law was paramount in republican government, 
the will of the majority was the only rightful corrective to constitutional flaws (or, in 
some cases, constitutional wrongs).  Later in the same missive, Jefferson suggests that a 
reliance upon the majority is the only sure means to preserving republican government in 
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the long term.  “Above all things,” he writes to Madison “I hope the education of the 
common people will be attended to; convinced that on their good sense we rely with the 
most security for the preservation of a due degree of liberty.”51   
Jefferson’s confidence in average, ordinary citizens—his faith in the common 
man—stems, in part, from his understanding of the moral sense.  Based on what he had 
learned from the likes of Hutcheson and Kames, Jefferson believed the moral sense to be 
innate and capable of guiding individuals toward upright decisions in matters social and 
political.  To be sure, this innate sense of right and wrong—common sense—requires 
cultivation; it does not simply emerge spontaneously or without assistance.52  However, 
when properly developed and employed alongside reason, individuals will typically 
(though certainly not always) act in accordance with right.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson 
believed that the moral sense was grafted onto the human heart by nature.  Believing that 
“nature hath implanted in our breast a love of others, a sense of duty to them, a moral 
instinct,” Jefferson argued that all human beings of sound mind possessed a “sense of 
right and wrong” which could be “submitted…in some degree to the guidance of reason; 
but it is a small stock which is required for this.”53   
With respect to public decision making and majority rule, Jefferson’s simple 
advice to Peter Carr appears to sum up succinctly the principles that Rousseau took great 
                                                
51 Ibid. 
 
52 Though Jefferson believed that public education should play an important role in cultivating the moral 
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pains to elucidate in the Social Contract.  Jefferson implores Carr to “lay aside all 
prejudices,” when considering questions of a public nature, “and neither believe nor 
reject anything because any other persons, or description of persons, have rejected or 
believed it.  Your own reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are 
answerable not for the rightness but uprightness of the decision.”54  Jefferson instructs his 
young charge to set aside private interests and personal prejudice for the sake of the 
public good.  Ultimately, it is not the rightness but the uprightness of the public will that 
Jefferson values in the legislative process.   
When, in the course of deliberation, informed individuals are free from personal 
bias and undue influence, and when they adhere to the precepts of the moral sense, the 
result of their deliberation will tend to be upright.  Here it is helpful to compare 
Jefferson’s defense of majority rule with Rousseau’s account of the general will.  
Rousseau argues that the deliberations of a sufficiently informed, impartial citizenry will 
tend to result in good, upright outcomes.  However,  
when intrigues and partial associations come into being at the expense of the large 
association, the will of each of these associations becomes general in relation to 
its members and particular in relation to the state.  It can be said, then, that there 
are no longer as many voters as there are men, but as many as there are 
associations.  The differences become less numerous and yield a result that is less 
general.55 
 
As I demonstrated in Chapter One, Rousseau’s emphasis is on the generality of the public 
will: the more individual voters rely on their private interests to inform their judgments, 
the less general (and less upright) the resulting will.  If, on the other hand, individual 
voters understand the value of impartiality and rely solely on their own reason, their 
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collective judgment will tend to be more general (and more upright).  This is why 
Rousseau is adamant that, “[f]or the general will to be well articulated, it is therefore 
important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up 
his own mind.”56  This is also why President Jefferson could not divorce the principles of 
federalism from republicanism; he thus entreats his fellow citizens to “pursue our own 
federal and republican principles, our attachments to our union and representative 
government.”57 
But Jefferson’s devotion to representative government was a reluctant 
commitment at best.  Representation was obviously a practical necessity in a large 
republic, but this did little to assuage Jefferson’s concerns.  Nowhere is this more evident 
than in Jefferson’s letter to John Taylor of 1816.  According to the definition Jefferson 
offers in the missive, republican government “purely and simply…means a government 
by its citizens in mass, acting directly and personally according to rules established by the 
majority.”  On this definition, a “pure” republic does not admit of representation as a 
legitimate mode of government.  Indeed, Jefferson insists that, “every other government 
is more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this 
ingredient of direct action of the citizens.”58   
Clearly, Jefferson has in mind something that has never existed and something 
that never will exist on a large scale.  “Such a government,” he writes, “is evidently 
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restrained to very narrow limits of space and population.  I doubt if it would be 
practicable beyond the extent of a New England township.”59  The New England 
townships that Jefferson admires serve, in some ways, as the model for his own “little 
republics” or “wards,” wherein governmental authority and power would be narrowly 
defined and relatively diffuse.  Since the power of citizens in these townships (and, at 
least in theory, in the Virginian wards) was rather limited, the problem of factions 
concerned Jefferson very little.  Additionally, since the size and composition of the 
townships made them ideally constituted to maintain republican principles and practices 
on a small scale—and since such a possibility did not exist at the national level—
Jefferson shifted his attention to preserving as much of the republican element as possible 
beyond the township.   
Given that the pure republican form cannot endure on a grand scale, Jefferson 
allows for “representatives [to be] chosen either pro hac vice, or for such short terms as 
should render secure the duty of expressing the will of their constituents.”  This he 
considers “the nearest approach to a pure republic which is practicable on a large scale of 
country or population.”60  It would seem, then, that Jefferson’s republican vision admits 
of the possibility, if not the necessity of representation; it even intimates that an approach 
to the ideal republican form requires, at the very least, strict limitations on terms and, 
more importantly, some mechanism by which representatives might be linked more 
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closely with the will of their constituents.  The latter concern is, after all, the crux of the 
problem of representation.61   
While Madison defended representative institutions on the grounds that the effects 
of factions could not be controlled by any other means, Jefferson was less concerned to 
alleviate this problem and more interested in suppressing (or perhaps forestalling) the rise 
of tyranny in any of the three branches.  Though he did not disapprove of Madison’s 
institutional scheme, Jefferson sincerely believed that the people, not their 
representatives, were the surest defense against governmental tyranny: “Believing as I do 
that the mass of the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights, and especially 
that the evils flowing from the duperies of the people are less injurious than those from 
the egoism of their agents, I am a friend to that composition of government which has in 
it the most of this ingredient.”62   
But, in 1816, Jefferson was not convinced that the government of the United 
States was as republican as it could have been.  For one, the people generally had less 
control over their representatives “than their rights and their interests require[d].”  This 
was not the result of apathy or carelessness on the part of the people (or, for that matter, 
on those who framed the national and state constitutions).  Rather, Jefferson suggests that 
the lack of control derives in large part from “a submission of true principle to European 
authorities, to speculators on government, whose fears of the people have been inspired 
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by the populace of their own great cities, and were unjustly entertained against the 
independent, the happy, and therefore orderly citizens of the United States.”63 
Jefferson’s reservations about representative government are not unlike 
Rousseau’s.  While Rousseau might have countenanced representation as a last resort in a 
less-than-ideal republic, he rejected it as a possibility in an ideal republic on grounds that 
the will (and thus, sovereignty) cannot be alienated or divided.  Although, as I showed in 
Chapter One, it is possible that political representation does not necessarily constitute an 
alienation of the will, Rousseau presents a more indirect objection in the Social Contract.  
This objection has less to do with alienation of the will and more to do with the 
relationship between citizens and their legislative influence.  As the size of the population 
increases, Rousseau says, a citizen’s “condition” does not change; the citizen still “bears 
equally the entire dominion of the laws” regardless of the size of the population.64  
However, the citizen’s legislative influence stands to diminish significantly as population 
increases.  “In that case,” Rousseau says, since the subject always remains one, the ratio 
of the sovereign to the subject increases in proportion to the number of citizens.  Whence 
it follows that the larger the state becomes, the less liberty there is.”65   
Rousseau means to suggest that as population increases, the gulf between private 
wills and the general will expands rapidly.  Liberty is lost, he believes, because the 
government, “in order to be good…must be relatively stronger in proportion as the 
populace is more numerous.”66  The implications for representative government are clear: 
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if a citizen’s legislative influence is diminished with each and every increase in the state’s 
size, and if the use of representatives creates a wide (though admittedly bridgeable) gap 
between citizens and the government, the prospects of locating the general will seem 
marginal at best.  What is more, Rousseau seems to foreshadow what later authors in 
Europe and the United States would bemoan: the rise of the administrative state.  “[T]he 
more the state is extended,” Rousseau complains, “the more its real force increases, 
although it does not increase in proportion to its size.”67   
Nearly a century later, in his study of the causes of the French Revolution, 
Tocqueville would draw conclusions about bureaucratic inefficiency not unlike 
Rousseau’s.68  Increases in population inevitably (though not always rightfully) lead to 
increases in governmental responsibilities.  Rousseau was confident that “the execution 
of public business becomes slower in proportion as more people are charged with the 
responsibility for it…and the fruits of deliberation are often lost by dint of 
deliberation.”69  Though he does not offer an explanation for why this phenomenon 
occurs, Rousseau is nevertheless adamant that when the state expands, the government 
ought to contract “so that the number of leaders decreases in proportion to the increase in 
the number of people.”70   
 Jefferson, too, would lament the rise of an increasingly powerful national 
government.  For Jefferson, republican government was, in essence, a government in 
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which a citizen’s share in legislative responsibility was tangible, at least on a local level.  
Wherever citizens were incompetent to perform such tasks (or whenever the affairs of 
government were simply out of their reach) citizens would rely on representatives.  The 
point, for Jefferson, was to keep government as close as possible to its constituents at all 
times.  “[A]ll governments,” Jefferson says, “are more or less republican in proportion as 
this principle enters…into their composition.”71  Even though he believed “that a 
government by representation [would be] capable of extension over a greater surface of 
our country than one of any other form”72 such a government should, nevertheless, 
remain “wise,” “rigorously frugal,” and “simple”—in short, limited and small.73  
Consider, for instance, Jefferson’s remarks to Joseph Cabell on the matter: “What has 
destroyed liberty and the rights of man in every government which has ever existed under 
the sun?  The generalizing and concentrating of all cares and powers into one body.”74 
Jefferson’s aversion to the centralizing tendency of large governments—a concern 
he shared with most of the Anti-Federalists—is also apparent in his constitutionalism.  
His strict constructionism notwithstanding, Jefferson did not embrace the idea of a 
constitution as a permanent foundation for republican government.  Jefferson did not 
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deny that the Constitution was (and ought to be) the ultimate appeal with respect to 
questions about the scope of federal power.  Put simply, the rule of law was just as 
important for Jefferson as it was for Adams and others.  But Jefferson’s democratic 
fervor simply did not allow him to assent to the proposition that constitutions (or any 
other form of law for that matter) could legitimately bind future generations without their 
consent, especially in the face of societal, moral, or political shifts of opinion.  
Constitutions are the product of fallible human reason and, as such, ought to be amenable 
to alteration if and when a people deems such change to be necessary.   
While Jefferson never backed away from his claim that “[p]rudence…will dictate 
that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient 
causes,”75 he refused to admit that perpetual constitutions were in any way compatible 
with popular sovereignty and genuine republicanism.  Positive law serves the ends of the 
living, he thought, and no generation had a right to assume legislative prerogative for 
another.  Jefferson’s theory of generational sovereignty—a rejection of so-called “dead 
hand arguments” for constitutions in perpetuity76 —was shared by several of Jefferson’s 
contemporaries, most notably Thomas Paine.  Disputing Edmund Burke’s claim that the 
law is and ought to be grounded in traditions and practices handed down through 
generations, Paine defends the right of the French revolutionaries to rise up and shake off 
the burdensome yoke of the past.  Since “circumstances…continually [change], and the 
opinions of men change also,” the “mouldy parchments” to which Burke appeals are 
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merely that—mouldy parchments.77  “Government is for the living and not for the dead,” 
Paine insisted, and “it is the living only that has any right to it.”78 
In September of 1789, prior to Paine’s publication of The Rights of Man, 
Jefferson spelled out to Madison his theory of generational sovereignty, or what some 
have termed Jefferson’s “political relativism.”79  “[B]y the law of nature,” he wrote to 
Madison, “one generation is to another as one independent nation to another.”  As such, 
the law of nature does not authorize the creation of “a perpetual constitution, or even a 
perpetual law.”  For Jefferson, it seemed self-evident that “the earth belongs in usufruct 
to the living; that the dead have neither powers nor rights over it.”80  In recommending to 
Madison that he incorporate the principle that all laws ought to expire “at the end of 19 
years” into the Constitution, Jefferson’s primary concern was the contraction of public 
debts.  The problem, as Julian Boyd has suggested, is that Jefferson presents to Madison a 
solution to a problem that was nonexistent in the United States in 1789.  Boyd argues that 
Jefferson, in a state of illness, had inadvertently transcribed to Madison a letter he had 
previously written to Richard Gem.  In that letter, as in the letter to Madison, Jefferson 
insists that the principle of generational sovereignty is “of very extensive application and 
consequences, in every country, especially in France.”81  As Boyd indicates, “[i]f the text 
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were in fact addressed to an American statesman with the hope of persuading him to 
incorporate the theory in American law, the italicized words would seem to be misplaced 
or badly chosen.”82     
Regardless of whether Jefferson intended his prescriptions to apply to France or to 
the United States (or both), the principle of generational sovereignty is undeniably a 
salient feature of Jefferson’s constitutionalism.  In addition to his recommendation that 
all laws expire at the end of nineteen years, Jefferson also suggested that the constitution 
ought to be subjected to popular scrutiny at periodic intervals.83  Like Sidney and 
Rousseau, Jefferson insisted that both fundamental laws and political institutions must 
stay abreast of changing social and political tides; the only way to prevent a constitutional 
or institutional lapse would be to schedule consistent, periodic re-evaulations.84   
In the Social Contract, Rousseau declares that, in order for a republic to be well 
ordered, the relationship between the people and the government must be clearly 
delineated.  The laws that regulate this relationship “bear the name political laws, and are 
also called fundamental laws.”85  In other words, Rousseau insists that a well-ordered 
republic must explicitly afford certain constitutional guarantees to citizens (a bill of 
rights, or an explicit list of things the government may not do).  These laws are 
                                                
 
82 Ibid., 389. 
 
83 See TJ to Kercheval, 12 July 1816. 
 
84 Ibid.  “Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious reverence, and deem them like the ark [sic] of 
the covenant, too sacred to be touched.  They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom more than 
human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amendment…this they would say themselves, were they to 
rise from the dead…We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as 
civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors…Let us follow no such 
examples, nor weakly believe that one generation is not as capable as another of taking care of itself, and of 
ordering its own affairs…let us provide in our Constitution for its revision at stated periods.” 
 
85 Rousseau, SC II.xii. 
 
 116 
presumably grounded in principles of right and, as such, are immutable, for it makes no 
sense to “accept as fundamental, laws that prevent [the political order] from being 
good.”86  But even if a people were to accept bad laws because of, say, a bad judgment 
(i.e., if the general will were to err), this would not be detrimental, for the people always 
reserve the right to alter the laws, even “the best laws.”87 
The fundamental law of which Rousseau speaks ought not to be confused with a 
constitution.  For Rousseau, the “true constitution of the state…is not engraved in marble 
or bronze” (or on parchment, for that matter), “but in the hearts of citizens.”88  The 
fundamental law, then, can be any set of positive laws laid down by the people according 
to the parameters established in their constitution.  Aside from stating that the 
constitution can be found “in the hearts of citizens,” Rousseau gives no indication as to 
where (or even if) such a constitution might be found in the event that citizens might need 
to consult it.  He simply states that, “[e]veryday it takes on new forces.  When other laws 
grow old and die away, it revives and replaces them, preserves a people in the spirit of its 
institutions and imperceptibly substitutes the force of habit for that of authority.”  
Rousseau is speaking not of a code but “mores, customs, and…opinion, a part of the law 
unknown to our political theorists but one on which depends the success of all the 
others.”89   
Fundamental or political laws simply define the structure or form of government; 
since it is supposed to embody commonly shared values, opinions, and, (at least ideally) 
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principles of political right, a constitution ought to define a people.  Values and opinions 
change over time and, as such, it seems that what Rousseau is after is something akin to a 
living or evolving constitution, that is, a constitution that is capable of adapting to 
societal and moral shifts of opinion, but one that is nonetheless grounded firmly in 
principles of right.90  The constitution would thus not be permanent in the sense that its 
articles are unchangeable; it is permanent only in the sense that it ought to be guided and 
informed by principles of moral and political right.  The opinions of the people can 
change—indeed will change—over time.  Because of this, Rousseau accepts that the 
legislator’s work during the founding is merely “the arching of the vault, whereas mores, 
slower to arise, form in the end its immovable keystone.”91 
For Jefferson, this “arching of the vault” would be completed in Philadelphia in 
July, 1776.  The Declaration of Independence was, in Jefferson’s words, “an expression 
of the American mind”92 and it can be viewed as the embodiment and articulation of 
American goals that are, more or less, binding commitments.  The principles of the 
Declaration are eternal and immutable—they are, quite simply, “self-evident truths.”  The 
Constitution, however, was simply meant to embody those truths as best as possible.  In 
other words, the Declaration is a statement of broad democratic commitments that the 
nation is supposed to live up to, not simply a statement of the purely contractual nature of 
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government.  If the Declaration contained the ends, then the Constitution had to contain 
the means.  But, to use Rousseau’s language, the Constitution could effectively sustain 
and “preserve the people in the spirit of [their] institution[s]” only if the principles of the 
Declaration could be instilled in the minds of citizens.  In time, these principles would 
help to inform and support revisions and amendments to the Constitution, continually 
forming “its immovable keystone,”93 and making it more reflective of our democratic 
commitments.  
 
IV.  Conclusion 
As I have shown, Jefferson’s political theory is open to several possible interpretations.  
Each of the interpretations presented herein points to one or more features of Jefferson’s 
political thought in order to cast him in a particular light.  These interpretations range 
from a pure natural rights theorist, a la Locke, to something of a liberal-republican 
hybrid; from the quintessential libertarian to the paragon of positive liberty.  Jefferson is 
decidedly not the paragon of positive liberty, as many early twentieth-century 
progressives would have it; nor is he the archetype for modern libertarianism.  While 
Jefferson’s understanding of various concepts or ideas might have undergone a shift or 
maturation between the 1770s and 1826, this is not to say that his principles ever 
vacillated.  Jefferson was indeed a principled republican until his death and the best way 
to understand his political theory is in terms of his commitment to principled, though at 
times overly-idealized, republicanism. 
 The principles of Jeffersonian democracy depart in significant ways from the 
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fundamental principles articulated and practiced by his Federalist counterparts.  Both the 
Federalists and what would come to be called the Jeffersonians (or the Democratic-
Republicans) believed that the purpose or end of self-government was, primarily, to 
protect the inalienable rights articulated in the Declaration of Independence.  However, 
while both the Federalists and Jefferson were wedded to the ideas and principles of 
republicanism, some, such as Hamilton, saw Jefferson and his followers as being a little 
too principled, or too idealistic in their approach to real-world political problems.  It 
might be an exaggeration to characterize Hamilton as overly-pragmatic and it would 
certainly be incorrect to label him as unprincipled; but, on the same token, it would be far 
from accurate to describe Jefferson as a man who was too theoretical or too idealistic in 
his politics.  Jefferson was certainly more of a philosopher than Hamilton and this shines 
through in much of his writing.  But it is perhaps the energy and dynamism of the two 
Federalist administrations preceding Jefferson that tend to cast him in this light.  
Jefferson was by no means a fan of energetic, large, powerful government; his 
philosophy and political practice were aimed at staying true to what he saw as the 
fundamental principles of the American republic, the ideals that were articulated in the 
Declaration of Independence and, to a great extent, embodied in an imperfect 
Constitution. 
 In the Federalists’ opinion, Jeffersonians were not well-attuned to the realities of 
the new political scene in which the United States found itself after the Revolution—the 
reality of an emerging global political economy, the reality of a shifting and dangerous 
global political order.  The Federalists were, in many ways, political realists, but their 
realism was perhaps over-extended at times and the sense of urgency that bolstered much 
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of their political action seems to have undermined some of the principles for which the 
Revolution was fought. 
 On the other hand, Jefferson’s continual struggle to uphold these principles indeed 
revealed a seeming lack of this sense of realism.  It was not that Jefferson failed to 
comprehend the realities of the new global political order; it was not that Jefferson was 
naïve and overly-idealistic in his approach to politics.  His political struggles as Secretary 
of State under Washington and his continued struggles as President against John 
Marshall’s supreme court simply suggest that he, more so than the Federalists, tried to 
balance theory with practice—that is, ideals with reality, principles with politics.  In some 
cases, Jefferson was not quite as forward-looking as he could have been, and this is 
certainly reflected in some of his writings.  In other cases, Jefferson stands as the paragon 
of liberty, as an untiring defender of American principles.   
 I have analyzed Jefferson’s republicanism along several important lines.  
Additionally, I have shown how Jefferson’s political theory mirrors much of Rousseau’s.  
For all that Zuckert, Appleby, and Bailyn’s analyses are worth, each fails to attend 
adequately to another significant, if not indispensible dimension of Jefferson’s 
republicanism: religion or, more appropriately, what Peter Onuf calls “republicanized 
Christianity.”  Chapter Four explores Jefferson’s thoughts on public religion and the 
ways in which it maps onto Rousseau’s concept of the civil religion
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Jefferson and the Idea of Public Religion 
 
I.  Introduction 
The Enlightenment is often characterized as a period in which reason begins to hold sway 
over the human mind.  Though the Age of Reason was punctuated with periods of 
intellectual upheaval, there was nevertheless a unified approach to advancing the cause of 
freedom in all its forms.  In Peter Gay’s words, the “vastly ambitious program” 
undertaken by the “men of the Enlightenment” was, at its core, “a program of secularism, 
humanity, cosmopolitanism, and freedom; above all, freedom in its many forms—
freedom from arbitrary power, freedom of speech…freedom, in a word, of moral man to 
make his own way in the world.”1  Among the waves of criticism to emerge in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, perhaps none was more forceful than the swelling 
chorus of religious skepticism.  Continental thinkers (such as Rousseau and Voltaire) and 
American thinkers (Jefferson, Madison, Rush) all played pivotal roles in deciding certain 
questions and laying the groundwork for debate in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.   
While many important questions were decided in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the focus of this chapter shall be the question of civil, or public religion.  
Religious problems abound in the thought of Rousseau and Jefferson, but the problem of 
public religion looms large and, in many ways, seems largely unresolved.  In this chapter, 
I explore the ways in which Jefferson developed and adjusted his understanding of 
religion over time and I examine the ways in which the role of public religion figures in 
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his republicanism.  More specifically, I try to show that although Jefferson was not 
exactly an orthodox Christian—he did, in fact, reject much of what institutionalized 
Christianity had to offer—he was deeply committed to the fundamental moral principles 
embedded in the Christian tradition.  Moreover, Jefferson firmly believed that the moral 
foundations of a pure, more rational form of Christianity were highly apposite, if not 
indispensible to the creation of virtuous, independent citizens in the American Republic.  
In other words, Jefferson recognized the value—indeed, the social utility—of an 
American civil religion grounded in the pure, unadulterated precepts of Jesus of 
Nazareth. 
First, I examine Jefferson’s understanding and critique of religion in general.  
Like Rousseau, Jefferson recognizes the importance of an unfettered mind.  The 
Virginian is often highly critical of institutionalized religion.  In fact, he and James 
Madison were regular allies in the assault on established religion in the Old Dominion.  
Nevertheless, Jefferson is neither the irreligious apostle of atheism many have painted 
him to be, nor is he committed to a disavowal of any and all religious influence in the 
public sphere.  Indeed, Jefferson’s private religion had a pronounced effect on his 
policies as President.  Moreover, we see Jefferson’s peculiar understanding of the 
Gospels and of Christianity in general weaved throughout his republicanism.  Though it 
evolves from the 1760s until his death in 1826, the role of religion in Jefferson’s 
republicanism is unmistakable. 
Next, I explore the ways in which Rousseau and Jefferson’s views on religion 
overlap.  Both men elevate freedom of conscience to a very high place in their respective 
republican ideals, yet both seem ready to embrace a system that denies, in certain ways, 
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pure and unadulterated freedom of the mind.  Rousseau’s tendency toward hyperbole 
might account for some of his rather outlandish prescriptions—for example, his claim 
that anyone who dares to say, “‘Outside the church there is no salvation’ should be 
expelled from the state.”2  Likewise, Jefferson’s attitude toward Native Americans 
reveals not only a certain naïveté in his thinking about supposedly uncivilized, inferior 
races, but also demonstrates the danger in relying too heavily on “scientific” truths as 
support for moral prescription and public policy making. 
Typically calculated and cool in his personal correspondence, the Virginian was 
occasionally reactive and heated, particularly on sensitive subjects dear to his heart.  In 
such cases, Jefferson’s meaning and his intent can be difficult to glean, as he was 
sometimes prone to exaggeration or, at the very least, overstatement.  Though not as 
hyperbolic as his Genevan counterpart, Jefferson did have a way with words that, at 
times, could do more to obscure his message than to convey it in a clear, easily 
discernible way.  With respect to questions of a religious nature, this is perhaps nowhere 
as apparent as in his later correspondence with John Adams (who is, without a doubt, 
more irascible and prone to verbal fits than Jefferson or Rousseau).   
Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” is lauded as the legislative 
cornerstone for religious liberty in the United States.  Along with James Madison’s 
“Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessment,” Jefferson’s Bill helped to 
pave the way for disestablishment of the Anglican Church in Virginia (and, subsequently, 
for the establishment of religious freedom more broadly in other states and at the national 
level).  A remarkable achievement indeed, Jefferson’s efforts to curtail sectarianism in 
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the Old Dominion are nevertheless misunderstood by contemporary scholars.  Although 
Jefferson did mean to rid the state of the corrupting influence of the Anglican clergy and, 
perhaps more importantly, to eliminate any and all obstacles to freedom of worship, his 
thoughts on the value of public religion are sometimes obscured.   
The Bill’s language is well known; it is inscribed on the walls of the Jefferson 
Memorial in Washington, D.C. and it has proved the touchstone for much First 
Amendment theory since the late nineteenth century.3  Jefferson’s intent is unambiguous: 
“…Almighty God hath created the mind free; [and] all attempts to influence it by 
temporal punishments or burdens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of 
hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy Author of our 
religion.”4  Several things are readily apparent in the Bill.  First, Jefferson makes it clear 
that the human mind is, and of right ought to be, unfettered and free; this is the only 
condition permitted by the laws of nature.  When civil or ecclesiastical laws inhibit or 
restrict freedom of conscience, the consequences are disastrous.  Second, any departure 
from the natural order of things is contrary to divine mandate; while God intends for 
human beings to follow his laws, he nevertheless created human beings free and 
independent and ultimately wants them to remain that way.   
The problem, then, is finding a way to reconcile these two demands: on the one 
hand, ensuring that human behavior conforms to God’s eternal laws; on the other hand, 
guaranteeing that human freedom is not unduly inhibited.  Peter Onuf sums up 
                                                
3 See Donald L. Drakeman, “Church, State, and Original Intent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2009). 
 
4 Jefferson, “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom,” Drafted 1779, PTJ 2:305; 545-553. 
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Jefferson’s sentiment in the Bill: what God created, man has corrupted.5  This, of course, 
oversimplifies Jefferson’s thinking, but it nevertheless goes to the heart of Jefferson’s 
intent.  Although Jefferson wished to see the complete and total disestablishment of state-
sponsored religion in Virginia, he did, in fact, understand and appreciate the vital role 
religion ought to play in the health and longevity of a republic.   
Rousseau considered this problem and its attendant consequences before Jefferson 
attempted to effect change in the Virginia Legislature.  Jefferson’s Bill appears to echo 
the opening lines of Emile, where Rousseau sums up his entire project: “Everything is 
good as it leaves the hands of the Author of things: everything degenerates in the hands 
of man.”6  Like Jefferson, Rousseau understands the value of public religion and he 
devotes a considerable amount of space to defending it as part of his republican ideal.  
Man’s corruption, or his departure from transcendent moral and political right, is 
Rousseau’s guiding light, so to speak.  As I tried to show in previous chapters, this is the 
standard upon which Rousseau’s entire republican project hinges.  Jefferson too weaves 
this idea into his republican fabric, though the Virginian is more constrained by political 
reality than Rousseau. 
 
II.  Jefferson’s Views on Religion 
In this section, I explore two important facets of Jefferson’s thoughts on religion.  First, I 
examine Jefferson’s general views on institutionalized religion.  Next, I consider 
Jefferson’s own “republicanized” version of Christianity, his thoughts on the utility of 
                                                
5 Peter S. Onuf, The Mind of Thomas Jefferson, 140. 
 
6 Rousseau, Emile, 37. 
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such a public religion, and the ways in which he wrestled with his understanding of 
Christianity both publicly and privately.  
Although Jefferson was confident that human beings were naturally good, he also 
recognized that institutions and conditions could easily corrupt them.  Jefferson was wary 
of political ambition and individuals who were bent on exercising an undue degree of 
influence over their fellow citizens.  In particular, Jefferson was deeply suspicious of the 
Anglican clergy and the power they exercised over their seemingly naïve, if not blind 
followers.  On Peter Onuf’s reading, Jefferson viewed the clericalism prominent in 
Virginia as portending the demise of the republican experiment.7  Onuf goes on to 
suggest that Jefferson’s antipathy toward clericalism “demanded a ‘wall of separation’ in 
order to secure the uncorrupted soul of the republic…[A]s long as the danger of 
priestcraft remained paramount, Jefferson’s concerns were largely negative: moral 
philosophers ancient and modern remained the best guides to the good life.”8   
Yet Jefferson’s apprehension was not limited to the corruption he found in the 
institutionalized religion of seventeenth and eighteenth century England and Virginia.  
Jefferson was perhaps more worried about the creeping effects of priestcraft in the private 
sphere, that is, the ways in which learned clergy directly and indirectly influenced the 
minds of their often-unlearned followers.  Most notable, in Jefferson’s mind, are the ways 
in which clergy had for centuries expounded on the legitimacy and meaning of sacred 
scripture, especially the Christian Gospels.  According to Onuf, the point at which 
                                                
7 Onuf, 143.  Compare Jefferson’s sentiment to that expressed by Lincoln in the “Address before the Young 
Men’s Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois,” 27 January 1838. 
   
8 Onuf, 145.  It should be noted that Jefferson’s primary concern here is not necessarily with the clergy in 
general; Jefferson set his sights on those corrupt members of the Anglican Church, those who might abuse 
the trust of the people whom they were charged to shepherd.  As previously discussed, Rousseau expresses 
a similar distrust over like-minded Roman Catholic clergy. 
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Jefferson began to assess and challenge the dangerous influence the Anglican Church had 
on Virginians is the point at which “his own ‘religious pilgrimage’ began in earnest.”9  
Understanding this “pilgrimage” is key to understanding not only Jefferson’s embrace of 
religious liberty, but also his subsequent support for a peculiar sort of public religion.   
Jefferson’s Christianity—his understanding of the teachings of Christ, his own 
particular worldview with respect to the church, his own faith—was a product of many 
years of contemplation, conversation, and examination.  Jefferson was raised in the 
established Anglican Church of Virginia, though as a young adult he was by no means 
wedded to the Church, nor was he a practicing Anglican.  Jefferson’s condemnation of 
the Church and the clergy is important, for religious tyranny and political tyranny often 
went hand in hand in seventeenth and eighteenth century Virginia.  However, the more 
important feature of Jefferson’s thinking is his understanding of the moral teachings of 
Christ.  Incidentally, Jefferson’s interpretation of these teachings and their place within 
the burgeoning American tradition serves to place his broad views on religious liberty, 
and his critique of religious establishment more specifically, into context. 
Onuf suggests that “Jefferson’s breakthrough was to cast Jesus as a great reformer 
and thus to establish a genealogy for America’s republican revolution—and for himself 
as a reformer in the Christian tradition.”10  Like others had done before him, Jefferson 
rejects the divine personhood of Christ.  He sees Jesus not as the Son of God, sent to heal 
the contrite and pardon sin, but rather as a mere mortal (though, in Jefferson’s estimation, 
                                                
9 Onuf, 146.  See also 146 n.24. 
 
10 Ibid., 147. 
 
 128 
the greatest mortal ever to walk the earth).11  The pure teachings of Christ were, for 
Jefferson, the most sublime and correct moral teachings ever to be found.  Yet, these pure 
teachings, as Jefferson understands them, had been corrupted through centuries of clerical 
manipulation and scholastic exposition.  The pure teachings of Christ were indeed to be 
found in the Gospels, but their accessibility was severely diminished.  Reform had been 
attempted through the ages but much to Jefferson’s chagrin, each of these attempts 
ultimately failed to rid Christianity of its cult-like elements.12 
 Still, reform seems to be the key theme Jefferson identifies in the Gospels’ 
account of the life and teachings of Christ.  When the Gospels were purified—that is, 
when the accounts given by the Gospel authors could be distilled into their essential 
parts—a true account of Jesus’s moral teachings could be acquired.  For Jefferson, this 
involved separating the genuine philosophical teachings of Jesus of Nazareth from the 
miraculous deeds attributed to him by Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John.  If the simple 
moral teachings could be isolated from the miracles—if the practical could be divorced 
from the mystical—then this would open the door for a more genuine and legitimate 
Christianity to permeate the American mind. 
According to Onuf, Jefferson believed that this inclination toward reform was the 
animating feature of Jesus’s moral philosophy: “The reform impulse…represented the 
true spirit of unadulterated Christianity…Only in America, perhaps, could the rejection of 
Platonic mystifications—and priestcraft—lead to a popular, purified Christianity that 
                                                
11 See also TJ to William Short, 4 August 1820, Writings, 1435-40. 
 
12 See Onuf, 146-7.  Compare Rousseau’s criticism of the “religion of man” and the “religion of the priest” 
in SC IV.viii and Emile, Book IV. 
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would sustain the moral progress of republican governments.”13  This, in turn, seems to 
be the crux of Jefferson’s position on public religion: a reformed or purified 
Christianity—a Christianity devoid of the corrupting influences of priestcraft and 
mysticism—is not only beneficial, but necessary to the cultivation of a healthy American 
republic.  In Jefferson’s estimation, the young republic was not merely set apart from 
history’s failed or fledgling republics, it was destined and designed by Providence to 
succeed as a model for all republics to come.   
Contrary to what many scholars have suggested, Jefferson’s brand of American 
exceptionalism is not unlike some of his more religiously fervent predecessors.14  Indeed, 
Jefferson’s rhetoric of exceptionalism is just as laden with Christian overtones as that of 
John Winthrop or Benjamin Rush.  Although the language is dialed down dramatically, 
and even though Jefferson wrote on the subject less frequently than his preaching 
counterparts, his point is still unambiguous: we, the American people, have been blessed 
by the God  
who led our forefathers, as Israel of old, from their native land, and planted them 
in a country flowing with all the necessaries and comforts of life; who has 
covered our infancy with his providence, and our riper years with his wisdom and 
power; and to whose goodness I ask you to join with me in supplications, that he 
will so enlighten the minds of your servants, guide their councils, and prosper 
                                                
13 Onuf, 147. 
 
14 For several solid accounts of Jefferson’s take on American exceptionalism (and the Republican 
understanding, more generally), see Thomas Kidd, God of Liberty: A Religious History of the American 
Revolution (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2010); Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, Empire of 
Liberty: The Statecraft of Thomas Jefferson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); John M. Murrin, 
“The Jeffersonian Triumph and American Exceptionalism,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 20, No. 1 
(2000): 1-25; Peter S. Onuf, “‘To Declare Them a Free and Independent People’: Race, Slavery, and 
National Identity in Jefferson’s Thought,” Journal of the Early Republic, Vol. 18, No. 1 (1998): 1-46; 
Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York, NY: Random House, 2010); and 
Matthew S. Holland, Bonds of Affection: Civic Charity and the Making of America: Winthrop, Jefferson, 
and Lincoln (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2007). 
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their measures, that whatsoever they do, shall result in your good, and shall secure 
to you the peace, friendship, and approbation of all nations.15 
 
In 1805, the American people enjoyed a certain “union of sentiment” which 
served to “[auger] harmony and happiness” throughout the land.  The preservation of 
such a union was tenable only if the spirit that animated it could be sustained.  But 
maintaining that spirit required something that Jefferson believed to be intrinsic to the 
pure form of Christianity that he found in the unfiltered, unabridged, and unmanipulated 
teachings of Christ: freedom of conscience.  Here Jefferson’s ideal is expressed clearly 
and concisely: genuine freedom of conscience and the absence of tyrannical public 
opinion are necessary conditions to the convergence of the hearts and minds of the people 
into one “entire union of opinion.”16   
Why, exactly, were the supposedly distorted teachings of various religious 
institutions so wrong and so dangerous?  Why did the clergy exercise such a dangerous 
influence over the minds of the people (and, by extension, over public opinion)?  
Institutionalized religion alarmed Jefferson because those who claimed power and 
authority within the church did nothing but obscure and distort the message of the 
Gospels to suit their own ends.  Ultimately, the power of priests and other members of the 
clergy rested on their ability to persuade and frighten their parishioners—that is to say, 
the clergy could effectively maintain their power and status only by keeping their 
followers uninformed and unenlightened.  True knowledge of sacred scripture was 
                                                
15 TJ, “Second Inaugural Address,” 4 March 1805, Writings, 523. 
 
16 Ibid.  Jefferson’s hope for an “entire union of opinion” seems quite Rousseauian.  Compare Colleen 
Sheehan’s take on Rousseau and public opinion vis-à-vis Madison in Sheehan, James Madison and the 
Spirit of Republican Self-Government, 64.  See also Chapter One. 
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limited to a select, enlightened few.17  Such a restricted or limited diffusion of knowledge 
meant that only those with access to education—and only those with a certain degree of 
privilege within the church—could claim to be able to interpret and disseminate the word 
of God.  Furthermore, this implies that those without such access are committed either to 
follow or suffer the consequences.  The danger, of course, is that when power and 
authority are concentrated, opportunities to challenge prevailing opinions or dissent from 
them are considerably limited.  Jefferson believed that people placed in positions of 
subservience, were far more likely to acquiesce and believe whatever they were told to 
believe. 
Although Jefferson may be correct to assume that “dependence begets 
subservience,” we must bear in mind that he is reacting to those particular clergy 
members (and other church officials) who were only after power.  What Jefferson fails to 
account for is the fact that certain supposedly irrational beliefs (e.g., belief in the trinity) 
must still be permitted and, more importantly, people must be free to accept or reject 
those beliefs on their own terms.  Jefferson seems to recognize that freedom of 
conscience requires this much, but he refuses to accept that reasonable individuals might 
choose to subscribe to such ideas and beliefs even in the absence of malevolent or corrupt 
influences.18 
 Nevertheless, Jefferson had his sights set on something more than just freedom of 
conscience.  Based on the seemingly nebulous promises of the Declaration of 
                                                
17 Here Plato’s allegory of the cave seems to fit the bill—ironically, considering Jefferson’s dislike of Plato. 
 
18 “Dependence begets subservience and venality, suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for 
the designs of ambition.”  Notes on the State of Virginia (1787), in Writings, ed. Merrill D. Peterson, Query 
XIV. 
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Independence and the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, Jefferson has been cast as 
a moral relativist by some, a Deist, and even an atheist by others.  Perhaps the most 
nebulous source of all—and, ironically, the one most often cited by those who wish to 
depict Jefferson as the apostle of Deism or as indifferent to religion altogether—is the 
famous “Letter to the Danbury Baptists” (the “Wall of Separation” Letter) of 1802.  
Jefferson did, in fact, claim that, “Religion is a matter that lies solely between man and 
his God.”19  Yet, Jefferson also insisted that once the deleterious influence of the High 
Federalists was purged from public office and the Republican spirit again prevailed, 
genuine, unadulterated Christianity would assume its rightful place in American society.  
The two seem to go hand in hand: republicanism values liberty and respect for both 
natural and moral right; genuine Christianity—that is, an adherence to the moral precepts 
of Jesus himself—requires the free and willing assent of the mind, an enlightened mind 
that is free from the “shackles” of undue and possibly corrupt influences.   
Jefferson believed that the decline of the Federalists and the reemergence of 
republicanism at the turn of the nineteenth century would usher in a new era of prosperity 
and happiness for the American people, and the so-called Revolution of 1800 marked the 
beginning of an important shift: a shift away from the influence of officious, overbearing, 
occasionally corrupt Federalists (whom Jefferson at one point likened to “witches”) and 
toward the non-intrusive, virtuous, and liberty-loving Republicans.20  Moreover, a 
Republican victory in 1800—and a resuscitation of republican principles more 
                                                
19 TJ to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins, and Stephen S. Nelson, a Committee of the Danbury 
Baptist Association in the State of Connecticut, 1 January 1802, PTJ 36:258. 
 
20 See TJ to John Taylor, 4 June 1798: “A little patience, and we shall see the reign of witches pass over, 
their spells dissolve, and the people, recovering their true sight, restore their government to it's true 
principles.” PTJ 30:389. 
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generally—would all but guarantee that Christianity could be returned “to the original 
purity and simplicity of its benevolent institutor.”21  Since Christianity was, in Jefferson’s 
mind, the “religion of all others most friendly to liberty, science, and the freest expression 
of the human mind,”22 it seemed only logical for it to flourish alongside republicanism in 
the United States, for it to permeate the American mind and inform public opinion at all 
turns.      
What bearing does this have on the American political landscape in the early 
nineteenth century?  Jefferson’s repudiation of the High Federalists is based primarily on 
reasons and principles not unlike those he employs to denounce established religious 
institutions and the priests and ministers who controlled them.  The problem with the 
Federalists, in Jefferson’s mind, was their assumptions about human nature and the 
inability of people to govern themselves effectively without institutional direction and 
approval.  Put differently, the Federalists sought to govern from the top down and, while 
they did appreciate the fact that power ultimately flowed from the people, they refused to 
accept that the people could be secure and well ordered in the absence of a watchful, 
enlightened state to keep their worse passions in check.  To the Federalists, the powers of 
the federal government were, in many ways, akin to the powers and judgment exercised 
by a parent for the good of a child. 
In Jefferson’s opinion, the Federalist vision was myopic at best.  It failed not only 
to appreciate the dignity and importance of the ordinary citizen—i.e., the common man—
but also tended to assume that broad, discretionary power in the hands of the federal 
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22 Ibid. 
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government was the best way to secure and maintain a republic.  In short, the Federalists 
failed on at least two fronts to remain true to the Revolution’s principles: not only did 
they embrace unnatural hierarchy and other dubious facets of the old order, they also 
reduced the ordinary citizen to a mere subject.  Jefferson, on the other hand, helped to 
shore up the republican experiment by rejecting artificial hierarchy and emboldening the 
common man.   
Where Jefferson’s political theory deemed inclusion, participation, and diffusion 
of power necessary to the overall health of the republic, so too did the Virginian’s vision 
of religious reform.  Indeed, Jefferson’s political theory is inextricably linked to this 
vision.  He does more than merely bracket the ideas of freedom of worship and freedom 
of conscience in a broader theory of natural rights; he incorporates what are essentially 
negative rights into a more positive democratic scheme that unfolds over time as the 
people grow wary of a distant, untethered power.  In other words, the people are not 
simply free to believe and worship as they see fit; just as the colonists did in response to 
Parliament’s unresponsiveness and the King’s complicity, the people would ultimately 
embrace their suppressed natural rights and require their ecclesiastical leaders to cede 
some power, to relinquish some authority—in short, to democratize their churches.   
Unlike most Federalists, Jefferson believed that the common sense of the average, 
ordinary citizen could—and would—prevail.  He was just as suspicious of the elite and 
officious holding high political office as he was of priests and ministers holding sway 
over their congregations.  A monopoly on power, political or ecclesiastical, could be 
dangerous if not checked properly.  Although Jefferson came to accept the institutional 
checks afforded and guaranteed by the Constitution, he was in no way satisfied that 
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similar checks were in place to prevent the manipulation of parishioners’ minds by their 
leaders.  One way to guard against such encroachments would be to rely on the judgment 
and common sense of the people, for “the people’s good sense would always be 
vindicated when they enjoyed real freedom of choice.”23   
But the problem, of course, did not lie in finding a way for common, ordinary 
citizens to express their preferences or in finding a way for such people to choose.  
Jefferson’s confidence in the common man is perhaps nowhere better expressed than in 
his well-known parable of the ploughman:   
The moral sense, or conscience, is as much a part of man as his leg or arm.  It is 
given to all human beings in a stronger or weaker degree, as force of members is 
given them in a greater or less degree.  It may be strengthened by exercise, as may 
any particular limb of the body.  This sense is submitted, indeed, in some degree, 
to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this: even a 
less one than what we call common sense. State a moral case to a ploughman and 
a professor.  The former will decide it as well, and often better than the latter, 
because he has not been led astray by artificial rules.24 
 
The problem, then, was not making men moral; the problem was delivering men from the 
chains imposed by calculating and conniving priests and politicians so that men may 
exercise their natural reason to the best of their ability.25    
 Jefferson believed that eventually reason would prevail and, as people enjoyed an 
unprecedented degree of religious freedom, churches would abandon their old ways.  
Likewise, the influence of outmoded beliefs and practices would be assuaged by an 
increasingly democratic structure within churches.  Disestablishment of ecclesiastical 
                                                
23 Onuf, 150. 
 
24 TJ to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787, PTJ 12:15. 
 
25 Onuf, 150: “The problem under the old regime, even in its attenuated American forms, was that 
‘ploughmen’ did not get to make choices as long as priests—the quintessential ‘professors’—enjoyed a 
state-sanctioned monopoly over opinion.” 
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authority was indeed important, but it would be wrong to conclude that it was paramount 
in Jefferson’s project.  In a way, Jefferson did wish to sever the bond between religion 
and politics, but only insofar as religion compelled people, upon pain of legal sanction, to 
subscribe to principles or accept beliefs that could not be apprehended by the human 
intellect.  It was not so much beliefs that Jefferson took issue with; though he might have 
seen concepts such as the trinity to be nothing but a farce, the free assent of the human 
mind to such a concept did not disturb Jefferson nearly as much as the idea of coerced 
conviction.   
Thus, the supreme goal of Jefferson’s crusade against established religion was not 
so much the destruction of religious beliefs—rational or irrational—but the destruction of 
irresistible religious authority.  Jefferson indeed embraced a version of Christianity that 
suited his own historical and moral interpretations of the Gospels, and he even went so 
far as to deem this brand of Christianity a fundamental feature of sound republicanism.  
But the only way to realize the worldly goals of Christianity as he understood it—the 
only way to reform existing institutions and ensure the development of a more rational 
Christianity that would inform the public mind—was to eliminate all vestiges of the old 
regime. 
Onuf is right to emphasize the value Jefferson placed on the cultivation of 
individual autonomy.  However, Onuf is mistaken to conclude that the autonomous 
individual is somehow the “ultimate source and foundation of morality and religion” in 
Jefferson’s vision.26  The foundations of Jefferson’s republicanized Christianity were the 
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moral teachings of Christ, while the autonomous individual was but a product (and 
simultaneously a continuation) of these precepts. 
  Jefferson was confident that sectarian divisions in the United States and the 
trivial theological disputations that fueled them would eventually vanish.  His confidence 
was bolstered by the rapidly increasing (or resurgent) republican sentiment that 
developed after the election of 1800.  Likewise, Jefferson was pleased with the 
momentum that religious reform had garnered at the turn of the century and no doubt 
expected this forward movement to continue well beyond his years.  Jefferson had faith 
in the ploughman’s moral faculties because the ploughman was better attuned to reality 
and was closer to nature than the professor.  The ploughman’s proximity to nature, his 
freedom, and his independence positioned him well against the tides of clerical 
corruption.  The ploughmen, Jefferson’s archetypical republicans, were the regulars from 
which the salvo against religious tyranny would be fired.  The first line of defense was, of 
course, legislative and constitutional protection in the form of guarantees of freedom of 
worship, association, and expression, but the real fighting was to be done in the trenches, 
so to speak.  So-called “parchment barriers” were only so effective in securing genuine 
religious liberty; the difficult—and arguably more important work—was combating and 
destroying centuries of harmful artifice within the institutions themselves in order to 
replace it with the pure, transcendent principles of nature.   
But Jefferson’s confidence in the republican ideal, or his confidence in the ability 
of nature to conquer artifice was perhaps premature, if not injudicious.  Jefferson’s 
idealism is apparent throughout his career, but nowhere does it seem to be as misguided 
or misplaced as in his vision for progressive religious reform in the nineteenth century.  
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Onuf suggests that Jefferson’s belief in the power of reason to steer the country toward 
the embrace of a more rational Christianity was based on a single assumption: that “Once 
Americans began acting like republicans, they would begin to think like republicans and 
no longer allow an ‘interested aristocracy of priests’ to ‘think for them.’”27  Ultimately, 
over the course of several decades, Jefferson expected the republican spirit to dominate 
the land; at that point, the people’s “union of sentiments” would not only subsume any 
and all sectarian conflict, but also radically “[transform] popular beliefs.”28 
 Given his reckoning with Christianity and his own professed belief in the verity of 
Jesus of Nazareth’s moral teachings, some scholars have questioned Jefferson’s caginess 
on the subject.29  Why was Jefferson so reluctant to express his beliefs publicly?  What 
explains his reticence?  There are two prevailing views on this matter, both of which 
seem to contain an element of truth.  On the one hand, Jefferson’s reservation and his 
unwillingness to profess his faith publicly are indicative of the Virginian’s firm belief in 
the intrinsic value of religious freedom.  To compel an individual to make a public 
profession of faith—to require submission to any sort of religious “test”—would be to 
violate the sacred right of conscience, and this is something Jefferson simply could not 
countenance.30  On the other hand, Jefferson can be seen not merely as a proponent of a 
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29 See, for instance, Alan V. Briceland, “Thomas Jefferson’s Epitaph: Symbol of a Lifelong Crusade againt 
Those Who Would ‘Usurp the Throne of God,’” Journal of Church and State, Vol. 29 (1987): 285-303; 
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30 See Onuf, 151-2. 
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more muted sort of Christianity, but as a conventional, public practitioner who did not 
shy away from opportunities to demonstrate his faith.  Moreover, on this account, 
Jefferson is understood to be in favor of a synthesis between popular, non-
institutionalized Christianity and republican institutions.31   
 In the case of the first view, Jefferson is understood to be overly cautious, though 
politically savvy when it came to his religion.  Knowing full well that the political 
climate was still volatile after 1800 and that anything he said would likely be 
misconstrued, Jefferson was sure to tread carefully when it came to something as 
controversial as religious beliefs.  Yet his optimism about the (ongoing) republican 
revolution seems to suggest that a more headstrong approach would be beneficial.  In 
other words, if Jefferson sincerely believed that a sound republican order required the 
perfusion of a more rational Christianity across the country, and that this diffusion was 
not only required but would succeed, then why would the author of the Declaration of 
Independence resist an inclination to forge ahead?  After all, the Declaration of 
Independence—indeed, the whole American experiment—was more of a risky wager in 
                                                
31 Some scholars acknowledge that Jefferson was, in fact, committed to certain religious principles.  
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1776 than an endeavor to demystify Christianity in the early nineteenth century would 
have been.   
 Or was it?  Jefferson might have had a good reason to restrain himself publicly 
both during his presidency and in retirement.  Onuf suggests that it was not so much 
Jefferson as it was the American public and he points to the problem of slavery to help 
illuminate Jefferson’s continual struggles.  In 1782, Virginia enacted legislation to help 
ease the manumission of slaves.  However, this was as far as most were willing to go.  
Few Virginians were ready to denounce and destroy the institution of slavery and, on 
Onuf’s interpretation, a lack of enlightenment on the part of Virginia’s citizens accounts 
for this antipathy.  Likewise, most Virginians had yet to understand or embrace “the 
broadest implications of religious liberty.”32 
Jefferson’s primary commitment was to upholding republican principles and 
practices, and here Onuf seems to capture the core of Jefferson’s thinking on the matter.  
On the festering issue of slavery and the question of religious liberty, the general public 
was either ill informed or simply ignorant.  As such, “‘public opinion’ needed to be more 
fully enlightened, whether to prevent backsliding on religious liberty or to prepare the 
way for emancipation.”33  Yet Jefferson was aware that such enlightenment was not easy 
to come by and, what is more, the people would not—and should not—stand for 
compulsion or coercion when it came to such enlightenment.  Instead, the enlightenment 
should “spring from below”—it should emanate from the people and not be imposed 
from above, for “[t]o dictate to the people, even for the most enlightened and progressive 
                                                
32 Onuf, 152. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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purposes, was to violate the most fundamental principle of republican self-government.  
Republican means should never be sacrificed to ostensibly republican ends.”34   
 Although he fully embraced the principle of generational sovereignty and the 
right of a reasonable majority to see its will enacted in law, Jefferson was well aware of 
the dangers (political and practical) inherent in a contravention of public opinion, 
regardless of how unreasonable or irrational that opinion proved to be.35  Like many 
others, Jefferson knew that slavery spelled the demise of the American experiment, but 
temporary measures to curtail its spread were the only things likely to keep a highly 
combustible public opinion from flaring into an inferno.  Similarly, the problem of 
religious enlightenment would take time to solve and, like slavery, it could not be 
sufficiently addressed from above.  Thus, Jefferson was forced to wait for enlightenment 
to spread throughout the masses, and he anticipated the eventual arrival of a well 
adjusted, informed, and willing majority.36  
 The second view mentioned above is that Jefferson was a proponent of religious 
freedom but not quite the strict separationist that twentieth century scholars and justices 
have painted him to be.  Most nineteenth and twentieth century jurisprudential work on 
Jefferson and the First Amendment relies heavily (if not exclusively) on his famous letter 
                                                
34 Ibid.   
 
35 On the question of generational sovereignty as well as Jefferson’s understanding of the scope of majority 
rule, see Chapter Three.  The right of a reasonable majority to enact its will seems to be something that 
even John Adams embraced, albeit reluctantly, as evidenced by his acceptance of a provision in the 
Massachusetts Constitution pertaining to the establishment of religion.  Though he disagreed with the 
provision in principle, he nevertheless accepted it as permitting the rightful will of the people.  Perhaps he 
also was able to accept the provision because he was fairly certain it would not stand the test of time and 
that an enlightened public would eventually come to see the error in its way.  In 1830, the provision was 
removed.   
 
36 Such a majority did not arrive on the political scene in Jefferson’s lifetime.  Although not a clear 
majority, the rise of Abolitionist sentiment in the 1830s-1850s certainly helped to avail public opinion on 
the matter and move the issue forward (albeit to the brink of civil war).   
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to the Danbury Baptists of January 1802.  In the letter, Jefferson assures the Baptist 
ministers that their beliefs are similar to his:  
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man and his 
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the 
legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should “make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,” thus building a 
wall of separation between Church and State.37 
 
At face value, the letter seems to suggest precisely what proponents of separation have 
claimed for the better part of a century it suggests: that Jefferson’s metaphorical wall is 
indeed meant to be an impenetrable barrier between religion and government.  While 
Jefferson did, in fact, endorse a strict separation with respect to establishment, it is 
questionable whether he also favored stringent prohibitions against any sort of church-
state relationship whatsoever.   
James Hutson argues convincingly that Jefferson’s attitude toward church-state 
relations cannot be derived from one letter or even a handful of letters, especially when 
the correspondence is taken out of its proper political context.  Regarding the Danbury 
Baptist letter specifically, Hutson concludes that it “must be understood in the political 
context in which Jefferson wrote it, and it was designed by the third president to respond 
to a malignant and persistent Federalist campaign of political defamation.”38  It is 
Hutson’s contention that Jefferson neither believed in a strict separation of church and 
state, nor did he indicate as much in his letter to the Danbury ministers.  Moreover, 
Hutson suggests that Jefferson’s anti-regal style and his efforts to republicanize (or 
                                                
37 TJ to Danbury Baptists, 1 January 1802, PTJ 36:258 
 
38 James H. Hutson, “Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: A Controversy Rejoined,” The 
William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 56, No. 4 (October, 1999): 776. 
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“detorify”) government institutions—as evidenced by numerous actions, including the 
manner in which he delivered his messages to Congress—help to explain Jefferson’s 
motives in the letter.39  Federalists routinely accused Jefferson of being hostile to all 
things Christian.  His disdain for and repudiation of Christianity, in their view, was 
demonstrated by his actions (and, in some cases, his lack of action) while in office: for 
example, Jefferson’s “invitation to…Thomas Paine to return from France to the United 
States,” or the President’s failure to “proclaim a national thanksgiving to praise God for 
the Treaty of Amiens.”40  On Hutson’s reading, the motivation behind Jefferson’s refusal 
to proclaim national thanksgivings had less to do with religion and everything to do with 
his desire to uproot the last remaining vestiges of British influence on American 
institutions.   
As revealing as they are, Jefferson’s political motives only tell half of the story.  
More important are Jefferson’s actual religious beliefs and his actions.  Regarding his 
personal beliefs, ample documentary evidence exists to show that Jefferson was indeed 
neither an indifferent deist nor an atheist; this I have already demonstrated.  But what of 
his practices?  What do Jefferson’s actions—particularly his public actions—tell us?  
Huston believes that the Federalist charges leveled against Jefferson were based almost 
exclusively on misinformation and assumptions about his personal life prior to the 
election of 1800.  Huston also points to practices common in Virginia after the adoption 
of Jefferson’s Act for Establishing Religious Freedom in 1786.  For example, 
Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers, and Methodists regularly held public worship 
                                                
39 Ibid., 778.  Compare Joyce Appleby, “Psychology of Democracy.”  Appleby suggests, in a similar vein, 
that Jefferson’s behavior as president was carefully constructed so as to convey a certain anti-Federalist 
sentiment to the public. 
 
40 Hutson, 784. 
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services in various government buildings.  According to Hutson, had Jefferson’s Act, 
“considered by some to be the mother of all church-state separation statutes, been 
intended to bring within its reach religious activities on public property, Virginia 
legislators, many of whom had recently voted for it, would certainly have prevented their 
state capitol from becoming a house of prayer on Sundays.”41  Certainly Jefferson, a clear 
advocate for disestablishment, would never have tolerated the state’s endorsement of 
religion in any form.  It would never have been appropriate for the state to support a 
particular denomination to the exclusion of another.  Nor would it have ever been proper 
for the state to permit the free exercise of one sect at the expense of another.   
Then why is it the case that Jefferson never took issue with the interminglings in 
Virginia’s courthouses and legislative halls?  Clearly, such intermingling seems to 
indicate partiality.  Though not an “establishment” properly speaking, such preferential 
treatment might be construed as coming dangerously close to violating the prohibitions of 
the Virginia statute for religious freedom, if not Jefferson’s own convictions.  Jefferson 
regularly attended such services in Albemarle County when he was in residence at 
Monticello.  Obviously, no political motive can be inferred from such attendance before 
and after his years in the Presidency.  To be sure, Jefferson expresses approbation for 
these practices as late as 1822: “The court-house is the common temple, one Sunday in 
the month to each…Here, Episcopalian and Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist, meet 
together, join in hymning their Maker, listen with attention and devotion to each others' 
preachers.”42 
                                                
41 Ibid., 786. 
 
42 TJ to Thomas Cooper, 2 November 1822, Writings, 1464. 
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That neither Jefferson nor his allies in the Virginia legislature—those who helped 
secure passage of the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom—expressed concern over 
the above mentioned practices speaks not only to the fact that they believed the practices 
to be perfectly compatible with the spirit and letter of the law, but also desirable and 
conducive to public happiness.  Hutson maintains that the Federalists—and many of 
Jefferson’s twentieth century detractors—simply got it wrong: “Patronizing religion on 
public property was, for Jefferson, putting principle in action, engaging in principled 
politics.”43  Moreover, “[t]hat he supported throughout his life the principle of 
government hospitality to religious activity (provided always that it be voluntary and 
offered on an equal-opportunity basis) indicates that he used the wall of separation 
metaphor in a restrictive sense.44  
What mattered most to the Danbury Baptists was the Connecticut government’s 
overt discrimination against religious minorities.  To the Baptists, the right of conscience 
was as inalienable as the rights to life and liberty.45  Jefferson, of course, took issue with 
Connecticut’s refusal to disestablish the Anglican Church, though his position on the 
matter—both politically, as president, and as a matter of principle—remained one of 
neutrality.  Jefferson’s Constitutional obligations as well as his commitment to the 
principles of federalism prohibited him from exerting any influence over the matter; as 
                                                
43 Hutson, 788. 
 
44 Ibid.  “Combined with the ‘republican principle’ of religious activity on public property, [Jefferson] 
seemed to be indicating in the words of the Danbury letter and in his virtually simultaneous action on 
January 3, 1802, that, in the relationship between religion and government, a distinction could be drawn 
between active and passive government support of religion.  Although it could not take coercive initiatives 
in the religious sphere, it might serve as a passive, impartial venue for voluntary religious activities.” 
 
45 See Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson and the Wall of Separation between Church and State (New 
York: NYU Press, 2003), 33; Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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the Baptists clearly understood, this was an issue that only the Connecticut legislature 
could resolve.46  As Daniel Dreisbach points out, Jefferson’s “wall of separation” 
was a metaphoric construction of the First Amendment, which governed relations 
between religion and the national government.  His “wall,” therefore, did not 
specifically address relations between religion and state authorities.  It is not self-
evident that Jefferson thought the metaphor, more generally, described his views 
on the constitutional and prudential relationship between religion and all civil 
government.47 
 
Hence, Jefferson’s use of the “wall” metaphor was intended to convey something other 
than separation in the strict sense.  The separation to which Jefferson referred was 
between “ecclesiastical institutions,” properly speaking, and “the civil state.”48  Neither 
the Danbury Baptists nor Jefferson could embrace establishment; however, religious 
establishment should not be confused with religious influence.  In the missive to the 
Danbury Baptists, Jefferson carefully crafted his language to indicate that he endorsed a 
separation between “church” and state, though not proscriptions on the admixture of 
“religion” and state.  As Philip Hamburger suggests, Jefferson and the Danbury Baptists 
are in complete agreement: each “merely sought disestablishment and did not challenge 
the widespread assumption that republican government depended upon the people’s 
morals and thus upon religion.”49 
                                                
46 On the authority of state legislatures to regulate religious conduct, see TJ to Samuel Miller, 23 January 
1808: “Certainly, no power to prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious 
discipline, has been delegated to the General Government.  It must then rest with the states, as far as it can 
be in any human authority.” Writings, 1186-87.   
 
47 Dreisbach, 50 (emphasis in original).  Many twentieth century scholars have failed to understand 
Jefferson’s nuanced position on religious liberty.  As Dresibach’s analysis shows, Jefferson may have 
questioned the rightfulness of certain state practices in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (for 
example, the Connecticut “Standing Order” and, of course, Virginia’s own Established Anglican Church), 
but this does not mean that he rejected the state’s authority to prescribe (or proscribe) religious practices. 
 
48 Ibid., 51 (emphasis in original). 
 
49 Hamburger, 163. 
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 On Dreisbach’s reading, Jefferson understands the proper relationship between 
church and state in a republic to be one in which religious “opinion” is separated, or 
walled off from any and all governmental interference.  Although Jefferson does not 
explicitly draw the distinction in the Danbury letter, the difference between permitting 
free inquiry and free expression of religious opinion and regulating religious conduct is 
crucial.  Jefferson’s republicanism requires absolute freedom of conscience: the realm of 
pure opinion is beyond the scope of the state’s rightful authority.  However, the state does 
have a rightful interest in regulating any and all conduct that might be subversive of 
public peace and tranquility.50  
 A few final remarks on the parallels between Jefferson’s vision of a republicanized 
Christianity and Rousseau’s thoughts on the utility of public religion are in order.  As 
discussed in Chapter One, Rousseau seems to want religious freedom, though for the sake 
of order and public peace he also seems to want a uniform, established (though very 
minimal), rational sort of Christianity—a civil profession of faith that is meant to 
galvanize public sentiment and strengthen bonds of affection between citizens.  While the 
profession of faith is purely civil insofar as the state cannot oblige individuals to believe 
in the articles, this does not detract from the civil religion’s main purpose: social and 
political cohesion.   
 Rousseau and Jefferson both reject institutionalized Christianity for the same 
reasons: it is grounded primarily, if not exclusively in the well-documented examples of 
ancient, medieval, and modern “mystics”—to wit, priests—playing upon certain 
                                                
50 See Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVII: “The legitimate powers of government extend 
to such acts only as are injurious to others.  But it does me no injury for my neighbour to say there are 
twenty gods, or no god.  It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg.”  Jefferson repeats this in the Letter 
to the Danbury Baptists.       
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irrational fears and, in many cases, the sheer ignorance of the laity in order to exploit 
them.  Their anticlericalism notwithstanding, both men appreciate the indispensability of 
public religion.  For Rousseau, good republican government could not endure if divorced 
from religion: 
Human governments needed a much more solid base than reason alone, and how 
necessary it was for the public repose that the divine will intervene to endow the 
Sovereign authority with a sacred and inviolable character that might deprive 
subjects of the fatal Right to dispose of it.  If religion had performed only this good 
for men, it would be enough for them all to have to cherish and adopt it, even with 
its abuses, since it still spares more blood than fanaticism causes to flow.51 
 
Jefferson accepts the value of a more rationalized version of Christianity and believes it 
to be necessary to the health of the American Republic (for the same reasons Rousseau 
does), but he simply cannot reconcile his aversion to established religion with a call for 
uniformity and mandatory professions of faith.  In much of his personal correspondence 
on the subject, Jefferson rails against the historical corruption of Jesus’ teachings: had his 
“doctrines, pure as they came from himself, been never sophisticated for unworthy 
purposes…the whole civilized world would at this day have formed but a single sect.”52  
Moreover, “[t]here would never have been an infidel, if there had never been a priest.”53 
                                                
51 Rousseau, SD, 76. 
 
52 TJ to Rev. Whittemore, 5 June 1822, ME 15:373.  In the same missive, Jefferson goes on to say that he 
has “never permitted [himself] to mediatate a specific creed.  These formulas [i.e., catechisms] have been 
the bane and ruin of the Christian church, its own fatal invention, which, through so many ages, made of 
Christendom a slaughter-house, and at this day divides it into casts of inextinguishable hatred to one 
another.”  For Jefferson, the various creeds and catechetical devices used to initiate followers are too far 
removed from the original, pure teachings of Jesus of Nazareth.  As such, these devices serve only to divide 
rather than unite Christians.  “The religions of antiquity,” he says, “had no particular formulas or creed.”  
Rousseau’s prescriptions for the civil religion, as well as his own understanding of Christianity more 
generally, line up neatly with Jefferson’s on this matter.  Compare, for example, Rousseau’s rejection of 
catechetical methods in favor of a more unadulterated approach to understanding the message of the 
Gospels in Julie. 
 
53 TJ to Rev. Whittemore, 5 June 1822, ME 15:373.  See also Jefferson’s lengthy correspondence with John 
Adams on the subject of institutionalized religion and the rejection of all things mystical: if we could “live 
without an order of priests,” he tells Adams, we could then “moralise for ourselves, follow the oracle of 
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IV.  Conclusion 
If Hutson is correct, why did Jefferson wait so long to make his beliefs known publicly?  
Though his practices clearly express his approval for and endorsement of various 
religious practices, why does he wait until after he retires from the presidency to expound 
on his beliefs?  If Jefferson was as committed to a republicanized Christianity as he 
claimed to be, shouldn’t he have made a more concerted effort to see these principles put 
into practice?  Perhaps, but there is also good reason to believe that such a project was 
not possible in Jefferson’s lifetime.  Moreover, Jefferson did not develop his religious 
views fully until later in life which, coincidentally, happened to be during and after his 
tenure as Chief Executive.  Onuf suggests that Jefferson had an even better reason for 
keeping his views to himself: 
Because Jefferson’s own beliefs did not affect anyone else directly, remaining 
silent about them was for [him] a ‘matter of principle.’  The people should judge 
[him] and other public officials by their deeds—in theological terms, by their 
‘works’—not by their professed ‘faith’ on controversial theological topics.54   
 
Thus, Jefferson restrained himself when it came to revealing his beliefs not 
because he was uncertain, but because he simply believed the time was not right.  
Jefferson knew he could do little to turn the tide of public opinion, particularly on issues 
as contentious as religion.  Yet, he was confident that the enlightened mind would 
eventually triumph.  With respect to the republicanization of Christianity, Jefferson was 
                                                
conscience, and say nothing about what no man can understand, nor therefore believe; for I suppose belief 
to be the assent of the mind to an intelligible proposition.”  TJ to John Adams, 22 August 1813, AJL:368. 
 
54 Onuf, 151.  Here it might be useful to consider the relevant differences between the doctrine of 
justification in Catholicism and Protestantism (i.e., Martin Luther’s version).  Also, although Jefferson 
excised the relevant passages from his own “Bible,” his own actions, if not his beliefs seem to line up 
neatly with Jesus’s commands to the disciples at Caesarea Philippi (cf. Matthew 16:13-20; Mark 8:27-30; 
Luke 9:18-21; John 6:67-71).   
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certain that the people would someday come to embrace it as he had done, but only if 
they had been sufficiently informed and were free from institutional impositions and 
burdens.  As with other moral and political needs—for instance, the need to throw off the 
shackles of political despotism and sever bonds with Great Britain; the need to “detorify” 
the country’s new political institutions; the need to dismantle the institution of slavery—
the people must be persuaded before they will sincerely and voluntarily embrace the 
prescribed change.  Jefferson was aware that free, independent individuals would accept 
only a certain degree of lecturing; they could not—and would not—be told what to do.  
The only proper way to uproot long-standing social and psychological conventions 
without sowing discord was to do so gradually over time.55   
The task of the great statesman, then, like Rousseau’s great lawgiver, was to 
persuade without convincing, and Jefferson’s missive to Edward Coles of 1814 
demonstrates the Virginian’s commitment to such a pedagogical method with respect to 
the dual goals of religious enlightenment and abolition: 
The laws do not permit us to turn [the slaves] loose, if that were for their good...I 
hope then, my dear sir, you will reconcile yourself to your country and its 
unfortunate condition; that you will not lessen its stock of sound disposition by 
withdrawing your portion from the mass.  That, on the contrary you will come 
forward in the public councils, become the missionary of this doctrine truly 
[C]hristian; insinuate and inculcate it softly but steadily, through the medium of 
writing and conversation; associate others in your labors, and when the phalanx is 
formed, bring on and press the proposition perseveringly until its 
accomplishment.  It is an encouraging observation that no good measure was ever 
proposed, which, if duly pursued, failed to prevail in the end.56 
 
While Jefferson would play the part of the great statesman as well as the great moral and 
political reformer, his role in proliferating religious enlightenment and bringing about 
                                                
55 See Chapter Three and Appleby, “Psychology of Democracy.”  
 
56 TJ to Edward Coles, 25 August 1814, Writings, 1343-46.  
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slavery’s demise would be more subdued.  Jefferson’s ideas and actions throughout his 
life certainly paved the way for abolition and a religious “awakening” of sorts, but the 
task of effecting actual change would ultimately fall to a younger generation.  Though it 
is questionable whether Jefferson truly embraced the principle of generational 
sovereignty he had worked out years before, by 1814, in the twilight of his life, the Sage 
of Monticello would call upon the youthfulness and exuberance of statesmen like Coles 
to complete certain monumental tasks the revolutionary generation simply could not.  
The task of republicanizing Christianity—and, as it were, Christianizing the Republic—
would fall to others, though Jefferson would certainly stand as a prototype of sorts, a 
fatherly figure not unlike Rousseau’s great legislator and a figure very much akin to 
Emile’s gouverneur.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Sentinels and Cynosures:  
 Thomas Jefferson, Affectionate Mentors, and the Education of Republican Citizens 
 
The human character, we believe, requires in general, constant and immediate 
control to prevent its being biased from right by the seductions of self-love.1 
   
The qualifications for self-government in society are not innate.  They are the 
result of habit and long training.2 
 
[If a] people [are] so demoralized and depraved as to be incapable of exercising a 
wholesome control, their reformation must be taken up ab incunabulis.3  Their 
minds [must] be informed by education what is right and what wrong, [must] be 
encouraged in habits of virtue and deterred from those of vice by the dread of 
punishments, proportioned indeed, but irremissible [sic].  In all cases, [they must] 
follow truth as the only safe guide and eschew error, which bewilders us one false 
consequence after another in endless succession.  These are the inculcations 
necessary to render the people a sure basis for the structure of order and good 
government.4 
 
I.  Introduction 
As I demonstrated in previous chapters, the picture of democracy we get from both 
Rousseau and Jefferson is one characterized by potentiality or possibility; the foundation 
and development of republicanism and the cultivation of democratic citizens are 
processes of perpetual becoming.  The idea that democratic citizenship entails perpetual 
improvement and progress towards an ideal form of freedom seems to be missing not 
only from current scholarly debates on Jefferson’s theories of republicanism and 
education, but also from the contemporary debate on civic education.  Jefferson insists 
                                                
1 TJ to Pierre Samuel Dupont de Nemours, 24 April 1816, Writings, 1386. 
 
2 TJ to Edward Everett, 27 March 1824, ME 26:20. 
 
3 “From the cradle” 
 
4 TJ to John Adams, 10 December 1819, AJL:549.  
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that, as a people, we are “conscientiously” democratic and conscious of moral right, 
though individuals are often tempted by “self-love” to deviate from right.5  It seems, then, 
that the development of conscientious republicans requires something more than good 
political institutions.     
Jefferson’s moral and political thought is complex and rather unsystematic, to say 
the least.  At times Jefferson seems ambivalent, if not inconsistent: for example, critics 
have been quick to point out that his professed faith in the common man is irreconcilable 
with his defense of the “natural aristocracy,”6 or that his egalitarianism, coupled with his 
resolute defense of natural rights, is inconsistent with the fact that he was a slave-holder 
until the day he died.  Enigmatic as the Virginian may be—and indeed many of his public 
and private actions do issue in a void between his principles and his practice—we need 
not conclude that the author of the Declaration of Independence and the author of the 
Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom has nothing to offer a distant posterity.  This 
much becomes clear if we read Jefferson carefully, and take his writings (and his actions) 
for what they are, rather than what we might want to make of them.   
This is not to say that Jefferson was never ambiguous, unclear, or even wrong for 
that matter.  He was, however, right about one thing: unless the American people took 
self-government seriously, degeneration would be inevitable and liberty would become 
nothing more than a vacuous concept.  No bulwark or barrier (parchment or otherwise) 
would be able to withstand the corrosive effects of internal decay, that is, of a body 
politic slowly being destroyed from within by citizen apathy, (excessive) dependence, 
                                                
5 TJ to Nemours, 24 April 1816, Writings, 1386. 
 
6 See TJ to John Adams, 28 October 1813, AJL:387-92. 
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and naïveté.  The Revolution had helped to forge the possibility of a genuinely republican 
government, Jefferson believed, but realizing that possibility would prove difficult, for  
the spirit of the times may alter, will alter.  Our rulers will become corrupt, our 
people careless…It can never be too often repeated, that the time for fixing every 
essential right on a legal basis is while our rulers are honest, and ourselves united.  
From the conclusion of this war we shall be going downhill.  It will not then be 
necessary to resort every moment to the people for support.  They will be 
forgotten…They will forget themselves, but in the sole faculty of making money, 
and will never think of uniting to effect a due respect for their rights.  The 
shackles, therefore, which shall not be knocked off at the conclusion of this war, 
will remain on us long, will be made heavier and heavier, till our rights shall 
revive or expire in convulsion.7 
 
In Jefferson’s estimation, the American people were uniquely capable of self-
government—capable of becoming genuine republican citizens, capable of exercising 
genuine democratic sovereignty—but only if the requisite faculties were properly 
cultivated in younger generations and faithfully promulgated over time.  In other words, 
Jefferson believed that education to a certain type of moral and civic virtue was necessary 
not merely to the preservation of the new Republic in his time, but for the attainment of 
true freedom and for the transmission and preservation of self-government for posterity. 
 Thus, my aim in this chapter is twofold: first, I consider Jefferson’s theories of 
moral and civic education in the context of his republicanism.  Jefferson was of the 
conviction that a properly educated citizenry—coupled with sound, stable, yet adaptable 
political institutions—was necessary to the vitality and longevity of the new Republic.  
The Declaration of Independence and the subsequent Revolution ushered in a new, 
untested form of republican government, a new order of the ages, as it were.  As 
Jefferson indicated to Roger Weightman in a letter commemorating the fiftieth 
anniversary of American independence, the Declaration (and, by implication, the 
                                                
7 Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XVII. 
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principles upon which the new Republic stood) was meant to be  
the Signal of arousing men to burst the chains, under which monkish ignorance 
and superstition had persuaded them to bind themselves, and to assume the 
blessings and security of self government…All eyes are opened, or opening to the 
rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to 
every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born, with 
saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them 
legitimately, by the grace of God.  These are grounds of hope for others.  For 
ourselves, let the annual return of this day forever refresh our recollections of 
these rights, and an undiminished devotion to them.8 
 
Rejecting the old world privileging of unqualified patriarchal authority and unnatural 
aristocracy, Jefferson envisioned a republican order that afforded primacy to natural 
rights, the autonomous individual, and self-government.   
Yet, in order to guarantee the protection (and free exercise) of natural rights, 
individual liberty, and genuinely republican institutions, citizens had to be well informed.  
In other words, individuals had to be broadly educated to understand their individual 
rights, their social duties, and the government’s proper role in protecting each.  A 
virtuous republic required first and foremost a virtuous citizenry.  However, as Harold 
Hellenbrand puts it, although Jefferson did believe that only a well-educated citizenry 
could bring the American Revolution to completion,9 Jefferson was not so naïve to think 
that sound moral and civic education would be easily attainable, especially if public 
institutions were charged with the responsibility.  Generally speaking, practicality and 
utility drove much of Jefferson’s thinking on matters pertaining to public education. 
After placing Jefferson’s thoughts on moral and civic education into context, I 
explore the ways in which his overarching theory parallels Rousseau’s.  In Chapter 
                                                
8 TJ to Roger C. Weightman, 24 June 1826, Writings, 1517. 
 
9 Harold Hellenbrand, The Unfinished Revolution: Education and Politics in the Thought of Thomas 
Jefferson (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1990). 
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Three, I highlighted some of the parallels between Rousseauian republicanism and 
Jefferson’s more mature thinking on the subject.  In Chapter Four, I discussed the 
important role the civil religion plays in the Virginian’s and the Genevan’s 
republicanism.  In this chapter, I try to show that Jefferson’s understanding of the 
educative function of fathers (and father figures) in both the private and public realms is 
not unlike Rousseau’s.  Among other things, Jefferson’s emphasis on an affectionate 
form of pedagogy, instruction by example, his appeal to natural rights and utility, and the 
importance of cultivating autonomous, duty-minded individuals puts him in close 
company with Rousseau.  I explore the ways in which Jefferson’s own education, his 
public and private thoughts on the subject, and his prescriptions and practices with his 
children, grandchildren, and other affectionate charges mirror much of what Rousseau 
prescribes in Emile.   
 
II.  Jefferson on Moral and Civic Education 
Jefferson’s vision for an enlightened and virtuous republican citizenry is often 
misunderstood.  While many commentators understand Jefferson to be a product of his 
time—and thus take his theories and prescriptions to be primarily, though not always 
historically contingent—some have attempted to wrest from the Virginian a timeless, 
transplantable theory of moral and civic education.  While I argue that much of what 
Jefferson had to say can be understood in terms of, and applied to the problems we face 
in the twenty-first century, it is important to understand Jefferson on his own terms.  
While Jefferson’s theories do contain kernels of timeless, or at least enduring truths, it is 
not possible to extract a single, unqualified set of guiding principles.  In other words, it 
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rarely makes sense to ask, as some contemporary commentators might, “What would 
Jefferson do?”  It makes more sense to say, “Given his own unique world view, the 
peculiar problems he (and the country) faced during the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, and given that his ideas are often, though not always historically 
contingent, how might Jefferson attempt to solve some of the problems we face today 
(problems which are in some respect similar, though in many other ways worlds apart)?”   
For over two centuries, historians have analyzed Jefferson’s views on education 
and, for the most part, the Virginian’s thoughts on the subject are well catalogued.10  
Though a great deal of critical commentary emerged in the twentieth century, many 
authors seem to ignore or overlook several significant components of Jefferson’s 
thoughts on education, thus failing to provide a complete picture of his ideas.  Jefferson’s 
ultimate goal was “a more general diffusion of knowledge” among the masses.  The 
touchstone of republican citizenship, it seemed, was knowledge of the best moral and 
political principles and practices: an uninformed citizenry could neither govern itself 
effectively nor rely on those entrusted with power.  Self-government and independence 
were paramount for Jefferson.  Thus, he devoted considerable effort throughout his life to 
solving one of republicanism’s perennial problems: how to educate individuals to moral 
and civic virtue in order to preserve the blessings of self-government and independence.   
                                                
10 The most prominent sources on Jefferson’s legacy with respect to education include, among others, 
Cameron Addis, Jefferson’s Vision for Education (New York, NY: Peter Lang, 2003); Richard D. Brown, 
Strength of a People: The Idea of an Informed Citizenry in America, 1650-1870 (Chapel Hill, NC: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); John Dewey, The Living Thoughts of Thomas Jefferson 
(Toronto: Cassel, 1946); Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims: The American Revolution against 
Patriarchy, 1750-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); James Gilreath, ed., Thomas 
Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1999); Robert M. 
Healey, Jefferson on Religion and Public Education (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1962); 
Harold Hellenbrand, The Unfinished Revolution; Peter Onuf, ed., Jeffersonian Legacies (Charlottesville, 
VA: University Press of Virginia, 1993); Merrill D. Peterson, Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation: A 
Biography (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1970); Jennings L. Wagoner, Jr., Jefferson and 
Education (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2004). 
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This section sheds some light on Jefferson’s pedagogical theories and 
prescriptions and attempts to synthesize several seemingly disparate strands of his 
thought into a coherent account of his views on education.  Jefferson’s theory of moral 
and civic education must be understood as an intersection of several key features, all of 
which serve to inform his republicanism more broadly.  First, I consider the complexities 
of Jefferson’s views on general education: why “a more general diffusion” of knowledge 
is useful (and good) for the individual and why this diffusion is useful (and good) for the 
public.  Second, I explore the often-ignored connection between republican education and 
ward democracy.  This brings into sharp relief Jefferson’s frequent emphasis on the link 
between individual rights and social duties.   
Among the plethora of academic inquiries into Jefferson’s moral and political 
thought, Jean Yarbrough goes to great lengths to place Jefferson’s teachings into the 
contemporary debate over character formation and so-called “liberal virtue.”11  As the 
author indicates, the study proceeds from a fundamental question, namely, “What kind of 
character must Americans as a people cultivate in order to ensure their freedom and 
happiness?”12  While Yarbrough successfully demonstrates that Jefferson’s thoughts on 
character formation are just as useful today as they were in the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, she does not adequately incorporate Jefferson’s rather nuanced 
understanding of republican citizenship into his broader political philosophy.  Moreover, 
Yarbrough seems to gloss over Jefferson’s defense of the utility of “ward” democracy 
while underplaying the significance of his thoughts on public education.   
                                                
11 Jean M. Yarbrough, American Virtues: Thomas Jefferson on the Character of a Free People (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1998), xv. 
 
12 Ibid. 
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With respect to the long-standing debate over America’s political or civic 
morality, Yarbrough is right to insist “the first mistake of both liberals and so-called 
classical republicans was to try to explain the American character by looking only at its 
public philosophy without regard to the virtues that are fostered in our private and social 
lives.”13  Indeed, the bulk of her study is devoted to the educational aspect of Jefferson’s 
thought in the broadest sense: Yarbrough is committed to showing that Jefferson has 
much to offer in the way of reconciling the seemingly irreconcilable—that is, in bringing 
to bear the ways in which both public and private moralities can (and must) conduce to 
the end of character formation.  But Jefferson had much to say about the role a system of 
public education ought to play in the formation of individual and national character (or 
the character of individuals as a people).  To ignore the vital role of public education in 
Jefferson’s thought—and to discount the importance of ward democracy—is to obscure 
the Jeffersonian vision considerably. 
It is helpful to begin with Jefferson’s crowning achievements in the realm of 
public education: the Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge and the 
establishment of the University of Virginia.  As Darren Staloff puts it, these two 
accomplishments “constitute the alpha and omega of Jefferson’s thoughts on 
education.”14  Since his death in 1826, historians have generally inferred that these two 
achievements are part of a larger, continuous endeavor.  However, on Staloff’s reading, 
an interpretation of this sort “ignores the changes in the nature of Jefferson’s political 
                                                
13 Ibid. 
 
14 Darren Staloff, “The Politics of Pedagogy: Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a Democratic 
Citizenry,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas Jefferson, ed. Frank Shuffelton (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008), 128. 
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thought and rhetoric” in the period spanning the introduction of the Bill and Jefferson’s 
more mature political thinking after his presidency.15   
The educational reforms Jefferson pursued can be understood as two related, 
though separate endeavors.  His primary (and arguably most important) goal, as 
articulated in the Bill, was to “illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at 
large.”16  Republican principles, as Jefferson understood them, dictated that the people 
ought to be able “to participate as equals in political democracy,” which in turn entailed 
that individuals had to be able to “think for themselves.”17  The provision of public 
education was thus the only way to ensure (or, at least, begin to ensure) that the elite 
Virginia gentry would not usurp political equality.   
Jefferson’s second goal included the galvanization and diffusion of republican 
principles at a higher, more complex level.  Efforts to establish a national university in 
the 1790s had all but failed and Jefferson’s attempts to implement substantial reforms at 
William and Mary had also fallen short.  Thus, Jefferson shifted his focus to the founding 
of a new institution.  The University of Virginia, as Jefferson envisioned it, would stand 
as the vanguard of republicanism and would “carry hence the correct principles of the 
day.”18  For some scholars, Jefferson’s rhetoric regarding the university’s founding 
principles compliments (if not completes) the seemingly egalitarian commitments 
expressed in the Bill.  Other critics have claimed that the driving forces behind the 
                                                
15 Staloff, 128.  Staloff characterizes the early Jefferson as an “enlightened optimate” and the later Jefferson 
as a “proto-Romantic champion of the politics of principle” in Hamilton, Adams, Jefferson (New York: Hill 
and Wang, 2005): 248, 309. 
   
16 TJ, “A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge,” PTJ 2:526-7. 
 
17 Ibid. 
 
18 TJ to William Branch Giles, 26 December 1825, Writings, 1512. 
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university were not the high ideals of political equality and educational democracy, but 
the perpetuation of aristocracy lurking in the guise of egalitarianism.  Staloff, for 
example, suggests that the principles at work in Jefferson’s vision “[had] less to do with 
liberalism and democracy than with a perceived sectional threat to the slave-owning 
South.”19  In other words, Jefferson’s combined efforts at educational reform in the state 
of Virginia demonstrate something less than a commitment to equality. 
Although Jefferson’s position on political equality was not always consistent with 
the principles articulated in the Declaration or the Bill, his commitment to natural 
equality and natural rights is indisputable.  On the other hand, Jefferson’s position on 
political equality seems, at times, to be on shaky ground, especially when considered in 
light of what the Bill actually accomplished.  Jefferson’s commitment to (or rather, his 
romanticization of) Enlightenment principles in both politics and education shines 
through in the Bill and the University of Virginia.  Yet the curriculum Jefferson proposed 
for primary schools was certainly inadequate in terms of facilitating genuine self-
government, and his proposals for university students did not seem much better: students 
would read widely in “Graecian, Roman, English and American history” and this would, 
presumably, educate them in “their rights, interests and duties, as men and citizens.”20  In 
Jefferson’s own words, such a curriculum was of limited value because “history, in 
general, only informs us what bad government is.”21  In other words, history is useful 
insofar as it reveals the ways in which the individual’s rights and liberties have been 
                                                
19 Staloff, 128. 
 
20 TJ, “Report of the Commissioners for the University of Virginia,” 4 August 1818, Writings, 459. 
 
21 TJ to John Norvell, 14 June 1807, Writings, 1176. 
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seized and abused by tyrants for centuries.  History might even disclose the underlying 
causes of tyranny, but it did not, in Jefferson’s estimation, offer prescriptions for the 
establishment of “good government,” or informed policy-making and constitutional 
design.22   
Thus, it seems that in Jefferson’s system, the foundation of good government 
depends not on average, ordinary individuals, but on enlightened individuals capable of 
apprehending abstract principles of moral and political right.  In Jefferson’s mind, such 
individuals would be capable of “[presenting] in one full and comprehensive view the 
system of principles on which such an organization should be founded, according to the 
right of nature.”23  Jefferson believed that an enlightened citizenry was the primary 
safeguard against abuses by the government; he was of the conviction that the people 
(i.e., the ordinary mass of citizens) were the only “safe depositories of the ultimate power 
of society.”24  But if this is the case, why does Jefferson restrict the study of higher, 
abstract arts and sciences—including political theory—to those fortunate enough to 
attend his university?  Staloff seems to suggest that Jefferson never intended for average, 
ordinary citizens to have any substantial role in democratic politics: 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
 
23 Ibid.  This also seems to be the point of Rousseau’s Social Contract and Emile: abstract principle is 
combined with real-world observation (i.e., deduction) and experience.  Emile comes to grasp the abstract 
only after he experiences the concrete.  Hence, as I demonstrated in Chapter Two, Rousseau is not entirely 
the positivist some make him out to be.  Empirical considerations are not excluded from either Rousseau’s 
theories or his practical prescriptions (e.g., for Poland and Corsica); he takes people as they are, as they 
ought to be, and as they can be, given their peculiar constraints.  Rousseau’s theory, like Jefferson’s, is thus 
driven by a certain over-arching moral principle (it is normative) and simultaneously informed by 
positivistic considerations (it is also empirical).  It seems that Jefferson does the exact same thing and, 
although neither man was really systematic in the way that, say, Kant or Hegel were systematic, both 
Rousseau and Jefferson embrace a certain “system” of moral and political right that informs, if not grounds 
their theories of moral and civic education.  Both men seem to have idealized or romantic visions, but both 
also attend to the real-world complexities that prevent or, at the very least, hinder realization of their 
visions. 
 
24 TJ to William C. Jarvis, 28 September 1820, ME 15:276. 
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Perhaps the small fraction of indigent geniuses educated at the university could 
aspire to truly participate fully in the political life of Virginia, but the mass of 
their fellow commoners simply lacked the knowledge to responsibly exercise that 
power.  Jefferson’s educational scheme, combined with his equation of 
knowledge and power, precluded any meaningful devolution of political 
authority.  Jefferson’s prescribed primary education was simply not a pedagogical 
stepping stone to participatory democracy.25 
 
It might be true that Jefferson did not embrace a vision of widely participatory 
democratic politics, but Staloff seems to be ignoring something very crucial in 
Jefferson’s thought, namely ward democracy.  Jefferson clearly did not intend for his 
scheme of public education to be a “stepping stone to participatory democracy.”  
Likewise, it is true that the masses, while certainly not ignorant, would nevertheless not 
be as intelligent or capable as the so-called natural aristocracy.  This would not owe to a 
lack of education per se; it would be because some individuals are simply more capable 
than others.  In other words, there are certain natural inequalities that positive educational 
schemes simply cannot overcome; lack of education can (and does) make a significant 
difference, but it is only one part of the equation.   
Staloff also ignores the fact that Jefferson ultimately embraced the federal nature 
of the Union (see, for example, his praise for The Federalist26) while simultaneously 
insisting on the implementation and development of a more localized, participatory 
democracy within the states.  For Jefferson, democracy did not mean direct, unfiltered 
participation by the masses; in a territorially expansive republic, this would have been 
both unwise and impracticable.  Rather, republican government was multi-tiered and, by 
necessity, representative, though ultimate authority was always to rest in the hands of the 
                                                
25 Staloff, 130-31. 
 
26 See TJ to James Madison, 18 November 1788, PTJ 14:187-190. 
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people.  Jefferson’s faith in the common man—his faith in average, ordinary citizens’ 
self-reliance and ability to come together in order to solve problems of a local nature—is 
not nearly as incompatible with Jefferson’s thoughts on education as Staloff seems to 
imply.  That the education of common people was to be different than the education of 
leaders (i.e., “the future guardians of the rights and liberties of [the] country”) does not 
seem to matter a great deal.  Cultivating a basic morality in people was the primary goal 
of education.  Jefferson seems only to be admitting of a natural inequality of ability; 
nowhere does he imply that these natural inequalities ought to translate into political 
inequalities.   
Staloff’s point thus seems lost.  Indeed, Jefferson’s prescriptions for primary 
education would not provide a “stepping stone to participatory democracy,” but this was 
never his intention.  Primary, public education was a vital component for the cultivation 
of responsible, republican citizenship, but it was by no means sufficient (nor did 
Jefferson believe it to be).  Perhaps in an ideally (small) virtuous, agrarian republic, 
people would be capable of complete or pure self-government (and perhaps democratic 
governance would be the mode of choice).  Still, despite his musings on agrarian virtue 
(however rhetorically charged they might have been) and despite his antipathy to industry 
and manufacture, Jefferson was well attuned to the increasing complexities of life in an 
expansive republic.  Moreover, Jefferson understood as well as Madison what this 
entailed: the need for a partly national, partly federal Constitution and system of 
government. 
Staloff’s myopic view of Jefferson’s educational reforms paints an incomplete 
and largely inadequate picture for two reasons.  First, focusing on the inegalitarian 
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qualities makes the Virginian seem elitist.  While Jefferson’s proposals for primary 
education might exclude a fair number of otherwise promising individuals, the goal was 
not to cultivate completely enlightened minds, particularly in the realm of politics.  As 
Staloff even acknowledges, Jefferson rightly agreed with Hume that “in matters of 
politics, ‘every man ought to be supposed a knave’ and animated solely by ‘insatiable 
avarice and ambition.’”27  While Jefferson and Hume are, in fact, often worlds apart in 
terms of their respective views of human nature and politics, the Virginian and the Scot 
do appreciate one pedagogical reality: all human minds are not created equal.  For Hume, 
what this entails politically is a bit different than what it entails for Jefferson.  However, 
both men agree that the uneducated, common farmer is just as capable as the enlightened 
statesman of judging human character.  Hence, instruction in subjects such as history and 
philosophy will likely not provide sufficient grounds for self-government, but such 
instruction will help to “qualify [the people] as [competent] judges of the actions and 
designs” of ambitious politicians and self-serving elites.28  Jefferson was thus more 
interested in cultivating suspicious minds than he was in cultivating wholly enlightened 
minds.   
The second problem with Staloff’s approach is that it discounts the importance of 
Jefferson’s federalism.  As I showed in Chapter Three, Jefferson is decidedly not the pure 
democrat some want him to be.  Jefferson’s democratic theory is tempered by his own 
nuanced understandings of the scope and limits of government across multiple levels.  
Jefferson’s republicanism boasts a general distrust of government: he bridles at the notion 
                                                
27 Staloff, 133.  See also David Hume, “Of the Independency of Parliament,” in Essays Moral, Political, 
and Literary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963 [1741]), 40-47. 
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of large, expansive regulatory systems and he embraces the idea of self-sufficiency and 
individual liberty.  That individual citizens should have not only a say but a share in the 
workings of government is, in fact, the essence of Jeffersonian republicanism.   
However, individual influence over government begins to wane as population 
increases, territory expands, and policy issues grow more complex.  Distance and 
complexity thus entail a greater need for citizens to rely more on representatives and less 
on personal judgments and capabilities.  Genuine self-government, in the true sense of 
the term, is only practicable on a very small scale.  Jefferson believed people could not 
actually govern themselves completely in a large republic because “they were unqualified 
for the management of affairs requiring intelligence beyond the common level, though he 
did think they were “competent judges of human character.”29  Thus, Jefferson embraced 
and promoted what he called ward republicanism until he died.   
 Although the system never really materialized in Virginia as he had hoped, ward 
republicanism forms the cornerstone of his overarching republican theory.  In Jefferson’s 
mind, the antidote to political corruption at all levels was the implementation of a system 
that would allow for citizens to act “directly and personally, according to rules 
established by the majority.”30  As such, “[t]hese little republics would be the main 
strength of the great one.”31  Jefferson was under no illusion that direct participation was 
always a desirable thing, nor did he see it as feasible at higher levels of government.  
Hannah Arendt was right to conclude that Jefferson not only “disliked the representative 
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30 TJ to John Taylor, 28 May 1816, Writings, 1392. 
 
31 TJ to Governor John Tyler, 28 May 1816, Writings, 1227.  See also TJ to John Adams, 28 October 1813, 
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system and feared the lack of direct political participation, but he also feared the 
corruption of the people themselves.”32  Hence, like Rousseau, Jefferson embraced 
representative government only as a necessary evil.  Far less laudatory than James 
Madison and certainly more accepting than most of his anti-Federalist brethren, Jefferson 
at once decried the dangers of the representative system and pointed up the benefits. 
 The first and perhaps most significant danger inherent in representative systems is 
the possibility of citizen isolation and civic apathy.  Tocqueville would observe this in the 
years immediately following Jefferson’s death and his analysis would be the first 
substantial contribution to understanding this phenomenon since the Anti-Federalists.33  
However, concerns over civic apathy and citizen withdrawal into the private sphere were 
certainly on the minds of American intellectuals before Tocqueville arrived.  Like 
Tocqueville, Jefferson praised the small New England townships for their ability to 
preserve citizen participation and a strong sense of local community.  But this would 
prove to be the limit of Jefferson’s admiration for New England.  His experiences 
traveling through Europe (particularly France) in the late eighteenth century only served 
to reinforce his belief in the corrupting tendencies of manufacture and large, urban 
environments.34   
For Jefferson, the solution to moral and political corruption lies in the 
establishment of small, self-sufficient communities where republican virtue can flourish 
unabated.  The key to American prosperity—and American virtue—was to be found in 
                                                
32 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Penguin, 2006 [1963]), 256. 
 
33 See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America.  See also, Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists 
Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the Constitution (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981). 
 
34 Emile’s travels are meant to illustrate this very same problem. 
   
 168 
agrarianism.  In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson’s musings on agrarian virtue 
might strike the modern reader as dated, to say the least.  Nevertheless, there is a 
significant point that lies beneath the outmoded claim that the tillers of the earth are more 
virtuous than their counterparts in manufactures.  Unless we set aside for a moment the 
claim that God has a special preference for farmers and get to the bottom of Jefferson’s 
reasoning, we are likely to miss the significance of this particular Query in the Notes.  
Jefferson’s point is not necessarily to exalt the American farmer; the exaltation is simply 
a matter of course: farmers, Jefferson thinks, tend to remain uncorrupted and virtuous not 
so much through the effects of Providence, but rather as a result of their industriousness 
and self-sufficiency (which, as it turns out, happen to be the ingredients necessary to their 
survival).  “Dependance [sic],” Jefferson says, “begets subservience and venality, 
suffocates the germ of virtue, and prepares fit tools for the designs of ambition.”35   
In something of a Rousseauian vein,36 Jefferson goes on to strike a chord with the 
counter-Enlightenment critique of the arts:  
This, the natural progress and consequence of the arts, has sometimes perhaps 
been retarded by accidental circumstances: but generally speaking the proportion 
which the aggregate of the other classes of citizens bears in any state to that of its 
husbandmen, is the proportion of its unsound to its healthy parts, and is a good 
enough barometer whereby to measure its degree of corruption.37 
 
In 1784, the virtue of the American people (by way of their agrarian disposition) was 
defined in terms of self-sufficiency and independence, two features of the American 
                                                
35 TJ, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query XIX. 
 
36 Compare Rousseau’s remarks in the Discourse on the Sciences and Arts (1750).  Although it is likely that 
Jefferson may have been acquainted with Rousseau’s works to an extent greater than the record of his 
personal library attests, Rousseau’s critique of the sciences and arts antedates Jefferson’s Notes on the State 
of Virginia by over thirty years.    
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social and political landscape that would persist well into the nineteenth century.  
Jefferson’s point is to draw our attention to the conditions that make the American farmer 
virtuous: those who constantly have an eye “to their own soil and industry” depend not 
on the capriciousness and whims of buyers and sellers (as the employ of manufactures 
might), but rather on their own diligence and determination.38  This idea forms, at least in 
part, the core of Rousseau and Jefferson’s pedagogical plan. 
 Yet, if the solution to political corruption is the cultivation of civic virtue in small, 
somewhat independent, republican communities, why does Jefferson fail to deliver a 
more precise account of how the wards are to function in practice?  Suzanne Morse 
suggests that Jefferson was intentionally vague when it came to crafting a practical plan 
for the development of the wards: “[Jefferson] knew fundamentally that the basis of a 
democracy was citizen participation.  At the same time, he knew that communities can 
have many functions.  His strategy was to have the idea of the small republics accepted 
and let their value for different purposes evolve.”39  The wards would naturally evolve 
over time and it would be up to the citizens of each to fill in the various administrative 
details of local government.  In other words, each ward would be a self-governing entity 
capable of handling its own affairs without the meddling of other governmental entities 
(presumably at the county, state, or federal levels).   
                                                
38 Jefferson’s exaltation of the American farmer is, no doubt, partially the product of bias: Jefferson, a 
planter himself, knew firsthand the challenges that agriculture posed as a way of life.  However, Jefferson 
was not, by any stretch of the imagination, a prototypical American farmer: though well learned in the ways 
of agriculture, Jefferson was nevertheless of a different order.  A lawyer by trade, his success as a planter is 
attributable to much more than simply back-breaking labor, an industrious spirit, and the blessings of 
nature.  The owner of a sizeable piece of arable land bequeathed him by his father—and, of course, the 
owner of numerous slaves by way of his marriage to Martha Wayles Skelton—Jefferson’s experience was 
indeed a far cry from that of the common man. 
          
39 Suzanne W. Morse, “Ward Republics: The Wisest Invention for Self-Government,” in James Gilreath, 
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It is best to think of Jefferson’s wards as subsidiaries: the lowest competent 
authority is the one that ought to deal with a given issue.  Put differently, if a lower, 
subordinate governmental body can perform a task more efficiently than any other, then 
the responsibility belongs with that particular agency.  Responsibility and authority ought 
to devolve to these lower bodies if they are in fact competent.  This is perfectly consistent 
with Jefferson’s federalism and, despite the seeming opacity of his writings on the wards, 
actually serves to illuminate some of the potential functions of the small republics.   
For Jefferson, the responsibilities of the federal government were, for the most 
part, clearly demarcated by the Constitution.  The vast majority of rights and 
responsibilities were reserved to the states (which could, of course, assume any 
prerogatives assumed by the counties or wards).  This gives rise to two separate but 
related questions.  The first question has to do with the proper division of governmental 
powers according to the Constitution, namely, what is the legitimate scope and authority 
of the federal government vis-à-vis the states (and citizens)?  Jefferson devoted 
considerable effort to answering this question largely in favor of the states.  The second 
and more relevant question does not concern the constitutionality of the devolution of 
power.  Rather, this question has to do with the normative implications of Jefferson’s 
plan.  Certain powers, he says, ought to be reserved to the states and, subsequently, to 
lower bodies such as the counties and wards.  Among the powers that ought to devolve 
into the hands of local communities is the power to regulate education.  The question, 
then, is whether such a power ought to be in the hands of local citizens (and, presumably, 
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parents) or whether a larger governmental body should establish uniform regulations at 
either the state or federal level.40   
Jefferson’s solution was, of course, to situate power over educational policy in the 
wards rather than at the county or state level.  By dividing Virginia’s counties up into 
smaller geopolitical units—sometimes called “hundreds”41 by Jefferson—citizens could 
more effectively participate in the day-to-day affairs of government.  In other words, 
citizens would, by virtue of necessity, have a greater share of sovereignty than they 
would otherwise have if the majority of the government’s business was handled from a 
distance at either the county or state level.42  The system Jefferson envisioned would not 
only handle many of the tasks typically assigned to the county or state—the 
administration of justice, care of the poor, jury selection, and schools, to name a few—
but would perform these tasks with greater efficiency and care.  Additionally, by giving 
each citizen a greater, more active share in government “and in the offices nearest and 
most interesting to him, [this] will attach him by his strongest feelings to the 
independence of his country, and its republican constitution.”43   
  Although Jefferson’s proposal for the ward system came relatively late in his 
life, the core features of the system and the rationale behind them are derived from a 
republican theory that predates the Revolution.  Moreover, the principles that form the 
                                                
40 Though highly apposite in the contemporary debate over federalism and the scope of the federal 
government’s authority, Jefferson’s thoughts on this subject are too complex to evaluate here.  Hence, this 
question must remain the subject of another study. 
   
41 The term “hundreds” derives from the English division of shires into smaller administrative units under 
the common law. 
   
42 See TJ to Joseph C. Cabell, 17 January 1814, PTJ:RS:133-35.; TJ to Cabell, 31 January 1814, 
PTJ:RS:176-78. 
 
43 TJ to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816, Writings, 1399.  
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basis of his ward theory also undergird a constitutionalism that Jefferson embraced from 
1787 onward.  “The way to good government,” Jefferson wrote,  
is not to trust it all to one, but to divide it among the many, distributing to every 
one exactly the functions he is competent to.  Let the national government be 
entrusted with the defence of the nation, and its foreign and federal relations; the 
State governments with the civil rights, laws, police and administration of what 
concerns the state generally; the Counties with the local concerns of the counties; 
and each Ward direct the interests within itself.  It is by dividing and subdividing 
these republics from the great one down through all its subordination, until it ends 
in the administration of every man’s farm and affairs by himself; by placing under 
every one what his own eye may superintend, that all will be done for the best.44  
   
The point of the ward system was to preserve the federal structure of the union, as 
Jefferson understood it, and to ensure that true republican principles would penetrate 
deep into the interstices of political society.  Jefferson’s fears of a “generalizing and 
concentrating” power are brought to bear when he asserts that the key to preserving 
America’s republican heritage—and the key to preserving liberty—is to render the 
individual “the depository of the powers respecting himself, so far as he is competent to 
them, and delegating only what is beyond his competence by a synthetical process, to 
higher and higher orders of functionaries, so as to trust fewer and fewer powers, in 
proportion as the trustees become more and more oligarchical.”45  
Though perhaps logistically problematic by twenty-first century standards, the 
wards were, at the very least, emblematic of Jefferson’s commitment to the principles of 
self-government and individual liberty.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson deplored the abuses of 
power common under self-interested, corrupt monarchs as well as the seemingly well-
intentioned, though typically misguided efforts of large, bureaucratic regimes to 
                                                
44 TJ to Joseph C. Cabell, 2 February 1816, Writings, 1380. 
 
45 Ibid. 
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micromanage the lives of citizens.46  Jefferson understood as well as, if not better than 
Rousseau the importance of appealing to citizens’ interests, that is, in motivating citizens 
to take an active role in local government.  In Jefferson’s estimation, the wards would 
provide the very practical civic education needed to produce just such a citizen.  
Combined with the moral and general instruction received in the schools, children would 
become self-reliant and vigilant adults rather than passive, withdrawn—in a sense, 
civically dead—subjects.   
Only the active participation of citizens could curb the tendency of representatives 
to drift away from their constitutional duties.  Although Jefferson eventually acquiesced 
to the Constitution, he did not necessarily embrace Madison’s theory in Federalist 10 and 
51.  Pitting power against power and interest against interest was certainly a step in the 
right direction, and Jefferson accepted this structural arrangement as by and large a good 
safeguard against legislative and executive despotism.  But even a good institutional 
design could not prevent the Congress from overstepping its legitimate authority in all 
cases, nor could it forestall the centralizing momentum that Jefferson felt was latent in 
Madison’s scheme.  The wards would thus stand as a potential bulwark against 
constitutional transgressions.  As Jefferson indicated to John Adams, constitutional 
disputes could likely be resolved with a “general call of ward meetings by their wardens 
on the same day throughout the State,” which “would at any time produce the genuine 
sense of the people on any required point, and would enable the State to act in mass.”47   
                                                
46 Tocqueville provides an historical analysis of this phenomenon in France in The Old Regime and the 
French Revolution.  See also Chapter Three. 
 
47 TJ to John Adams, 28 October 1813, AJL:390. 
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Madison ultimately rejected Jefferson’s theory of generational sovereignty and his 
call for periodic constitutional conventions,48 but Jefferson never relented in his 
commitment to preserving the rightful will of the people against the inevitable 
encroachments of a distant, disconnected, and seemingly unrestrained federal 
government.  The educative function of the wards was thus indispensible to Jefferson.  
Presumably, if republicanism flourished in the wards, it would thrive at the state and 
federal levels as well.  In terms of preserving republican principles, it was not 
constitutions that mattered so much to Jefferson; although certain principles were eternal, 
laws and institutions could be altered, modified, or even abolished to keep pace with 
changing social and political tides.  What mattered most to Jefferson was the strength and 
character of the American people—in a word, its spirit.49     
Such republican spirit flourished during the Revolution, or at least Jefferson 
believed that it did.  Once the “reign of [Federalist] witches”50 was brought to an end 
with the election of 1800, Jefferson set out to revitalize this republican spirit from the 
nation’s highest office.51  But Jefferson was sensitive to the limitations of the presidency, 
especially when it came to having a palpable effect on the moral and civic development 
of the people.  He knew that government could only do so much—and rightfully so.  If 
republican virtue was to be nourished and reproduced—if the “qualifications for self-
government” were indeed “the result of habit and long training” and such training “must 
                                                
48 See Madison, Federalist 39. 
 
49 “Where is our republicanism to be found,” Jefferson asked.  “Not in the constitution, but merely in the 
spirit of the people.”  TJ to Samuel Kercheval, 12 July 1816, Writings, 1397. 
 
50 TJ to John Taylor, 4 June 1798, PTJ 30:388. 
 
51 See Chapter Three.  See also Onuf, The Mind of Thomas Jefferson, 83-98; Peter S. Onuf and Leonard J. 
Sadosky, Jeffersonian America (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002). 
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be taken up ab incunabulis”—then most of the heavy lifting would have to be performed 
by citizens themselves, in conjunction with, but distinctly separate from the state.  In 
other words, the type of moral and civic education required to produce virtuous 
republican citizens—and the kind necessary to realize the hopes and fulfill the promises 
of Jefferson’s First Inaugural—would have to be carried out on multiple levels, but 
primarily within the family.  The next section explores Jefferson’s thoughts on the role of 
republican fathers as founders and highlights the parallels between the Virginian and 
Rousseau’s theory of affectionate pedagogy. 
 
III.  Jefferson and Rousseau: Affectionate Pedagogy and Amor Patriae 
Jefferson’s revolutionary rhetoric pitted a parent country (the King in parliament) against 
its children (the colonists).  Many, including Jefferson, worried that the colonists’ 
independence would be undermined if affectionate ties to a neglectful father persisted.  
Jefferson especially feared that many Americans would, like irrational and passionate 
children, retain a sentimental attachment to—and, even worse, a dependence upon—the 
Crown.  Thus, in his writings on education and the wards, Jefferson emphasized the 
important role mentors, teachers, and parents ought to play in cultivating autonomy and a 
sense of gratitude in their charges, as well as a more rational sense of dependence and 
affection. 
In order to guarantee that affection toward a neglectful and even harmful British 
monarch would not persist, Jefferson insisted on the establishment of a public school 
system.  Still, the core features of the curriculum and the philosophy behind its design 
remained closely tied to the romantic ideals presented by Fénelon and Rousseau: children 
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would travel away from home (progressively farther as they aged and moved on to higher 
levels); experience and observation would serve to stimulate and develop common sense 
and, eventually, abstract reason; and finally, the public schools, in close conjunction with 
affectionate mentors, would help to perpetuate American republicanism and cultivate 
amor patriae.52   
The antipatriarchal rhetoric Jefferson leveled against the Crown should not be 
taken as an assault on patriarchalism per se.  To be sure, the King was guilty of more than 
simply neglect: Jefferson painted the King as a once affectionate parent whose attitude 
toward his children’s well-being had slowly drifted from mild indifference to negligence 
and, by 1776, to exploitation and abuse.  The British monarch was most deserving of a 
severing of the “political bands” Jefferson mentions in his Declaration, but this did not 
mean that the parental model was to be abandoned when it came to instituting new 
government and educating citizens in their rights and duties.  Although Jefferson wished 
to sever political ties with Great Britain, his goal was decidedly not to generate either an 
absolutely anti-patriarchal sentiment or a sentiment that would incline citizens to reject 
out of hand any and all forms of tradition, custom, and law.  Jefferson’s revolutionary 
rhetoric was indeed radical, but the Virginian simply could not abide a total rejection of 
the laws and practices handed down by his English ancestors.53  This much is clear from 
                                                
52 Compare Emile: Rousseau might have assented to this sort of plan for public education if he did not 
detest the system of public education in Europe.  Cf. Jean Bloch, Rousseauism and Education in 
Eighteenth-Century France (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). 
 
53 Jefferson supported numerous legal reforms in Virginia, including the abolition of primogeniture and 
entail.  For an analysis of these reforms, see Michael Grossberg, “Citizens and Families: A Jeffersonian 
Vision of Domestic Relations and Generational Change,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a 
Citizen, ed. James Gilreath (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999), 3-27; Holly Brewer, “Beyond 
Education: Thomas Jefferson’s ‘Republican’ Revision of the Laws Regarding Children,” in Thomas 
Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen, 48-62. 
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Jefferson’s language in Bill 79 and Bill 80.54  The various proposals contained in the bills 
for establishing a public school system ensured that the core principles of American 
republicanism would be passed down from generation to generation.  The tripartite 
philosophical foundation of the curriculum would encourage independence, critical 
reflection, and a healthy suspicion of governmental authority, while simultaneously 
instilling in youth respect and gratitude for their predecessors, especially their 
affectionate mentors. 
The transmission of republican principles to future generations was vital for 
Jefferson; his rhetoric as well as his legislative efforts to reform education attest to this.   
The idea of transmitting republican principles goes hand in hand with the image of the 
affectionate father, but neither are readily apparent in Jefferson’s political writings (i.e., 
in drafts of bills, speeches, and other public messages).  However, both ideas are clearly 
observable in his personal correspondence and his revolutionary writings.55  On occasion, 
Jefferson emphasizes in his public writings the importance of preserving America’s 
republican heritage in both institutions and the law, but the image of fathers as founders 
and affectionate mentors is noticeably missing.  As important as the idea was in the 
American mind, perhaps Jefferson saw no need to buttress it through speeches and 
political messages during his presidency.  After all, in terms of influencing the American 
mind, much of what Jefferson accomplished during his presidency was done in a less 
                                                
54 Bill 79, “A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge,” PTJ 2:526-7.  Bill 79 was presented to 
the Virginia House of Delegates by Jefferson in 1778 and again in 1780.  The Bill failed to receive a 
majority vote and was later reintroduced several times by James Madison during Jefferson’s tenure as 
Minister Plenipotentiary to France in the late 1780s.  In 1796, the Bill was enacted as an “Act to Establish 
Public Schools.”  PTJ 2:535n.  Bill 80, “A Bill for Amending the Constitution of the College of William 
and Mary, and Substituting More Certain Revenues for its Support,” PTJ 2:538. 
  
55 For instance, in “A Summary View of the Rights of British America” and the “Declaration of 
Independence.” 
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overt way.56  After his two terms as president, Jefferson’s focus shifted to mentoring his 
affectionate charges and his own children.  Thus, after 1801, the image of the affectionate 
father and mentor, never very prominent in Jefferson’s public writings, all but disappears, 
though it remains in his personal missives until his death. 
 Much of Jefferson’s revolutionary rhetoric was designed to paint King George III 
as a neglectful tyrant and failed father.  Jefferson’s post-revolutionary writings, on the 
other hand, offer an account of what republican fathers ought to do to cultivate virtuous 
republican citizens and perpetuate amor patriae.  Jefferson was hopeful that properly 
ordered institutions, good laws, and a sound system of education would nurture and 
develop his romanticized republican vision.  After the 1790s, Jefferson’s efforts to 
cultivate virtuous republican fathers and children would gradually drift away from the 
nation and back to his native Virginia.  Increasingly, Jefferson’s function as a founder 
would give way to his duties as a father (in both the literal and metaphorical sense).    
 The image of the affectionate father is an enduring feature in Jefferson’s 
republican vision.  The question of whether this image had been successfully grafted onto 
the American mind by the 1780s is important, but cannot be answered here.  Still, the 
reification of the image—the conversion of that image from something allegorical into 
something more literal—looms large in Jefferson’s thought from his revolutionary days 
through his retirement.  Jefferson’s efforts to galvanize the American people and solidify 
the image—his attempts to embolden the people to be virtuous republicans—are 
exemplified in the design for a national insignia submitted to Congress in 1776.  As 
Hellenbrand has noted, when Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin collaborated on the 
                                                
56 See Appleby, “Psychology of Democracy,” 158. 
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insignia, both concurred on the use of Pharaoh’s image to represent George III.  
Depicting the King as being “swallowed up by the Red Sea revealed their own poignant 
desire that the Atlantic and God conspire to defeat George.”57  However, Jefferson 
favored a design that would elicit stronger sentiment and considerably greater reverence 
for legitimate authority and republican principles.  In addition to a design that 
emphasized Americans’ Saxon58 heritage and something of a reclaimed patrimony, 
Jefferson also conceived of a second, and in his mind, more fitting and “proper device for 
the American states united.”59  This image would not emphasize the moral and political 
failings of a neglectful King; instead, it would portray something more positive and, 
above all, it would impart a crucial lesson.  This “device…would be the Father presenting 
the bundles of rods to his sons.”60  In Hellenbrand’s words,  
This “Father,” from Aesop, taught his sons a political object-lesson.  Held 
separately, each rod easily could be snapped.  Held with others in a bundle, it 
could not.  “Insuperabiles si inseparabiles,” warned the motto of this insignia.  
Fathers who were not like Pharoah had lessons to teach.  Their primary lesson 
was that true fathers ruled and raised their sons to be independent.  Then, the 
elders bonded fraternally and affectionately with their heirs.61 
 
                                                
57 Hellenbrand, 75. 
 
58 The Saxon glory Jefferson lauds is admittedly a myth.  In general, Jefferson rejected myths as 
instructional devices, especially religious myths.  Nevertheless, he saw fit to employ this particular myth 
time and again in order to convey a particular political message to the American people.  The Saxons’ 
“ancient constitution,” as well as the virtues and glory of these ancient republicans, were trumped up by 
Jefferson in “A Summary View of the Rights of British America.”  Later in life, Jefferson would admit that 
the Saxon legacy was nothing but a historical contrivance.  Still, in his mind, the myth served a vital 
purpose. 
  
59 TJ, “Report on a Seal for the United States, with Related Papers,” 20 August 1776, PTJ 1:494-97. 
 
60 Ibid. 
 
61 Hellenbrand, 75.  This is not unlike my interpretation of Rousseau’s republican project as spelled out in 
the Social Contract and Emile.   
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The importance of this lesson for republican citizens cannot be understated.  The image 
of the affectionate father was not merely a rhetorical device for Jefferson; fathers—actual 
and surrogate—play a pivotal role in Jefferson’s republican theory. 
Jefferson was of the conviction that a sound, comprehensive course of study—
what we might today call a liberal education—was indispensible to the establishment and 
maintenance of good government and individual liberty.  According to Jefferson’s 
preeminent twentieth century biographer, Dumas Malone, the Virginian’s “chief concern 
was for the attainment of liberty, and this provides the best single clue, not only to his 
motives in the Revolution, but also to his entire career.”62  Malone is right to conclude 
that Jefferson’s paramount objective was the preservation of individual liberty, as far as 
practicable.  However, there is more to Jefferson’s plan, another side of the coin that 
Malone seems to ignore.  Unenlightened liberty was certainly a “contradiction in 
concepts” for Jefferson, as Cauthen has observed.63  But more important was the link 
between individual liberty and personal integrity (or the balance between individual 
rights and personal responsibility).  This, of course, is not unlike the position staked out 
by Rousseau in Emile.  While Rousseau might have bridled at the idea of children being 
compelled to learn useless (or nearly useless) things, he, like Jefferson and Milton, 
appreciated the value of a curriculum that focused almost exclusively on practical 
knowledge and the development of morally and civically virtuous citizens.   
                                                
62 Dumas Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, Vol. 2 of Jefferson and His Time (Charlottesville, VA: 
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63 Irby Cauthen, “‘A Complete and Generous Education’: Milton and Jefferson,” The Virginia Quarterly 
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 Jefferson’s theory of moral and civic education is ostensibly straightforward: he 
embraces dual conceptions of natural equality and political democracy and he is 
committed to instilling the virtues of republicanism in the American citizenry from birth.  
Paternalism and pedagogical mentorship play pivotal roles in Jefferson’s vision.  Like 
Rousseau, Jefferson marked out a unique, if not indispensible place for pedagogues and 
fathers in a republic.  The primary function of these pedagogues was to cultivate 
independent, self-sufficient, and virtuous republican citizens.  This was no easy task, for 
things like self-government and the responsibilities entailed by individual liberty were far 
from intuitive in young children.   
Jefferson’s prescriptions are often associated with Locke’s.  For many 
Enlightenment thinkers contemplating the minutiae of childhood pedagogy, Locke’s 
Thoughts on Education was often the standard.  Much scholarship has focused on a 
commonly occurring theme in Enlightenment thinking on the subject—namely, the 
analogy between parents as sovereign authorities and children as political subjects.  
While Locke’s analysis in Thoughts seems to invite such an analogy, nowhere does he 
actually suggest that political sovereignty is on a conceptual par with parental authority.64  
Hellenbrand persuasively argues that, while many of Locke’s followers embraced this 
analogy (if not wrongfully attributing it to him), Jefferson did not.  In fact, on 
Hellenbrand’s reading, Jefferson “not only adopted Locke’s benign view of the 
impressionability of the infant mind, but he attributed to political sovereignty the power 
and responsibility of solicitous parenthood.”65   
                                                
64 Indeed, Locke’s great bête noire was Sir Robert Filmer, the paragon of patriarchal theorists. 
 
65 Hellenbrand, 13. 
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If Hellenbrand is correct, then something of a Rousseauian paradox lurks beneath 
the surface of Jefferson’s republicanism: ever suspicious of encroachments by the 
government on individual liberty, it seems odd that Jefferson would tirelessly defend a 
system of education that depended almost entirely on government subsidy and political 
will.  Likewise, it seems strange that Jefferson, the champion of autonomy and archrival 
of state political paternalism, would buoy up a scheme that sought first and foremost to 
instill in children his own republican virtues.  It would seem that a system consistent with 
Jefferson’s values should encourage critical thinking, a healthy suspicion of 
governmental authority, and, above all, self-sufficiency and independence.  Scholars such 
as Staloff and Fliegelman imply that Jefferson’s plans ultimately issue in something of an 
inegalitarian and even illiberal order: children are inculcated to embrace a peculiarly 
southern strand of republicanism and are thus too dependent on the state.  Others, such as 
Hellenbrand and Lewis, suggest that Jefferson may have gone too far in the other 
direction.  For Jefferson, the state indeed had a crucial role to play in public education.  
However, being a government institution, its scope was to be strictly limited.  Parents 
were to be the primary teachers with schools merely serving an ancillary or 
supplementary role.  On this reading, Jefferson seems to be placing a significant burden 
on republican parents and, in doing so, he renders children far too dependent on their 
pedagogues.66    
                                                
66 Staloff, 130-34 ff.; Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and Pilgrims, Ch. 7; Hellenbrand, Ch. 3; Jan Lewis, 
“Jefferson, the Family, and Civic Education,” in Gilreath, ed., Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a 
Citizen, 67.  The latter interpretation seems wrong.  Jefferson’s aim was to transform children, over time, 
from dependent and unreasonable persons to autonomous, independent, and self-sufficient citizens, albeit 
while retaining strong bonds of affection with their parents.  Independence was something that had to be 
learned and the starting point was, of course, a state of dependence.  For Jefferson, independence is not a 
toy for children to play with; it is a privilege for the fully matured mind.  As such, independence—that is, 
full, genuine, unfettered independence—must be acquired or learned over time in order to be fully 
appreciated (and fully exercised). 
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It is true that Jefferson believed a certain degree of dependence was inevitable in 
the course of a child’s education.  He was confident that the only way to cultivate 
autonomous, rational, republican citizens was to begin with a properly coordinated and 
properly executed education as early as possible.  Like Milton and Locke, Jefferson 
believed that most of the rigors associated with traditional education were largely 
inadequate.  Obliging children to conform to narrowly defined standards and 
unnecessarily restricting them were ideas anathema to both Locke and Jefferson.  The 
pedagogue’s task was not so much to drive facts and formulas into children’s minds, but 
to help them garner useful knowledge through processes of discovery, or experiential 
learning.  The teacher would be tasked with selectively filtering everyday experiences so 
as to lead students to the point of self-sufficiency as adults.  This is the guiding principle 
that undergirds Locke’s scheme in Thoughts and it is also the cornerstone of Rousseau’s 
approach in Emile.  Although the principles Rousseau espouses in Emile and the 
approaches he advocates sometimes resemble much of what Locke has to offer, the 
Genevan goes to great lengths to highlight the defects of the gentry-oriented education 
contained in Thoughts.   
The question, then, is whether Jefferson’s approach is more in line with Locke or 
Rousseau.  I argue that Jefferson embraced (and practiced) a system that more closely 
resembles Rousseau’s on at least two levels.  First, Jefferson’s long-held conviction that 
general education and the diffusion of useful knowledge were public responsibilities 
separates him not only from Locke, but also his own contemporaries (e.g., John Adams, 
Benjamin Franklin, and Benjamin Rush).  While Rousseau insists that private education 
is vastly superior to public education, he concedes that private education is only 
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practicable for a few, namely the wealthy.  In a truly republican system, public education 
is thus not something the people ought merely to settle on; it is, rather, a matter of 
necessity.     
 The second point on which Jefferson and Rousseau converge is the idea of 
affectionate pedagogy and the indispensible role played by parents and mentors.  The 
political import of Jefferson’s thoughts on affectionate pedagogy and the educative 
function of fathers is profound.  In what follows, I offer an analysis of the ways in which 
Jefferson’s system lines up with the interpretation of Rousseau I offered in Chapter Two.  
There, I show the central theme in Rousseau’s Emile to be the idea of fathers as the 
founders of moral and civic virtue in republican children.  The founding and fatherly 
roles played by the tutor are not mutually exclusive and, in the end, the goals of both the 
tutor and Emile are to found privately and publicly.  Jefferson’s role as a father and a 
founder can be understood to follow a similar trajectory.  
Jefferson believed that, given the right conditions and competent instruction, 
children could be molded into civically minded, virtuous republicans.  For Jefferson (as 
for Rousseau), the pedagogue would be the indispensible lynchpin in the entire scheme: 
affectionate mentors, or father figures, would, in a way, help to complete the American 
Revolution in the minds of the young.  Like many of his contemporaries, Jefferson 
understood the Revolution to be an ongoing process, something that was, as of 1781, 
incomplete.67  The task of completing the revolution (or, rather, of continuing the 
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revolution) would fall to the people as a whole, though the bulk of the work would be 
performed at a much lower level.  Parents, Jefferson believed, were ultimately 
responsible for educating and shaping their children, for preparing them to be 
independent, republican citizens.  His plans for public education certainly gave great 
consideration to the role the state ought to play in such an enterprise, but education 
remained, by and large, the responsibility of individual parents. 
Jefferson’s approach to education is marked by several tensions.  On the one 
hand, there is a tension between Jefferson’s faith in the power of reason and his deference 
to sensibility, or sentimentality.  On the other hand, Jefferson routinely emphasizes the 
importance of individual liberty and self-sufficiency while simultaneously underscoring 
the need for a seemingly rigid, inflexible pedagogy.  If Jefferson’s words and actions are 
examined carefully—if close attention is paid to the nuances of his political and 
educational theories—both tensions can be easily resolved.  As I showed in Chapters One 
and Two, a similar set of tensions emerges in Rousseau’s thought and, upon careful 
consideration, both tensions are reconciled to some degree.  Jefferson’s thoughts and 
proposals are no different; circumstances and politics notwithstanding, the Romantic 
trajectories of both Rousseau and Jefferson’s pedagogical schemes is unmistakable.    
It is helpful to begin with an analysis of Jefferson’s conception of the relationship 
between reason and sensibility.  As Hellenbrand has noted, Jefferson’s father taught “his 
son to think well of a morality that depended more on observation and action than on 
pure introspection and abstract virtue.”  Likewise, the next most influential teacher in 
Jefferson’s youth, the Reverend James Maury, believed that humans had something of an 
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innate or biological imperative “as well as a moral imperative to do good deeds.”68  
Jefferson, perhaps the master of abstraction among all the revolutionaries, was actually 
well attuned to the ways in which observation and experience could color one’s moral 
philosophy.  The ability to abstract away from the ordinary was crucial—virtue, after all, 
was a high ideal that needed to be grounded in something greater than the mundane—but 
the building blocks for such abstraction could only be found in everyday experiences.69   
Though he in no way discounts the value—indeed, the invaluableness—of reason, 
Jefferson, like Rousseau, accords primacy to affect, to natural sentiment, and to the 
passions (properly restrained).  In his famous letter to Maria Cosway in 1786 (the “Head 
and the Heart” letter), Jefferson intimates the indispensability of affect in political 
matters.  Following the Head’s admonition that “Everything in this world is matter of 
calculation,” the Heart rejoins:  
Morals were too essential to the happiness of man to be risked on the uncertain 
combinations of the head.  She [i.e., nature] laid their foundation therefore in 
sentiment, not in science…If our country, when pressed with wrongs at the point 
of the beyond, had been governed by its head instead of its hearts, where should 
we have been now?  Hanging on a gallows as high as Haman’s.70   
 
Reason told Jefferson that very little, if anything in this world could endure.  However, 
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70 TJ to Maria Cosway, 12 October 1786, PTJ 10:448; 450-51.  Remarking on the substance of this very 
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Jefferson refused to embrace such a cold, calculating world-view and instead deferred to 
reason’s counterpart, sensibility.  While the “head” advises against entangling 
relationships and eschews solicitude, the “heart” is biased toward sociability.  The head 
dictates prudence; the heart inclines toward what is right.  Jefferson recognized and 
appreciated, if not over-indulged this sentiment in his early adulthood (particularly during 
his sojourn in France).   
Though he remained wrapped in a silhouette of sentimentality, Jefferson’s 
romanticism did not blind him to the perils and pitfalls of relying too heavily on the 
heart’s impulses.  Humans naturally desire affection and the heart has a tendency to 
ignore the head’s advice and override its commands.  When properly balanced, however, 
the head and the heart counseled moderation and warned against excessive passion.71  
Like Rousseau, Jefferson accepted the teachings of the Epicureans: the passions were 
perfectly natural impulses which could neither be restrained completely nor disregarded 
and left unchecked; rather, the passions must be put into the service of reason through 
moderation.  Finding the mean between excessive sentimentality and implacable 
reason—between credulity and neurosis—is easier said than done, as both Jefferson and 
Rousseau learned on numerous occasions in their younger years.72  Still, cultivating the 
moral sense and moderating the passions were integral in the education of children and 
young adults. 
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72 Rousseau’s Confessions are a testament to this fact, as are the Reveries.  Jefferson was typically more 
reserved in his correspondence and rarely confessed to the sort of scandalous behaviors Rousseau so readily 
divulged.  However, there are occasions where Jefferson offers a glimpse into his own struggles to situate 
reason atop the passionate impulses of his heart.  The correspondence with Maria Cosway is, perhaps, the 
most notable instance of Jeffersonian confession.  Anything resembling confession became more infrequent 
as Jefferson aged. 
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Like Rousseau, Jefferson accepted that the moral sense was grafted onto the 
human heart by nature.  Believing that “nature hath implanted in our breast a love of 
others, a sense of duty to them, a moral instinct,” Jefferson argued that all human beings 
of sound mind possessed a “sense of right and wrong” which could be “submitted…in 
some degree to the guidance of reason; but it is a small stock which is required for this.”73  
Cultivation of the moral sense was, for Jefferson, the first and perhaps most important 
task for pedagogues.  Since the heart is the locus of our moral impulses, and since moral 
virtue was the primary goal of education, it made sense to begin a child’s education with 
affective lessons and ground all subsequent lessons in affect, where possible.  In 
Jefferson’s mind, the cultivation of a child’s moral sense—and, more broadly, fostering 
the affect—was a father’s duty.  
The predominant posture of the time was to accept fathers (or elder males) as the 
primary educators of children (boys, specifically).  Although mothers (and other women) 
did play an important role, their primary function was not educative in the strict sense.  
Jefferson’s attitude was no different than his contemporaries.74  In fact, Jefferson seems 
to embrace, in theory and in practice, the same views articulated by Rousseau in Book I 
of Emile: “As the true nurse is the mother, the true preceptor is the father.  Let them be in 
agreement both about the order of their functions and about their system; let the child 
pass from the hands of one into those of the other.  He will be better raised by a judicious 
and limited father than by the cleverest master in the world.”75   
                                                
73 TJ to Peter Carr, 10 August 1787, PTJ 12:15. 
 
74 Jefferson’s attitude towards women (politically as well as domestically) is well documented and has been 
extensively analyzed elsewhere.  It is not within the scope of this chapter to explore in detail Jefferson’s 
views on gender inequality.   
 
75 Rousseau, Emile, 48.  
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Most scholars locate the intellectual origins of Jefferson’s thoughts on moral and 
civic education in various ancient philosophers and, of course, in John Locke.  Given the 
prevalence of Locke’s writings in America during Jefferson’s time (and, no doubt, the 
significant influence of Locke on the political thinking of many revolutionaries), it is no 
surprise to find traces of Locke woven throughout Jefferson’s earlier thoughts on 
education.  Still, most scholars seem to take the Lockean influence for granted.   
Jefferson accepts the Lockean dictum that moral virtue is the “good which tutors 
not only should read lectures and talk of but the labour and art of education should 
furnish the mind with.”76  However, where Locke directs education toward the ends of 
reflection, happiness, and leisure, Jefferson goes one step further.  Education, in 
Jefferson’s mind, was not intended simply to equip children with the skills necessary to 
engage in abstract, secluded reverie; nor was the purpose of education to prepare children 
for lucrative careers in business or law.  For Jefferson, education was intended to afford 
all educable children the means to reflect critically on their own life pursuits as well as 
the affairs of the world around them.  In theory, a quality education would ensure that 
children would learn never to forget their private and public duties.  This, of course, 
meant that once children became adults, they would remain constantly vigilant and 
committed to serving the public good.   
  Like Locke and Rousseau, Jefferson decried the use of physical punishment as a 
                                                
 
76 John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education, §70.  Rousseau parts company with Locke on 
several occasions in Emile, most notably with respect to the usefulness of lecturing or precepting.  For 
Rousseau, lecturing was a useless practice.  Nevertheless, both Rousseau and Locke agree that tutors ought 
to be supplying their students with the resources necessary to pursue freedom and happiness and, above all 
else, virtue.  There is a moral component to education that both Locke and Rousseau see as indispensible, 
though the importance of pursuing virtue is, perhaps, more apparent in Rousseau than it is in his English 
counterpart.  
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means of motivating children or correcting inappropriate behavior.  The use of 
commands, threats, or violence was generally counterproductive and served only to 
produce resentment and incite rebellion in youth.  Likewise, since children could not 
possibly be inspired by abstract principles, it made no sense to Locke, Rousseau, or 
Jefferson for a tutor to resort to reprimand or reproach.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson 
believed that children could (and ought) to be motivated first and foremost by interest, 
not by abstract principles they cannot grasp.  If a tutor’s goal was to foster independence 
and virtue in a child, then physical coercion was decidedly not the answer when it came 
to discipline.  Still, a certain form of coercion was necessary, albeit a restrained and 
moderated form that relied primarily on psychological and emotional appeal rather than 
corporal inducement.77  
Jefferson often took the time to instruct and advise his affectionate mentees on 
various aspects of their education.  Jefferson’s letters to Peter Carr are particularly 
interesting and reveal some of the Virginian’s thoughts on the value of shaming as an 
instructional device.  There was a certain utility in shame, if employed properly, and 
Jefferson was acutely aware of this.  Children and young adults often respond to 
emotional discomfort and the possibility of losing the esteem of others could be 
especially motivating.  Hence, Jefferson admonishes his charge: “[N]ever suppose, 
that…under any circumstances, it is best for you to do a dishonorable thing, however 
slightly so it may appear to you.  Whenever you are to do a thing, though it can never be 
known but to yourself, ask yourself how you would act were all the world looking at you, 
                                                
77 Compare Emile: the tutor coerces Emile, though not physically and not with precepts. 
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and act accordingly.”78  The possibility of disappointing his affectionate mentor would 
surely have weighed heavily on Peter’s conscience, and Jefferson was fully aware of this 
when he composed the letter.  More importantly, however, was the possibility that Peter 
would somehow fail to reach his full potential.  Peter’s education at William and Mary 
(as well as his preparation at Monticello) were intended to groom him for virtuous public 
service.  Letting down his affectionate mentor (and, more broadly, the public to whom he 
would eventually be accountable) was not something he could countenance. 
Shaming Peter was not intended to do anything more than redirect his mental 
focus and return his desires to their proper orbit.  Jefferson knew that children and young 
adults prized the esteem of others.  Though Jefferson wanted to ensure that these 
impressionable minds did not learn to covet the esteem of others for self-aggrandizing 
purposes, it was nevertheless a useful exercise for Jefferson’s charges to learn to keep 
vanity and arrogance in check.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson understood that self-love was 
terribly caustic and, if left unchecked, was liable to cause significant (and perhaps 
irreversible) psychological damage in children and young adults.  Rousseau goes to great 
lengths to quell self-love in the course of Emile’s education (for example, the scene with 
the magician79) and Jefferson’s own efforts are not dissimilar (the only difference being 
that Jefferson employs shaming techniques directly, usually through the missive, whereas 
Emile’s tutor acts indirectly through others).  It is not clear the extent to which these 
methods worked for figures such as Peter Carr.  What is clear is Jefferson’s belief in the 
power of non-parental figures to influence, directly or indirectly, the conduct of 
                                                
78 TJ to Peter Carr, 19 August 1785, PTJ 8:406. 
 
79 See Emile, 173-75. 
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affectionate mentees.  Rousseau was acutely aware of this power, though he ultimately 
fails to articulate the precise psychological dynamics at work in such relationships.  
Regardless, both Jefferson and Rousseau embraced the method, even as they were both 
uncertain of exactly why children seem to respond to shaming and disgrace from 
authoritative figures who simply play the role of a parent.   
Jefferson begins the missive to Peter Carr by making his displeasure abundantly 
clear:   
I am much mortified to hear that you have lost so much time; and that when you 
arrived in Williamsburg, you were not at all advanced from what you were when 
you left Monticello.  Time now begins to be precious to you.  Every day you lose, 
will retard a day your entrance on that public stage whereon you may begin to be 
useful to yourself.80   
 
Jefferson would reiterate this point time and time again to his affectionate charges as well 
as his own children.  The theme of personal and public utility runs throughout Jefferson’s 
private correspondences that deal with education.  The theme of this letter is strikingly 
similar to the theme Rousseau repeats throughout Emile.  Just as Rousseau cautions 
against idleness and the pursuit of useless enterprises during childhood, Jefferson warns 
his mentees as well as his own children of the dangers inherent in laziness and an 
unstructured curriculum (or even a curriculum that emphasized the study of subjects with 
little or no practical utility, e.g., metaphysics).  For Jefferson as well as Rousseau, 
learning was meant to be a constant activity.  “Of al the cankers of human happiness,” 
Jefferson wrote to his daughter Martha, “none corrodes it with so silent, yet so baneful a 
tooth, as indolence…Idleness begets ennui, ennui the hypochondria, and that a diseased 
body…It is while we are young that the habit of industry is formed…The fortune of our 
                                                
80 TJ to Peer Carr, 19 August 1785, PTJ 8:405. 
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lives therefore depends on employing well the short period of youth.”81   
The development of this “habit of industry” is meant to be a diversion for children 
as well as preparation for responsible adulthood.  Rather than allowing children 
constantly to withdraw and flee from the world, as it were, Jefferson counseled the 
development of industriousness so as to maximize gains in the fruitful (and long) period 
of childhood.  While play and leisure were certainly integral components of a sound 
education, lack of structure (and even excessive freedom) could be extremely 
counterproductive.  The point, then, was not so much to teach (or attempt to teach) a 
child everything under the sun (as some modern educators and parents are wont to do), 
but to instill in them the virtue of industry and develop their self-reflective capabilities so 
that they may be free to pursue their own happiness as adults.82  This involved not only 
extending the period of education beyond childhood and into young adulthood, but also 
slowing the pace of education so that children may proceed securely from one level to the 
                                                
81 TJ to Martha Jefferson Randolph, 21 March 1787, PTJ 11:250-51.  See also TJ to Martha Jefferson 
Randolph, 21 May 1787, PTJ 11: 370: “A mind always employed is always happy…The idle are the only 
wretched.  In a world which furnishes so many employments [sic] which are useful, and so many which are 
amusing, it is our own fault if we ever know what ennui is, or if we are ever driven to the miserable 
resource of gaming, which corrupts our disposition, and teaches us a habit of hostility against all mankind.”  
Rousseau would agree with Jefferson on this point, but there is a slight difference.  Jefferson’s pedagogy 
prescribes constant, rigid structure (not unlike Locke’s), while Rousseau’s pedagogy is ostensibly not as 
inflexible.  It is true that Emile’s instruction does not consist in lectures and rigidly defined coursework, but 
the content and execution are no less structured and strictly supervised.  The key difference is that Emile’s 
tutor successfully disguises much of what he does and Emile gradually becomes aware of this contrivance 
over time.  Rousseau’s aim is to keep Emile constantly active and engaged in some form of useful learning. 
 
82 Regarding the pursuit of happiness as the ultimate end of human existence, Jefferson embraced the 
teachings of Laurence Sterne, especially the Sermons.  Sterne’s teachings on human happiness are almost 
indistinguishable from Rousseau’s.  Like Epicurus, Sterne and Rousseau viewed happiness as elusive, but 
still the ultimate end of life, with virtue as its true foundation.  Moreover, Sterne and Rousseau insist that 
man’s passions must not be stifled, but rather moderated, or brought into the service of reason.  Thus, 
following Sterne, Jefferson embraces a moderate sort of stoicism: not a hedonistic brand of stoicism, or one 
that leads only to extreme indifference, but a tempered, sublimated version more closely aligned with 
Epicurus’ own views.  For a penetrating analysis of Sterne’s influence on Jefferson, see Andrew Burstein 
and Catherine Mowbray, “Jefferson and Sterne,” Early American Literature, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1994): 19-34.  
For Jefferson’s remarks on Epicureanism, see TJ to William Short, 31 October 1819. 
 
 194 
next (and, eventually, into the world).  In doing so, Rousseau believed that educators 
could effectively gain more by learning to lose time.83   
A habit of industry was not all that Jefferson sought to cultivate in his affectionate 
mentees.  Since precepts could not possibly instill virtue into the minds of youth—at 
least, not sufficiently—a more effective technique was needed.  Antiquity furnished 
Jefferson with a host of excellent sources from which to draw the various lessons in 
morality that he felt were indispensible to republican children.  Since example over 
precept was the general rule of thumb, a survey of ancient authors, such as Polybius, 
Epictetus, Cicero, and Xenophon, among others, would provide a solid foundation from 
which Jefferson’s charges could draw moral inspiration.84  Most of the authors on 
Jefferson’s recommended reading lists offered unparalleled accounts of the histories of 
nations, government, and morals by way of carefully constructed narrative and the use of 
poignant examples.  These were not merely forays into ancient history; such a course of 
study would presumably “inoculate the mind with a purified strain of experience” and 
“immunize [youth] to the seduction and contamination of the real world.”85  Just as Emile 
is immunized against the baneful effects of amour propre and the moral relativism of 
                                                
83 See Emile, 93: “Dare I expose the greatest, the most important, the most useful rule of all education?  It is 
not to gain time but to lose it.”  As William Payne noted at the turn of the twentieth century, “This is a 
century of haste; of all peoples, we [i.e., Americans] seem to be the most addicted to this vice, and the 
general drift of our education is to curtail the period of discipline and preparation.  We need…to be recalled 
from time to time to the duty of going slowly in order that we may go safely and well.”  Payne, trans., 
Emile, or Treatise on Education, “Introduction,” (1905).  Though the haste of which Payne speaks is a 
relatively modern phenomenon, Jefferson presaged the pandemonium of what we now call consumerism as 
early as the 1780s. 
 
84 See TJ to Peter Carr, 19 August 1785, PTJ 8:407-8 for a complete list of recommended authors.  See also 
TJ to Robert Skipwith, 3 August 1771, PTJ 1:76-81. 
 
85 Hellenbrand, 45. 
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bourgeois society, so too would Jefferson’s charges be safeguarded form the same.86   
Like Rousseau, Jefferson believed that the study of history was indispensible for 
republican statesmen (and for enlightened citizens in general).  Interestingly, Jefferson 
recommends Fénelon’s Télemaque to Peter Carr and others as a device for instructing 
them in true republican principles.  Telemachus, a young man roughly equal in age to 
both Peter Carr and Emile, travels the world in search of his father, Ulysses.  In their 
travels, Telemachus and his tutor, Mentor, take stock of the virtues and vices of the 
people they encounter.  The point of observing the various laws, customs, and political 
practices of numerous foreign peoples is to help Telemachus glean an understanding of 
political right.  Throughout his journey, Telemachus is being molded for political rule, 
and the countless parables presented by Fénelon are in fact moral lessons that the reader 
is meant to internalize.   
 Written in the eighteenth century, Fénelon was read widely in Enlightenment 
circles, so it is no surprise that both Jefferson and Rousseau were familiar with 
Télemaque.  What is of interest is the way in which Fénelon’s approach to educating a 
future sovereign is mirrored in Rousseau’s prescriptions for and Jefferson’s practices in 
moral and civic education.  Fénelon’s narrative describes the travails of a fatherless 
young boy and his quest to discover true, eternal principles of moral and political right.  
The boy’s teacher is more than mere pedagogue; Mentor is indeed Telemachus’s dear 
friend, but Mentor is also a clever, contriving, God-like being who directs Telemachus’s 
                                                
86 While Emile’s studies and his experiences with the tutor help to immunize him and keep amour propre at 
bay, Rousseau also prescribes worldly travel.  Rather than merely reading about the trials and tribulations 
of other peoples throughout history, Emile will travel to foreign lands in order to experience these societies 
firsthand.  Jefferson does not discount the importance of worldly travel and, in fact, agrees that such 
experience is rather useful, though he does not see it as absolutely indispensible. 
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experiences behind the scenes.  Mentor is not Telemachus’s father, but he is, in no 
insignificant way, a father figure.  Mentor stands in for Telemachus’s actual father, 
Ulysses, who has all but abandoned his son.  Telemachus believes he is on a quest for his 
father, when in fact he is actually learning firsthand, from experience and observation, 
how to live and act in accordance with right and how to govern.   
 Fénelon has Mentor instill in Telemachus a sort of patriotism, or a genuine love of 
both his parents and his country.  But all that Mentor could do was attempt to nurture 
amor patriae in his affectionate charge; such a love could neither emerge on its own 
without affection, nor could it be coerced.  Like Telemachus, Emile also embraces amor 
patriae and all of its attendant obligations, including the obligation to return to his 
homeland and become a father.87  Just as Mentor and the tutor educated Telemachus and 
Emile to moral and civic virtue—and just as Telemachus and Emile were molded to 
become affectionate and founding fathers—Jefferson’s experiences with his own 
affectionate pedagogues and father figures obliged him to do the same. 
  
IV.  Conclusion 
Republican citizenship, for Jefferson, implies a healthy degree of individuality in 
conjunction with a strong sense of duty to others, two seemingly antithetical 
requirements.  Moreover, Jefferson has a rather nuanced understanding of democracy and 
what freedom entails for a democratic people.  Like Rousseau, Jefferson saw democracy 
and democratic citizenship as potentiality or possibility, a process of perpetual becoming, 
                                                
87 Emile returns home to become an actual father and an affectionate pedagogue for his children.  
Additionally, he has been molded to become something of a metaphorical or founding father in the political 
sense.  See Chapter Two. 
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so to speak.  In a remarkable, though concise essay on Jefferson’s legacy and the future 
of democracy in the United States, Douglas Anderson explores the notion of perpetual 
becoming as it plays out in a variety of Jefferson’s writings.  In the closing pages of the 
essay, Anderson underscores the significance of becoming by drawing attention to 
Jefferson’s original draft of the Declaration of Independence and to the revisions made in 
committee by Benjamin Franklin and John Adams: 
Where Jefferson had called his American compatriots a “people who mean to be 
free,” [the committee] substituted the concise and confident designation “a free 
people.”  It is easy to see the tactical reasons for the change.  But it is just as easy 
to recognize the basis for Jefferson’s own, wary approach to such a resonant 
claim.  What works for slogans and for songs is seldom true to the dark 
complexities of human experience…[Jefferson’s] belief in the continuing 
necessity to strive towards a yet unattained freedom for all continues to matter.  
We are not yet what we mean to be.  This is the anti-monumental message latent 
in the inscriptions on Jefferson’s tomb: a reminder that the house of the living, 
like the house of the dead, is never finished.”88  
 
It is this very notion of becoming—or the idea that democratic citizenship is a perpetual 
process of improvement and adjustment—that seems to be largely forgotten, if not 
missing from contemporary analyses of Jefferson’s republicanism and his thought on 
moral and civic education.  Perhaps unbeknownst to Jefferson, this is also a theme that 
pervades Rousseau’s, most notably in the Social Contract and Emile.   
For Jefferson, moral autonomy is paramount.  However, as Yarbrough points out, 
the “perfection of the moral character” is not something the state can legitimately coerce; 
such perfection “must always be an act of free will.”89  Still, for Jefferson there is a direct 
correlation between education, democratic citizenship, and self-government.  The 
                                                
88 Douglas Anderson, “Jefferson and the Democratic Future,” in The Cambridge Companion to Thomas 
Jefferson, Frank Shuffelton, ed., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 203. 
 
89 Yarbrough, xxii.  
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preservation of independence and self-government requires a certain type of education, 
an education that all citizens should receive, though Jefferson does insist that “[e]very 
citizen [also] needs an education proportional to the condition and the pursuit of his 
life.”90 Be that as it may, Jefferson’s theory of human nature posits that we have certain 
innate moral senses, including that of duty to others.  This, I believe, is the core of 
Jefferson’s belief that we are conscientiously democratic: we value self-government, 
individual liberty, and the preservation of individual rights; but we are also naturally 
social beings and, as such, we recognize that interdependence is a fact of life, that the 
mutual satisfaction of our wants and needs can be achieved only in and through society.91   
As a people, we are conscious of moral right, though, as Jefferson correctly 
insists, individuals are often tempted “by the seductions of self-love” 92 to deviate from 
right.  Human beings are born with the capacity to be morally autonomous; we are not 
born already in possession of the capability.  Hence, in order to turn potentiality into 
reality—in order to translate capacity into capability—certain faculties must be cultivated 
and certain habits positively reinforced.  But cultivating a reverence for right and 
reinforcing the habits necessary to develop moral autonomy in the individual are not 
goals that can be accomplished simply through the use (force?) of law.  Rather, the 
                                                
90 TJ to Peter Carr, 7 September 1814, PTJ:RS:638. 
 
91 On the role of society and Jefferson’s understanding of the public/private dichotomy, see Jan Lewis, 
“‘The Blessings of Domestic Society’: Thomas Jefferson’s Family and the Transformation of American 
Politics,” in Jeffersonian Legacies, Peter S. Onuf, ed., 109-146 (Charlottesville, VA: The University Press 
of Virginia, 1993).  See also Frank Shuffelton, “Binding Ties: The Public and the Domestic Spheres in 
Jefferson’s Letters to His Family,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen, James Gilreath, ed., 
28-47 (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1999).  See also Jan Lewis’s rejoinder in the same volume, 
“Jefferson, the Family, and Civic Education” (63-75).  
 
92 TJ to Nemours, April 24, 1816, Writings, 1386. 
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development and reproduction of conscientious democrats is accomplished, in part, 
through instruction by example. 
As Jan Lewis points out, “Jefferson assumed and sought to encourage a family 
bound by affection rather than force.”93  However, the affectionate family Jefferson 
romanticized would, in all likelihood, find itself forced to retreat from the world.  This 
also seems to be the outcome of Emile’s education: Emile learns self-sufficiency and 
paternal affection, among other things, but he ultimately retreats from the world.94  Yet, 
as Frank Shuffelton understands him,  
Jefferson…did not intend that the family would become a refuge from the world; 
instead, [Jefferson] believed it should be a training ground for participation in 
vigorous public life…Shaped by a still influential republican ideology, 
[Americans in Jefferson’s time] attempted to socialize their children with the 
understanding that public, civic life was worth the concern of every citizen; 
moved by eighteenth-century currents of sentimentalism and romanticism, they 
also sought to make the family a place which could nurture the child’s emotional 
and affective identity.95 
   
This is exactly what Rousseau sought to accomplish as well.  His goal is not necessarily 
to make Emile retreat from public life.  In fact, Emile is taught that he has certain duties 
toward society—he has obligations to learn about and participate in civic life, among 
other things.  However, the possibility of Emile eventually retreating from a world in 
which others do not share his sense of duty is very likely.  Rousseau’s goal, as I have read 
him, is to make Emile an example and, of course, for others to educate their children as 
                                                
93 Jan Lewis, “Jefferson, the Family, and Civic Education,” in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a 
Citizen, 68. 
 
94 The disaster that ensues in Rousseau’s unfinished sequel to Emile is prefaced by these very worries.  A 
similar disaster unfolds in Julie. 
 
95 Frank Shuffelton, “Binding Ties: The Public and Domestic Spheres in Jefferson’s Letters to His Family,” 
in Thomas Jefferson and the Education of a Citizen, 45-6. 
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the tutor has educated Emile, so as to avoid the eventual (and almost inevitable) retreat 
into the private realm.  This, too, seems to be Jefferson’s aim, as I understand him. 
Still, Lewis is right to conclude that Jefferson viewed the family with an eye more toward 
affection than power: “The family, for Jefferson, was a natural unit ruled by love; it could 
be trusted to govern itself.”96   
The educations of Telemachus and Emile might be ideal, but they are far from 
practical.  Nevertheless, Jefferson borrowed what was possible from the ideal and grafted 
it onto the reality of Virginia’s political landscape as best he could.  Thus, the ward 
system and the public schools replace but do not supplant private education.  Nor do 
affectionate mentors fall by the wayside in Jefferson’s plans.  Affectionate mentors, it 
seems, are the real guardians of liberty in Jefferson’s vision, insofar as they are 
responsible for ensuring the development of republican virtue in children.  For Jefferson, 
affectionate mentors are the sentinels of republican citizenship, the cynosures of the 
nation; they are nothing more and nothing less. 
                                                
96 Lewis, 71. 
 
 201 
CONCLUSION 
 
An honest heart being the first blessing, a knowing head is the second.1 
 
 
In order to demonstrate the affinity in principle between Rousseau and Jefferson, I have 
compared their moral, political, and educational thought in several ways.  I would like to 
conclude by returning to some of the more significant comparisons I have drawn 
throughout the dissertation and addressing some of the points of contention between 
Jefferson and Rousseau.  I began with Rousseau’s rather cryptic account of the general 
will and later I returned to Jefferson’s staunch defense of majority rule in order to 
highlight their common commitment to democracy and self-government.  I also 
considered how the Virginian and the Genevan regarded representation as a flawed, 
though unavoidable instrument of republican government and I noted how Rousseau’s 
argument for a periodic reaffirmation of the social contract is, in principle, not unlike 
Jefferson’s theory of generational sovereignty and his dedication to the “rights of the 
living.”  Next, I drew a brief comparison between Rousseau’s thoughts on federative 
unions and subsidiarity and Jefferson’s belief in the utility of ward democracy.  After 
exploring the ways in which their respective thoughts on democratic government overlap, 
I turned to a discussion of the similarities between Rousseau’s civil religion and 
Jefferson’s republicanized Christianity.  Lastly, I considered the important role of 
affectionate mentors and father figures in the moral and civic education of republican 
children.   
Chapter One illustrated the ways in which Rousseau’s understanding of volonté 
générale serves as the cornerstone of his conception of democratic citizenship and his 
                                                
1 TJ to Peter Carr, 19 August 1785, PTJ 8:406. 
 202 
republicanism more broadly.  On my reading, Rousseau’s republicanism consists in a 
tripartite theoretical division, the first and most important being his account of the general 
will (upon which all else presumably turns); the other two parts deal with the functional 
features of the government and the social dimensions of the state.  I considered whether 
Rousseau’s conception of the general will—a political volonté générale— is sound, that 
is, whether Rousseau’s amalgam of freedom, will, and commonality (communauté)—the 
voluntaristic determinations of a people in common—is free from misapprehension.  I 
argued that while Rousseau cannot be wholly divested of incongruence, his conception of 
volonté générale can be disambiguated to a certain extent.  Additionally, I offered a new 
interpretation of the general will that, while certainly requiring a charitable (though, I 
think, not overly-charitable) reading of Rousseau, serves to render his notion of a 
political volonté générale more plausible.  It seems to me that Rousseau’s notion of 
squaring the circle might be somewhat misguided, though not ill conceived.  I suspect 
that his geometric design was simply not thought through as carefully as it should have 
been; perhaps my idea of approaching a mathematical “limit” helps us understand what 
Rousseau was driving at.  Put differently, the idea of making something what it is not—or 
attempting to make it what it ought to be—captures the spirit of Rousseau’s thought, and 
clarifying the matter in more precise, mathematical may provide a helpful model for 
understanding what Rousseau wanted to say.   
As noted, the second important feature of Rousseau’s theory involves the 
mechanical or operational aspects of his ideal republican state.  Here I explored the ways 
in which Rousseau attempts to reconcile the problems associated with political 
representation and the need to resort to such arrangements in modern republics.  
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Rousseau is ambivalent about representation, to say the least.  Even though he rejects 
representation on the grounds that the sovereign will cannot be alienated, he nevertheless 
seems to accept representation as a legitimate possibility under certain circumstances.  
Rousseau’s devotion to the idea of a federative union of European states seems to 
alleviate some of his concerns over the inalienability of the sovereign will.  Though it 
does not solve the problem entirely, the idea of subsidiarity—an idea built into the notion 
of a federative union—helps to ease some of the worries Rousseau expresses when it 
comes to representative government.  If representation is necessary in larger republics, 
and if it is desirable that citizens remain as close as possible to the political issues that 
affect them directly and personally, then the logical solution seems to be some form of 
federative union of republics wherein governmental responsibilities are divided up in a 
way that gives citizens a genuine share in law making (wherever possible) and the use of 
representatives is minimized as much as possible. 
The third aspect of Rousseau’s republicanism involves the social dimensions of 
the ideal state, or the need for social unity and its relation to politics.  The civil religion 
functions as a cohesive of sorts, a binding agent that secures the bonds between and 
among the people in a political community.  I argued that Rousseau’s civil religion is 
indeed a necessary feature of his republican state, even though it might be plausible to 
suggest that he merely included it in the Social Contract as a gauge for judging the 
legislator’s success.  Still, as I have suggested, Rousseau understood human nature all too 
well to believe in a future state in which individuals would not stand in need of 
something like the civil religion.  Even the best of people would need some something to 
bind them together and something other than law to restrain them. 
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In Chapter Two, I considered the other side of Rousseau’s republican project, 
namely, his theory of moral and civic education.  There, I posited two possible 
interpretations of Rousseau’s project based on a careful reading of Emile in conjunction 
with the Social Contract.  I suggest that the tendency to leave Rousseau suspended in 
paradox is simply the easy way out.  A close reading of Emile in conjunction with the 
Social Contract shows that a natural education of the individual both within and apart 
from society is required before that individual can become a genuine citizen.  Such a 
reading positions Emile’s education prior to the ideal civil society of the Social Contract, 
though such a reading also seems to discount the importance—indeed, the necessity—of 
the legislator’s work.  I argued that we need not read Rousseau in this way, and that a 
careful reading actually reveals the tutor and the legislator to be civic analogues.   
My aim was to show the ways in which Rousseau underscores the value of a more 
affective approach to moral and civic education—that is, an approach that affords 
primacy to experience and sensibility (or learning through guidance) over reason and 
precepts (or being taught through instructions and commands).  For Rousseau, an 
affective moral and civic education will consist in lessons that are felt, lessons that aim to 
cultivate the moral or common sense by speaking directly to both the heart and the mind.  
Rather than combating natural inclination and self-interest, such an education is grounded 
primarily in the affect: it proceeds naturally from sensory experience to ideas and then, 
eventually, to reason.  If we value a more genuine, deliberative democracy, and if we 
desire to produce conscientiously democratic citizens, then my reading of Rousseau 
suggests that a more affective moral and civic education is indispensible.  
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Having considered several salient features of Rousseau’s moral, political, and 
educational thought, I proceeded to consider Jefferson’s republicanism and his thoughts 
on moral and civic education.  In addition to placing Jefferson’s republicanism in context, 
in Chapter Three I began pointing up the affinities between Jefferson and Rousseau that 
had merely been suggested up to that point.  Although Jefferson’s thoughts on numerous 
political subjects evolved over time, his principled commitment to natural rights and the 
rightful (read: reasonable) will of the majority remained firm throughout his life.  Like 
Rousseau, Jefferson realized that the majority was likely to err from time to time and that 
this was simply an unavoidable feature of republican government.  No matter how well 
informed or well-intentioned public deliberations might be, no amount of information or 
education could eliminate the possibility of an erroneous public will.  This is one of the 
reasons Jefferson embraced the idea of generational sovereignty: in addition to believing 
in the principle behind this theory—that no generation can rightfully bind a future 
generation without its consent—Jefferson also saw utility in the practice of periodically 
convening the people to revise, accept, or reject constitutional arrangements.  Such 
periodic conventions could, in theory, help to rectify occasional legislative errors and 
abuses.  The point is that for Jefferson, as for Rousseau, public deliberations might not 
always be right, but the public could generally be counted on to realize the error of its 
ways and, in time, correct itself.   
Of course, finding a way to enlighten the public was one of Jefferson’s highest 
aspirations, if not his paramount objective.  Jefferson’s faith in the common man might 
have derived, in part, from his understanding of certain less-than-scientific inquiries into 
the nature and locus of the moral sense.  As Kames and Hutcheson understood it, the 
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moral sense operated on the human heart in an unmistakable way: individuals could 
discern right from wrong based on the impulses of the moral sense, with little assistance 
from reason.  The moral sense required cultivation, to be sure, and reason was required to 
operate alongside of it at all times, as Jefferson repeatedly insisted to Peter Carr.  For 
Jefferson, reason was indeed the “only oracle” individuals could consult when it came to 
public decision-making.  But it would not be pure reason Peter Carr would consult when 
making decisions of a public nature; nor would it be reason alone that citizens would 
consult in public deliberations.  Since the uprightness of the public will mattered more 
than anything else, reason ought to be guided by the moral sense at every turn.  As 
Jefferson understood it, the moral sense would, more often than not, help to produce a 
sufficiently general, majority will. 
In Chapter Four, I tried to show how Jefferson’s understanding of the role of 
religion in a republic mirrors some, though certainly not all of what Rousseau discusses 
in the Social Contract.  Jefferson’s civil religion can be thought of as a rational or 
“republicanized” form of Christianity.  I tried to show that, despite Jefferson’s rejection 
of institutionalized religious practices, he was deeply committed to the fundamental 
moral principles embedded in the Christian tradition.  Moreover, Jefferson firmly 
believed that the moral foundations of a more rational form of Christianity were highly 
apposite, if not indispensible to the creation of virtuous, independent citizens in the 
American Republic.  In other words, Jefferson recognized the value—indeed, the social 
utility—of an American civil religion grounded in the pure, unadulterated precepts of 
Jesus of Nazareth.   
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In Chapter Five, I took up the question of moral and civic education and the 
theme of fathers and founders in order to show that, in Jefferson’s republican ideal, moral 
and civic virtue turn on something more than merely the principles he articulates and that 
education to such virtue requires more than the positive prescriptions Jefferson explicitly 
discusses.  While we should be careful not to overlook his words, it is nevertheless 
important to look beyond what Jefferson wrote and toward what he did (or at least what 
he attempted to do) as a father and an affectionate mentor.  I tried to show that Jefferson’s 
understanding of the educative function of fathers and other affectionate mentors is 
similar to Rousseau’s portrayal of the tutor’s functions in Emile.  Among other things, 
Jefferson’s emphasis on an affectionate form of pedagogy, instruction by example, his 
appeal to natural rights and utility, and the importance of cultivating autonomous, duty-
minded individuals puts him in close company with Rousseau. 
Overall, Jefferson and Rousseau are remarkably similar on a number of 
significant levels.  In addition to the features I have outlined in the dissertation, there are 
several other points that deserve mentioning.  First, both Jefferson and Rousseau 
sincerely believed in the natural goodness of man as well as man’s educability.  Even 
though both recognized inherent limitations on the extent to which individuals could be 
educated, both agreed that individuals were, by and large, educable to at least a minimum 
degree.  Some are indeed more educable than others—Jefferson’s “natural aristocrats” 
and Rousseau’s Emile, or those who are made for leading, as it were—but all individuals 
of sound mind were capable of receiving an education that would allow them to be 
competent, responsible citizens.   
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Second, both Rousseau and Jefferson romanticized the agrarian way of life and a 
pastoral sort of republicanism.  Rousseau could only envision the pastoral, as he did with 
Clarens in Julie (and to a certain extent in Emile); Jefferson, on the other hand, did all he 
could to cultivate the pastoral at his beloved Monticello.  Both loathed the deleterious 
effects of urban society and both expressed a deep mistrust of commerce and 
manufacturing.  While Rousseau was free to abandon bourgeois society and retreat into 
himself, Jefferson could not.  Though he very much longed to retire to the domestic 
tranquility of his mountaintop estate, Jefferson reluctantly returned to politics on several 
occasions to serve his fellow citizens in a variety of capacities (for instance, his 
emergence from retirement to serve two terms as President and his service during a 
second retirement as the founder of the University of Virginia). 
Although Jefferson and Rousseau share much in common at the level of principle, 
there are undoubtedly important points at which they simply diverge.  For instance, 
Jefferson’s deep, principled commitment to freedom of expression made it impossible for 
him to countenance anything like the scheme for a civil religion that Rousseau prescribes.  
Jefferson’s “eternal hostility against every form of tyranny over the mind of man” leads 
him to foreclose on the possibility of public sanctions on non-believers (or better, non-
conformers).  Jefferson may have attended worship services and other religious functions 
during and after his presidency in much the same fashion (and for the same reason) as 
Wolmar does in Julie.  Moreover, Jefferson and Wolmar are, in many ways, akin to 
Rousseau’s great legislator: both stand above the people insofar as they understand the 
principles of political right and the best ways to translate these principles into practice; 
and, because they are sufficiently enlightened, neither needs the consolatory benefits 
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religion provides to ordinary individuals.  However, while Wolmar is indeed an atheist—
or better, a God-like figure whose atheism is merely a logical necessity required to 
complete his character construction—this much cannot be said of Jefferson.      
Jefferson was convinced that the American people were generally uncorrupted 
and lived in a place of great political possibility.  As a result, Jefferson tended to be rather 
optimistic when it came to the people and their prospects for self-government.  Although 
Rousseau remained unconvinced that a territorially expansive nation-state could be a 
cradle for republican virtue, he did believe that an uncorrupted people would be ideally 
situated for the legislator to mold them into virtuous republicans.  Still, Rousseau doubted 
whether a truly uncorrupted people existed in the eighteenth century; even the Corsicans 
displayed difficulties that caused Rousseau to have misgivings about their potential to 
become virtuous republicans.  The Government of Poland reveals Rousseau’s pessimism 
about real-world projects for constitutional revision: the Poles, nearly corrupted beyond 
repair, can only hope to patch up the disrepair into which their institutions have fallen; at 
any rate, the Poles will eventually succumb to the might of the Prussian army, so it 
matters little what they do in the interim.   
In a similar vein, Emile’s education might produce a moral man, a model father, 
and a virtuous citizen, but Rousseau holds out little hope for Emile’s happiness down the 
road.  In fact, in the unfinished sequel, Emile et Sophie, ou les Solitaires, Rousseau 
suggests that despite Emile’s virtue and despite his learning to bear the yoke of necessity, 
nothing in this world can forestall the inevitable; more importantly, nothing can shelter 
his heart from the pangs of betrayal and promises broken.  Whereas prior to his 
engagement to Sophie, Emile’s happiness was in his own hands and he was more or less 
 210 
impervious to the deleterious effects of civil society and amour propre, now he is 
vulnerable, and his happiness rests with Sophie’s will alone.  Emile does conclude on an 
optimistic note: a newly married man is about to embark on the most important calling of 
his life, fatherhood; but the sequel bespeaks the painful reality that forms a constant 
thread throughout Rousseau’s writings: the ideals that Rousseau goes to great lengths to 
construct—the model state in the Social Contract, the model man in Emile, the model of 
virtue in Julie—all succumb, in one way or another, to the acrimony of a world that is 
driven by corruption and a human existence that is marked by desire and despair.2 
Like the demigod of Clarens, M. de Wolmar, Rousseau himself stands to be 
something of an intellectual artificer when it comes to laying down rules and principles of 
political right.  In Rousseau’s mind, he has discovered these eternal principles (or at least 
he has come extremely close); though he will not admit it directly, he seems to see 
himself as capable of transmitting these principles to his readers and, by extension, to 
those who care to take seriously the founding of a republic and the education of citizens 
to moral and civic virtue.  Rousseau is under no illusion that the system he conceives will 
ever be realized.  He understands that people are simply too corrupted to engage in the 
enterprise of self-government as he has envisioned it; he is certain that education, public 
or private, can never achieve what Emile achieves; and he is confident that Julie’s 
                                                
2 Lori Marso has suggested that Rousseau’s projects ultimately fail because, although he “finds emotions 
absolutely necessary to initiate and sustain sociability, his fear of divisive interests and erotic passion 
toward particular others ultimately undermines his commitment to democratic community.”  Marso, “The 
Stories of Citizens: Rousseau, Montesquieu, and de Staël Challenge Enlightenment Reason,” Polity Vol. 
30, No. 3 (1998), 446.  Rousseau is certainly ambivalent about the prospects for success in any of his 
projects, but I would not say he has failed per se.  Instead, I think Rousseau tries to show why the ideal of 
detached, universal reason will not work in practice (if, in fact, it is much of an ideal at all).  His “fear of 
divisive interest” does not undermine his democratic commitments; he is simply trying to point up the 
dangers inherent in the suppression of divisive interest, much like Madison does in the Federalist.  In fact, 
what Rousseau says in Emile about interests seems to suggest this much.  There is, after all, a difference 
between properly directing passions and suppressing them altogether.  Rousseau is decidedly not after the 
latter. 
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virtue—what is, perhaps, an embodiment of the type of civic virtue he really believes to 
be necessary to good republican order—is nothing but pie in the sky.   
In certain ways, Jefferson too can be seen as something of an intellectual artificer.  
In fact, it is possible to view Jefferson as the American analogue to each of Rousseau’s 
three artificers.  Jefferson spent years constructing (and reconstructing) an idyllic, 
pastoral backdrop against which the bonds of community and family would be forged.  
Like M. de Wolmar at Clarens, Jefferson was both architect and overlord of Monticello: 
the day-to-day work of the plantation and its seemingly natural, fluid functionality was, 
of course, borne on the backs of slaves; the intricate design and flawless mechanics, 
however, are owed almost entirely to Jefferson’s intellect.  Just as Wolmar’s artifice 
ensures that the Alpine estate at Clarens functions flawlessly and with an almost natural 
rhythm, Jefferson’s Monticello marked time perfectly by the beat of his own mental 
metronome.   
In addition to being the intellectual artificer of Monticello, Jefferson also stands to 
be the analogue to Rousseau’s great legislator.  As the principal author of the Declaration 
of Independence, Jefferson’s role as a founder is obvious.  By articulating to the world 
the principles of the American Revolution and American republicanism—by giving voice 
to the American mind—Jefferson stood to be the metaphorical father of the United States.  
Of course, many others were involved in the Revolution but it was Jefferson’s mind that 
unified the colonists in principle, that justified Lexington and Concord, and that presented 
to King George—indeed, to the world—a concise, yet thorough statement of the 
American political creed.  
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Ultimately, what we get from my reading of Rousseau and Jefferson is a better 
sense of how each author wrestled with some of the more salient moral and political 
problems of the eighteenth century.  More generally, we get a better sense of how 
Rousseau and Jefferson attempted to meet some of political philosophy’s more pressing 
problems.  In their monumental study of the educational thought of the American 
Founders, Lorraine Smith Pangle and Thomas Pangle begin by considering a problem of 
perennial import in political philosophy, a problem with no easy solution, but a problem 
that is, in many ways, prior to all others.  In very broad terms, the problem is 
pedagogical: what is the best (or rather, proper) way to educate individuals to be good 
citizens?  To be sure, much is bound up in both the concepts of “citizen” and “goodness.”  
What does it mean to be a citizen?  What does it mean to be a good citizen?  Without 
considerable qualification, both of these concepts slide quickly into relativity and lose 
much, if not all of their meaning.   
Thus, it seems that questions of civic education cannot be answered in 
universalistic terms; the ends of civic education—and the means we choose to achieve 
those ends—are determined first and foremost by regime type.  Hence, John Adams 
insisted, in classic republican style, that moral and civic virtue were the pillars of any 
sound republic, and, more importantly, virtue must be the foundation upon which the 
American Republic was to be constructed.  However, as Pangle and Pangle point out, 
Adams repeatedly broached a larger and certainly more complex question with his 
inquiries into the relationship between moral and civic virtue: is virtue prior to or the 
product of a good political constitution?3  This question—and the attendant question of 
                                                
3 Lorraine Smith Pangle and Thomas L. Pangle, The Learning of Liberty: The Educational Ideas of the 
American Founders (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993): 2-4. 
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how best to educate individuals to moral and civic virtue—is a question as old as the 
republican tradition itself; as I demonstrated in Chapters Two and Five, this is also a 
question to which Rousseau and Jefferson devoted a considerable amount of time and 
energy to answering.  On Adams’s account, the cultivation of moral virtue depends 
largely, if not entirely on institutional arrangements, wherein “power [is] opposed to 
power, and interest to interest.”4  In slightly oversimplified terms, Adams (along with 
certain other Federalists) believed virtue would be the only logical (perhaps even natural) 
outcome of a sound constitutional order in which the rule of law prevailed.   
 But Adams was wrong.  The rule of law and good institutions are indeed 
necessary, though hardly sufficient to produce genuinely virtuous citizens.  Moral and 
civic virtue is not—and cannot be—the necessary outcome of well-ordered institutions 
and the rule of law.  Rousseau and Jefferson clearly understood this better than John 
Adams, and perhaps they understood it better than any of their contemporaries.  Their 
differences notwithstanding, the affinity in principle between Rousseau and Jefferson is 
unmistakable.  Bearing in mind the comparisons I have drawn, it should be readily 
apparent that Rousseau and Jefferson share certain fundamental commitments that, for 
one reason or another, scholars have largely overlooked.   
Finally, perhaps the most overlooked (or rather, underemphasized) way in which 
Jefferson is analogous to a Rousseauian artificer is in his capacity as affectionate mentor 
and father figure.  In addition to his role as the father of the University of Virginia (and, 
to an extent, elementary public education in his native state), Jefferson took it upon 
                                                
 
4 John Adams, “Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States,” in The Works of John 
Adams, 4:556. 
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himself to serve as an affectionate mentor to numerous charges throughout his life, in 
much the same way as others had done for him.  Jefferson learned the value of 
affectionate pedagogy through the examples of his own father as well as the various 
father figures he encountered at Williamsburg, individuals with whom he formed 
significant and enduring relationships.  But he acquired something more from these men, 
something that transcended the particular lessons in law that he learned from George 
Wythe and William Small, or the understanding of classical authors he derived from 
studying under Reverend James Maury.  Beginning with the example set by his own 
father at an early age, Jefferson learned that parents were obliged to educate their 
children; but more importantly, Jefferson came to see that this obligation extended to 
others as well.  As Hellenbrand puts it, when Jefferson took care to mentor Peter Carr, 
Robert Skipwith, and others, “his life echoed the designs of pedagogical philosophy and 
literature, as well as the solicitude of his own teachers.”5   
Jefferson’s crowning achievements are engraved on his epitaph at Monticello: 
beneath the obelisk is buried the “Author of the Declaration of American Independence; 
of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom; and Father of the University of Virginia.”  
The remarkable achievements Jefferson is lauded for are, in many ways, hallmarks of 
American republicanism.  But Jefferson’s grand political deeds would not have been 
possible in the absence of his affectionate mentors.  Likewise, the blessings of 
republicanism that flow from Jefferson’s deeds are difficult, if not impossible to realize 
when we fail to adhere to one important pedagogical maxim: the preservation of 
republicanism depends, first and foremost, on the cultivation in children of an honest 
heart and a knowing head.
                                                
5 Hellenbrand, 67. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Figure 1.  Artist unknown, The Providential Detection (1797-1800), Courtesy of the 
American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts. 
 
 
 
 
